Board structure, board process and board role performance by ONG CHIN HUAT
  
BOARD STRUCTURE, BOARD PROCESS  




ONG CHIN HUAT 






A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION 




I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor (Dr David Wan) and my 
thesis committee members (Dr Loizos Heracleous and Dr Rao Kowtha) for their 
untiring guidance, support and encouragement.  
 
Thanks must also be given to my former supervisor Dr Lee Soo Hoon and former 
thesis member Dr Phillip Phan for encouraging me to take up the PhD challenge.  Even 
when they are no longer working in NUS, they have continued to guide me along. 
 
Dr Hui Tak Hee, Dr Mak Yuen Teen and Dr Kulwant Singh also deserved special 
mention for their unselfish advice on the study. 
 
Thanks to the two hundred and twelve companies which participated in my 
questionnaire survey.  I also wish to express sincere thanks to the various industry 
representatives, board directors and company secretaries for their valuable time and 
insights in the face-to-face interviews. 
 
Thanks also to my ex-director (Ms Chow Kit Boey) and ex-colleagues (Anne, KC, Ah 
Mun, Ah Leng and Pascal) of NUS Consulting for their useful suggestions and 
continuous advice.  Thanks for allowing me to take leave and covering my duties when 
I was working there. 
 
Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my wife Alice, whose constant support and 
understanding assist greatly in the completion of the project. 
 
But, any faults and errors in this study are my sole responsibility. 
 
Ong Chin Huat 
2006     
 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
    Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i
    
TABLE OF CONTENTS  ii
    
SUMMARY  vi
    
LIST OF TABLES viii
 
LIST OF FIGURES ix
    
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 1
 1.1 Research Question 1
 1.2 Motivation For Study 2
  1.2.1 General Motivation For Study 2
  1.2.2 Specific Motivation For Study 6
 1.3 Objectives Of Study 8
 1.4 Contributions Of Study 10
  1.4.1 Theoretical Contributions 10
  1.4.2 Practice 12
 1.5 Organization Of Study 13
    
CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 15
 2.1 Corporate Governance Theories  15
  2.1.1 Agency Theory 15
  2.1.2 Stewardship Theory 17
  2.1.3 Resource Dependence Theory 18
 2.2 Board Role Performance 20
  2.2.1 Monitoring 21
  2.2.2 Service 22
  2.2.3 Strategy 22
  2.2.4 Resource Provision 24
 2.3 Board Structure 24
  2.3.1 CEO-Chairman Duality 24
  2.3.2 Insider-Outsider Directorship 25
  2.3.3 Board Size 27
 iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Con’t) 
 
 2.4 Board Process 27
  2.4.1 Effort Norms 28
  2.4.2 Cognitive Conflict 30
  2.4.3 Use Of Skills 30
 2.5 Importance Of Study Variables 31
 
CHAPTER 3 : HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 35
 3.1 The Structure Model 35
  3.1.1 Monitoring 35
  3.1.2 Service 36
  3.1.3 Strategy 38
  3.1.4 Resource Provision 39
 3.2 The Process Model 40
  3.2.1 Effort Norms 41
  3.2.2 Cognitive Conflict 42
  3.2.3 Use Of Skills 43
 3.3 The Mediation Model 44
  3.3.1 Effort Norms 45
  3.3.2 Cognitive Conflict 46
  3.3.3 Use Of Skills 47
 3.4 Concluding Remarks 48
 
CHAPTER 4 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 50
 4.1 Research Design And Sample 50
  4.1.1 Research Design 50
  4.1.2 Research Sample 51
 4.2 Research Procedure 56
  4.2.1 Pre-Survey Interview Period 56
  4.2.2 Survey Period 57
  4.2.3 Post-Survey Interview Period 59
 4.3 Research Measurements 60
  4.3.1 Board Structure 60
  4.3.2 Board Process 62
  4.3.3 Board Role Performance 63
  4.3.4 Control Variables 65
 
 iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Con’t) 
 4.4 Data Analysis 66
  4.4.1 Response Rate 66
  4.4.2 Comparison Between Survey Respondents And Non-
Respondents 
66
  4.4.3 Aggregation Analysis 67
  4.4.4 Reliability And Validity 69
  4.4.5 Transformation Of Variables 71
  4.4.6 Descriptive Statistics And Correlations 72
  4.4.7 Regression Analysis 74
  4.4.8 Path Analysis 75
 4.5 Concluding Remarks 79
 
CHAPTER 5 : RESULTS 81
 5.1 Response Rate 81
  5.1.1 Company/Board Response Rate 81
  5.1.2 Directors/Company Secretaries Response Rate 82
 5.2 Comparison Between Survey Respondents And Non-
Respondents 
83
 5.3 Aggregation Analysis Results 84
 5.4 Reliability And Validity Results 87
 5.5 Descriptive Statistics And Correlations  90
 5.6 Regression Analysis Results  92
 5.7 Path Analysis Results  96
 5.8 Further Analysis 103
  5.8.1 Breakdown Of Board Service Role Into Two 
Components 
103
  5.8.2 Breakdown Of Full Sample Into Two Sub-samples 107
  5.8.3 Extension of Conceptual Model To Firm Performance 112
 5.9 Chapter Summary 123
   
CHAPTER 6 : DISCUSSION 125
 6.1 Discussion Of Results 125
  6.1.1 Board Size And Board Resource Provision Role 125
  6.1.2 General Effort Norms And Board Role Performance 126
  6.1.3 Use Of Skills And Board Role Performance 128
  6.1.4 Cognitive Conflict And Board Strategy Role 131
  6.1.5 Outsider Directors And Board Process (General Effort 




TABLE OF CONTENTS (Con’t) 
 
 6.2 Implications 134
  6.2.1 Importance Of Studying Separate Board Roles 134
  6.2.2 Importance Of Studying Board Process 134
  6.2.3 Potential Of Extending Agency And Resource 
Dependence Theories 
136
  6.2.4 Possibility Of Introducing A Code Of Board Process 137
 6.3 Concluding Remarks 139
 
CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSION 140
 7.1 Limitations Of Study 140
  7.1.1 Second-Best Method 140
  7.1.2 Constraints Imposed By Sample 142
  7.1.3 Cross-sectional Design 142
  7.1.4 Generalizability Of Findings 143
 7.2 Areas For Future Research 144
  7.2.1 Application To Other Countries 144
  7.2.2 Application To Non-profit Organizations 145





Appendix A:  Study Questionnaire 170
Appendix B:  Pre-Survey Interviews 174
Appendix C: Survey Letters 191
Appendix D: Post-Survey Interviews 194






 This study examines and tests the relationship among board structure, board 
process and board role performance in Singapore listed companies.  Unveiling this 
relationship could help one to understand the formation of an effective board of 
directors. 
 Board structure concerns the affiliations, position and power of directors.  
Three issues are studied: CEO-chairman duality; insider versus outsider directorship 
and board size.  Board process refers to the ways in which directors interact and 
behave as they aim to fulfill their roles.  Three dimensions are identified: effort norms 
[general effort norms and meeting intensity]; cognitive conflict and use of various 
skills.  Board role performance means the ability of the board in executing its role.  
Four board roles are studied: monitoring; service; strategy and resource provision. 
 Three conceptual models are developed to test for the relationship among board 
structure, board process and board role performance: structure model (which tests the 
relationship between structure and performance); process model (which tests the 
contribution of process to performance) and mediation model (which posits that 
structure influences performance through process).   
 Based on 212 boards of Singapore listed companies and 16 face-to-face 
interviews, it is found that both structure and process affect board role performance. 
However, in view of its stronger impact on performance, board process appears to be a 
more important determinant than structure.   
 Briefly, the results show that board size is positively related with a board’s 
resource provision role.  Two board process variables (general effort norms and use of 
skills) affect all the four board roles of monitoring; service; strategy and resource 
 vii
provision.  General effort norms, cognitive conflict, and use of skills mediate the 
relationship between the proportion of outsider directors and board role performance.   
 The contributions of this study are as follows.  Firstly, the key aspects of board 
role performance (monitoring, service, strategy and resource provision) are examined 
simultaneously.  This contrasts with previous research which largely investigates board 
role performance in general or under the dominant agency perspective of monitoring.  
Examining various roles together in a single study furnishes a richer perspective into 
governance theories. 
 Secondly, the role of board process is explicitly considered when it is often 
inferred in the past.  The study has shown the importance of incorporating board 
process into board research.  Board process is more crucial than structure in 
influencing board role performance.  Future research on the various process 
dimensions of effort norms, cognitive conflict and use of skills should also be 
undertaken. 
 Thirdly, the use of the three conceptual models regarding the relationship 
among board structure, process and performance provides an alternative to examine 
and explain inconsistencies in past board research. 
 Fourthly, the study is conducted in a non Anglo-Saxon setting.  The data has 
served to extend the validity of the governance theories on board structure by 
suggesting the importance of incorporating board process variables.  In this study, 
outsider directors indirectly affect board role performance through board process.  The 
agency and resource dependence theories have long advocated the importance of 
outsider directors but seem to be relatively quiet on board process. The Singapore 
finding suggests the need for a more explicit incorporation of process variables into 
governance theories in any future research. 
 viii
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study investigates corporate governance in Singapore organizations.  The 
study examines and tests the relationship among board structure, board process and 
board role performance.  More specifically, the question of whether board role 
performance is a function of board structure, board process or both is investigated.  
Unveiling this relationship could enable one to better understand what constitutes an 
effective board of directors. 
A broad definition of board structure pertains to the organization of the board 
and division of labour among the directors (Tricker, 1994; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  
Thus, board structure deals with the affiliations, position and power of the directors.  
Three issues of board structure are covered in this study: CEO-chairman duality; 
insider versus outsider directorship and board size (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & 
Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999).   
Board process refers to the ways in which directors interact and behave as they 
aim to fulfill their roles (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
Based on the literature, three process variables are identified for examination in this 
study: effort norms [divided into general effort and meeting intensity]; cognitive 
conflict1 and use of different skills (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hackman, 1983; Jehn & 
Mannix, 2001; Shanley & Langfred, 1998).   
 
                                                           
1 Conflict in this thesis is defined in terms of the social psychological approach.  It refers to the different 
viewpoints and disagreement among group members.   
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Board role performance means the ability of the board in executing its roles 
(Cornforth, 2001; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Lorsch, 1997).  Based on the literature, 
four board roles are examined: monitoring; service; strategy and resource provision 
(Cornforth, 2001; Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 
1.2 MOTIVATION FOR STUDY 
There are two factors which motivate this study.  The first reason arises from a 
general need to verify whether and to what extent board structure and/or board process 
affects board role performance.  The second reason pertains to the importance of the 
research question in view of the unique characteristics of Singapore corporate 
governance. 
 
1.2.1 General Motivation For Study 
Current literature provides little consensus as to the specific configuration for 
effective board role performance.  The lack of agreement may result from the multiple 
roles fulfilled by directors (Daily, et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1996).  More 
importantly, the proposition of each board role is dependent on the chosen theoretical 
perspective (Johnson et al., 1996).   
Those researchers who posit that only board structure influences board role 
performance generally follow the argument by Pfeffer (1983), and Hambrick and 
Mason (1984).  In their propositions, they argued that it is not necessary to consider 
process as the latter can be inferred from the observable structural characteristics.   
The agency theory, for example, views executives as self-serving and 
opportunistic (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  As such, the most 
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important board role is to monitor the top managers within the firm (Fama, 1980).  To 
carry out the monitoring role effectively, a board structure comprising a separate CEO-
chairman position, a high proportion of outsider directors and small board size are 
advocated.  The first two characteristics facilitate objectivity and impartiality (Kosnik, 
1987; Rechner & Dalton, 1991).  A small board size allows for more effective 
functioning and prevents the CEO from controlling it (Jensen, 1993).  In contrast, the 
competing stewardship theory describes managers as having interests that could be 
isomorphic with shareholders (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997).  Proponents of 
this approach strive to enhance board-management ties and decision-making by 
empowering managers of the firm.  Stewardship theory thus stresses board service and 
calls for boards to advise the managers (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  Structurally, 
CEO-chairman duality furnishes a unity of command that may clarify decision-making 
authority (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994); insider directors offer operational expertise 
(Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk, 1991) and a large board size could provide multiple areas 
of expertise for advice (Dalton, et al., 1999). 
To a large extent, a board structure-board role performance justification is 
parsimonious: if one can show that board structure leads to board role performance, it 
is not required to explain how/why a board operates in certain ways.  This analysis is 
very appealing, as quantification of board structure is much easier than that of board 
processes.  It will overcome the difficult problem of gaining access to directors to 
obtain process data (Pfeffer, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Zahra and Pearce (1989), 
for example, noted that the overall low number of empirical investigations into board 
process can be explained by the difficulty of accessing boards for information. 
A second group of researchers argued that instead of board structure, it is board 
process which shapes board role performance.  As noted by Pettigrew (1992), the 
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central problem with research on boards of directors is that the majority of studies have 
been conducted outside from board activity.  The testing of various corporate 
governance theories is based mainly on secondary data.  For example, while board 
process is advocated in the agency theory, there appears to be a lack of documentation 
on how board decisions are made (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Stiles & Taylor, 2000)  
Similarly,  stewardship theory suffers from lack of empirical support and like agency 
theory, does not document on the importance of board process (Stiles & Taylor, 2000).  
The resource dependence theory has noted that directors bring skills to the company 
(Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000) and hence implicitly emphasized the importance 
of board process.  However, the theory has little information about the workings of 
boards (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Process theorists thus have two lines of argument.  Firstly, it is incorrect to 
infer board processes from board structure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Lawrence, 
1997).  A board with a majority of outsider directors will not inevitably show more 
objectivity.  For example, Bhagat and Black (1999) noted that as outsider directors are 
nominated by CEOs, many have turned out to be lapdogs rather than watchdogs.  In 
addition, a certain structure could involve various processes.  A large board size could 
lead to more skills available in the board, which is beneficial to board role 
performance.  In contrast, a large board is expected to exhibit higher levels of 
disagreement, which can be detrimental to directors in performing their roles (Dalton, 
et al., 1999).  As a result, the impact of board structure on board role performance will 
not be a one-to-one effect (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
 The second line of argument calls for research beyond board structure (Daily 
et al., 2003; Heracleous, 2001).  Past studies involving board structure have failed to 
yield strong research findings or result in more robust corporate governance in 
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practice.  It is thus hypothesized that an under-investigated board dimension – board 
process – could be the key to better board role performance.  Since boards are groups, 
processes such as effort norms, cognitive conflict and right use of skills, can be critical 
factors of board role performance.  As noted by Nadler (2004), the key to better 
corporate governance lies in the working relationships between boards and managers; 
the dynamics of board interaction and the constructive involvement of individual 
directors. 
The third group of researchers posit board structure to influence board role 
performance indirectly (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  They 
postulate that board structure influences board role performance entirely through board 
process and that it has no direct effect on board role performance.  For example, a high 
number of outsider directors will bring about a higher level of board effort norms 
which in turn could enhance the level of board monitoring.  On the other hand, more 
outsider directors could lead to disagreement among directors, which can be 
dysfunctional to the board’s advisory (service) role to management.  Investigating 
board process as a mediator variable between board structure and board role 
performance reflects the complexities of board dynamics.   
To date, there are no studies which simultaneously test the three alternative 
views on the relationship among board structure, board processes and board role 
performance.  This study will fill an important gap in governance research. 
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1.2.2 Specific Motivation For Study 
A study on board of directors is important for the corporate governance scene 
in Singapore.  This is because Singapore corporate governance has its own unique 
characteristics vis-à-vis U.S. or U.K.  Mak and Li (2001) noted three such features.  
First is the rarity of hostile takeovers in Singapore.  The method of undertaking 
business in Asia is characterized by steering clear of aggression, confrontation and 
bitterness.  In addition, merchant bankers are more careful about supporting takeover 
deals and will seek clearance from relevant government authority before undertaking 
such business.  As a result, when compared to the U.S., there is the lack of external 
mechanism of takeovers to control managerial behaviour.  The second characteristic is 
the relatively high ownership of shares by blockholders in Singapore.  In their study of 
147 listed Singapore companies, Mak and Li (2001) found that the mean and median 
share ownership by blockholders (denoted as those holding 5% or more of voting 
stock) are 62 per cent and 63 per cent respectively.  Consequently, protection of 
minority shareholders can be expected to be lower in Singapore.  The third feature is 
the significant ownership of private sector by the government.  In Mak and Li’s study 
(2001), the Singapore government owned over 20 per cent in more than 10 per cent of 
Singapore listed companies.  With substantial government ownership, it is also more 
difficult to launch takeover attempts in this country.   
Mak and Li (2001) also argued that as compared to non-government linked 
companies (non-GLCs), GLCs may have weaker governance.  Firstly, GLCs will take 
cues from the government.  Such signals may concern the well being of the nation 
more than the company.  Secondly, being government-owned, GLCs are less 
pressurized to pay dividends to shareholders and obtain other sources of financing.  
Thirdly, as the government takes a long term view of investment in the GLCs, it is 
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unlikely to support solicited takeover offers for GLCs and to monitor the investments 
in GLCs very actively.   
Corporate governance may be weaker in Singapore in view of the lack of 
takeover and high ownership of shares by blockholders.  Singapore, like Canada, has 
laws with oppression remedies to protect the rights of minority shareholders (Phan, 
1998).  But it may not be sufficient.  This has thus made boards of directors in 
Singapore to be a more important internal mechanism (Mak & Li, 2001; Phan, 1998).  
As argued by Phan (1998), directors, in evaluating the strategic decisions, must be 
transparent as to the effect on shareholder value.  They should not be compelled into 
taking steps that will benefit the majority shareholder.  An effective board is an 
ingredient of good corporate governance in Singapore. 
Moreover, the collective shareholdings of the government make it a potent 
force for corporate governance reform.  The government through its various holding 
companies, for example, Temasek Holdings and The Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation, already has a big say in terms of board appointments.  The 
fact that many of the boards of the GLCs are staffed by high ranking civil servants, or 
ex-civil servants suggest the influence of the government (though after these board 
members are appointed, they are generally left to run the companies).  Since the GLCs 
are also frequently among the largest listed companies in Singapore, their structures 
and practices are in a position to be held as a model for other listed companies (Koh, 
1999). 
The legal focus thus falls on the directors, in particular their role in ensuring 
corporate governance practices.  First is that he/she has a duty to act in the best interest 
of the company.  Second is that he/she has a duty not to place himself/herself in a 
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position where his/her duty to the company and his/her personal interests may conflict.  
Third is that he/she has a duty to act for proper purposes (Koh, 1999). 
With increasing globalization, the role and influence of foreign institutional 
investors will only get more prominent in Singapore.  As the government continues to 
open and develop the funds management industry, the ownership of companies by 
mutual funds will likely increase.  Consequently, the monitoring provided by these 
large institutional investors will possibly become more active (Mak & Phan, 2001).   
As foreign institutional shareholders are unlikely to possess similar national and 
cultural concerns as domestic shareholders, they will demand maximum shareholder 
returns.  There will be increasing pressure for board of directors to monitor and hold 
management accountable. Thus, in view of Singapore’s unique characteristics (weak 
market for takeovers, more concentrated stock ownership and significant government 
ownership), a study of board structure, board process and board role performance will 
thus further enhance the understanding and possibly contribute to the knowledge of 
corporate governance in the different environment of Singapore as compared to US or 
UK. 
 
1.3  OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
The following three issues are investigated:  
(a) To what extent does board structure explain variation in board role performance? 
(b) To what extent does board process explain variation in board role performance? 
(c) To what extent does board process mediate the relationship between board 
structure and board role performance? 
Accordingly, three alternative models are tested in this study.  The structure 
model hypothesizes that only board structure accounts for board role performance 
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outcomes.  The process model predicts that only board process contributes to board 
role performance.  Finally, in the mediation model, board structure affects board 
processes which in turn influence board role performance.  This model thus posits no 
direct links between structure and performance and predicts that all effects of structure 
will work through processes.   
The conceptual models are tested using a sample of 212 listed companies from 
Singapore.  Sixteen face-to-face interviews were also conducted to add some insights 
on the statistical findings. 
In market economies like Singapore, the vitality and strength of the private 
sector is critical to economic growth.  The company is often regarded as the engine for 
private sector growth.  With increasing globalization, companies are undergoing rapid 
fundamental changes. The quality of corporate governance is of particular importance.  
The presence of global multinationals in Singapore has also resulted in corporate 
governance practices moving from multinationals to local companies.   Every company 
is affected and “no one escapes” (Phan, 1998: 45). 
Past research in corporate governance has concentrated in U.S. and U.K.  As 
this study is conducted in a non Anglo-Saxon context, it has the potential to extend the 
governance theories or reshape them.  In a study by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
(CLSA), Singapore was ranked as the highest for its environment in promoting 
corporate governance among ten Asian countries (Leong, 2003).  Furthermore, in early 
1995, Singapore became the second country in Asia after Japan to be classified by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a developed 
economy (Zang, 2000).  As remarked by Brancato (2003), the Singapore corporate 
governance scene has improved greatly in recent years, especially after the 1997-1998 
Asian financial crisis.   
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In addition, as explained in the section 1.2.2, Singapore corporate governance 
has its own three unique characteristics vis-à-vis U.S. or U.K (Mak & Li, 2001).  First 
is the lack of hostile takeovers; second is the relatively high ownership of shares by 
blockholders and third is significant ownership of private sector by the government.  
Corporate governance may be weaker in Singapore in view of these three features.  
While Singapore, like Canada, has laws with oppression remedies to protect the rights 
of minority shareholders (Phan, 1998), it may not be enough.  This has thus made 
boards of directors in Singapore to be a more important internal mechanism (Mak & 
Li, 2001; Phan, 1998).  .  A study of board process and role performance among 
Singapore companies could thus lead to a contribution to knowledge in corporate 
governance. 
 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF STUDY 
1.4.1 Theoretical Contributions 
 Firstly, this study examines various aspects of board role performance.  This is 
in contrast to previous research which largely investigates board role performance in 
general or under the dominant agency perspective which emphasizes the board’s 
monitoring role.  Daily et al. (2003: 375) for example noted that “In addition to the 
monitoring role, directors fulfill resource, service, and strategy roles”.  Examining all 
four roles together in a single study may provide a richer perspective into board 
research. 
 Secondly, unlike traditional governance models, the role of board process is 
explicitly considered in this study.  Despite its importance, board process is still an 
under-investigated research issue.  The first reason is that traditional governance 
research tends to emphasize the structure-performance relationship.  Board process is 
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often inferred from board structure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Pfeffer, 1983).  
Secondly, the tradition of board members being cronies of the CEO has not 
disappeared, and boards often are reluctant to challenge a CEO, especially a powerful 
and successful one.  They often feel obligated to the incumbent for recruiting them to 
the board and often have strong social ties to the CEO.    To research behaviour of 
boards, one needs to conduct primary research with directors.  The examination of 
board process may hence close an important gap in governance research (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
  In addition to the limited investigation on board process, empirical evidence 
has also pointed to the need to study board process to better understand performance.  
A limitation of extant governance research is its near universal focus on a direct 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance (Daily 
et al., 2003).  Empirical evidence on this direct relationship has not been conclusive 
(Becht, Bolton & Roell, 2002; Daily et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997).  Researchers have thus questioned the assumptions underlying this 
linkage (Lawrence, 1997; Melone, 1994).  On the other hand, the results of the limited 
studies which have focused on process variables are stronger (Amason & Sapienza, 
1997; Ancona & Caldwell, 1988; Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, O’Bannon & Scully, 
1994).  In short, researchers are paying more attention to board process for board role 
performance (Kesner & Johnson, 1990; Monks & Minow, 2004).  Incorporating board 
process provides a more comprehensive picture to understanding the relationship 
between structure and performance. 
 Thirdly, the three conceptual models regarding the relationship among board 
structure, process and performance give an alternative avenue for researchers to 
explain inconsistencies in past board research.  This study also complements the 
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growing interest in opening up the “black-box” of decision-making that has been 
manifested in studies involving top management teams (Lawrence, 1997). 
 Finally, as explained in the previous section, the study is conducted in a non 
Anglo-Saxon setting.  While agency theory dominates corporate governance research, 
a growing share of the governance literature is coming from a wider range of 
theoretical perspectives (Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya, 2003).   These theories 
are intended to be complements to – not substitutes for – the agency theory.  A 
multitheoretic approach to corporate governance is necessary for recognizing the 
various board structures and processes that might enhance board role performance.  
While the agency theory is appropriate for conceptualizing the monitoring role of 
directors, additional (and perhaps contrasting) theoretical perspectives are essential to 
explain directors’ service, strategy and resource provision roles (Daily et al., 2003; 
Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  The Singapore data can therefore serve 
to extend and/or reshape the validity of the various governance theories.     
 
1.4.2 Practice 
 Firstly, the study allows a company to work towards an effective board by 
understanding the determination of board role performance.  The corporate board and 
governance failures of companies like Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia and Global 
Crossing, coupled with increasing pressure from the media, institutional investors and 
government, have heightened the need for boards to perform their roles better.  As 
boards lie at the apex of decision making in companies, understanding which board 
structure/process dimensions affect performance will allow directors to discharge their 
roles more effectively.   
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 Thus, understanding the determinants of board role performance is important 
for practitioners as boards are engaged in various important roles (Conger, Lawler & 
Finegold, 2001; Daily et al., 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  These include the 
monitoring role (e.g. planning for management succession and evaluating performance 
of senior management); service role (e.g. bolstering the company's image in the 
community and advising the senior managers on major decisions); strategic role (e.g. 
identification of possible threats or opportunities to the future of the company and 
shaping long-term strategy) and resource provision role (e.g. securing outside 
resources that strengthen the company). 
 Secondly, a boost to future empirical studies in Singapore involving primary 
data collection is provided.  Until recently, boards have been generally reluctant to 
provide access to data on board process.  It has to a certain extent dampened research 
in such areas. Attracting half of the targeted respondents to participate in this study 
shows that directors are willing to contribute to scholarly research in governance. 
 Thirdly, this study aims to explore the possible need to look beyond the current 
codes of corporate governance.  These codes have been directed at improving board 
structure (Phan, 1998), calling for board reforms such as the separation of CEO-
chairman roles, a majority of independent directors and a certain board size.  In view 
of the growing awareness of board process, there may be a need for government and 
other institutions to consider introducing/incorporating a code of board process.   
 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The dissertation is organized into seven chapters.  Following the introductory 
chapter, Chapter Two covers the literature review while Chapter Three concentrates on 
the hypotheses development.  Chapter Four describes the data and methodology used 
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in this study.  In Chapter Five, key findings are presented.  The discussion of results is 
found in Chapter Six.  Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the study.  This chapter 
discusses the limitations, presents some possible areas for future research and outlines 
the contributions of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, an overview of three corporate governance theories – agency, 
stewardship and resource provision – is firstly presented.  In the next section, the 
definitions of board role performance, board structure and board process are covered.  
As definitions adopted by researchers are often not uniform, explaining them reduces 
the amount of controversy and establishes the positions taken in the thesis.  The 
importance question is then discussed to identify the research worthiness of the key 
study variables.  
 
2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES 
2.1.1 Agency Theory 
Rooted in finance and economics, the agency theory is often regarded as the 
most well-developed and longest established perspective that has been used to explain 
the contributions made by boards to performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Davis et al., 
1997).  Its popularity is due to two reasons (Daily et al., 2003).  Firstly, the theory is 
simple.  A firm is reduced to only two participants (managers and shareholders).  The 
interests of each group are assumed to be both clear and consistent.  Secondly, the idea 
of humans being self-interested and generally unwilling to sacrifice one’s own needs 
for the benefit of others is both traditional and prevalent.  For example, Berle and 
Means (1932) noted that shareholders have three interests.  The first is that the 
company should be able to earn the maximum profit under an acceptable degree of 
risk; the second is that the shareholders want to have as large a proportion of profits to 
be distributed to them as possible, and third, the company’s stock should remain freely 
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marketable at a fair price.  A manager, in contrast, has only one major aim, that is, to 
run the company for his maximum utility that may be at the expense of the 
shareholders. 
Supporters of the agency theory thus argued that firms need to align the 
interests of managers with the shareholders.  Three structural measures applicable to 
this thesis are the separation of CEO and chairman because the CEO cannot both 
represent the shareholders and management due to conflict of interest (Rechner & 
Dalton, 1991); inclusion of a high proportion of outside directors to monitor the 
performance of the CEO and other managers (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) and 
having a small board size for more effective functioning (Jensen, 1993).  
Board process is generally advocated in this theory.  According to Zahra and 
Pearce (1989:301), “Agency theorists have shown more attention to board decision 
making processes . . . This emphasis is consistent with agency theorists’ interest in 
how boards perform their job and how they monitor managerial actions to reduce 
agency cost”.  
Agency proponents adopt a broad definition of board roles.  Monitoring is the 
most important board task, followed by service and strategy (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  
As board of directors lie at the “apex of the internal control system” (Jensen, 1993: 
862), board monitoring is the primary role.  Directors are responsible for key 
monitoring functions that include hiring, firing, and compensating CEOs and the other 
top managers (Blair & Stout, 2001; Jensen, 1993; Johnson et al., 1996).   
For the service role under the agency theory, a separate board chairperson and a 
high presence of outsider directors may serve as a sounding board for the CEO or 
source of confidential counsel (Dalton, et al., 1998; Jones & Goldberg, 1982; Spencer, 
1983).   
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As for the strategy role, Zahra and Pearce (1989; 302) argued that “agency 
theory places a premium on a board’s strategic contribution, specifically the board’s 
involvement in and contribution to the articulation of the firm’s mission, the 
development of the firm’s strategy, and the setting of guidelines for implementation 
and effective control of the chosen strategy”. 
Despite its popularity, the agency perspective has three limitations.  Perrow 
(1986) noted that the theory’s view of individuals as opportunistic and self-seeking 
may be too simplified.  Eisenhardt (1989) thus recommended that the agency theory be 
used with other theories because the agency perspective “presents a partial view of the 
world that, although it is valid, also ignores a good bit of the complexity of 
organizations.  Additional perspectives can help to capture the greater complexity” (p. 
71).  The second limitation of the agency theory is that while acknowledging its 
significance, there is the lack of literature on how a board functions (Stiles & Taylor, 
2000; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Thirdly, although the agency perspective emphasizes 
the importance of the board’s service and strategic roles, there appears to be a lack of 
empirical evidence (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Stiles & Taylor, 2000; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989).   
 
2.1.2 Stewardship Theory 
While agency proponents see managers as self-serving and opportunistic, 
supporters of stewardship theory, tapping insights from sociology and psychology, 
view them as frequently having interests that are similar with shareholders (Davis, et 
al., 1997).  However, this does not mean that stewardship theorists behold managers as 
altruistic; rather they believe that there are many situations in which managers 
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conclude that in serving shareholders’ needs, their own interests are also fulfilled 
(Lane, Cannella & Lubatkin, 1998). 
Stewardship theorists thus argue that directors should implement governance 
structures and mechanisms to maximize the benefits of a steward (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991, 1994; Fox & Hamilton, 1994).  For managers who are stewards, their pro-
organizational actions are best facilitated when the board structure give them high 
authority and discretion (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  Structurally, this situation is 
attained more readily if the CEO is also chair of the board of directors; the board is an 
insider-dominated entity and the board is large.  The CEO-chair who is unambiguously 
responsible for the fate of the corporation will have the power to make decisions 
without fear of countermand by an outside chair of the board (Davis et al., 1997).   
Insider directors are valued for their operational expertise (Baysinger et al., 1991) 
while a large board will provide varied insights into effective management (Dalton et 
al., 1999).  Board service is thus the board role advocated under the stewardship 
theory.  The board is to advise the managers to enhance board-management ties and 
decision-making (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).   
Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory is much less established.  Therefore, 
it suffers from a lack of empirical support.  In addition, the theory ignores the inner 
workings of the boards (Stiles & Taylor, 2000).   
 
2.1.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence perspective stems from streams in economics and 
sociological research (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Proponents of this perspective see 
boards of directors as a means to manage external dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
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1978), decrease environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972), and reduce transaction 
costs associated with environmental interdependency (Williamson, 1984).   
In terms of board structure, resource dependence theory emphasizes the 
importance of having outside directors who are able to provide resources and 
information as well as facilitate inter-firm commitments.  A board chairman who is 
different from the CEO of a company may also be in a better position to serve as a link 
with the external environment and bring resources to the firm, such as information, 
skills, access to key constituents (for example, suppliers, buyers, policy makers and 
social groups) and legitimacy.  The provision of such resources is expected to be more 
difficult if the chairman is the same person as the CEO (Dalton et al., 1998).  In this 
theory, board size is often taken as a measure of an organization’s ability to form 
environmental links to secure critical resources (Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994).  
A larger board is associated with a firm’s ability to extract critical resources such as 
size of budget, external funding and leverage from the environment (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Provan, 1980).     
Board process is emphasized in the resource dependence theory under the area 
of skills.  Conger et al. (2001) noted that as directors do not meet frequently, the 
members are unlikely to be as effective as many other teams.  This point, however, 
only serves to emphasize the importance of doing everything possible to make them 
effective as a working group.  As most decisions are complex, they require multiple 
perspectives.  Boards therefore need individuals who can pool their best skills in order 
to produce a high-quality outcome.  The primary role of the board, in the resource 
dependence theory, is to serve as resource providers (Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 
2003).  Stiles and Taylor (2000) also argued that the board’s boundary spanner activity 
contributes to the strategy role by bringing in new strategic information. 
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Like the agency and stewardship theories, the resource dependence theory 
largely ignores the details about the inner workings of the boards and their 
involvement in decision-making (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 Table 2.1 provides a summary on the three corporate theories applicable to this 
thesis.  In the next section, the study variables of board structure, process and role 
performance are explained in more detail. 
 Table 2.1: Corporate Governance Theories 
Dimension Agency  Stewardship Resource Dependence 
Foundation 
 
Economics & Finance Psychology & Sociology Economics & 
Sociology 
Board Structure CEO and chairman to 
be different persons 
CEO and chairman to be 
same person 
CEO and chairman to 
be different persons 
 Outside directors 
advocated 
Inside directors advocated Outside directors 
advocated 
 Small board size 
 




Advocated in general 
term 
Advocated in very 
general term 
Advocated in the area 
of skills 
Board’s Primary Role 
 
Board’s Other Roles 
Monitoring 
 









2.2 BOARD ROLE PERFORMANCE 
 Board role performance is generally denoted as a board’s ability to perform its 
roles (Cornforth, 2001; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Lorsch, 1997).  Based on the 
literature, there are four board roles: monitoring; service; strategy and resource 
provision (Daily et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Daily et al. 
(2003: 375) remarked that “In addition to the monitoring role, directors fulfill resource, 
service, and strategy roles”.  Research may yield more productive results if all the four 




 Monitoring is a very crucial board role (Fama, 1980; Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1997) as boards of directors are “the apex of the internal control system” 
(Jensen, 1993: 862).  The monitoring role comprises of aspects such as how CEOs are 
chosen and rewarded; evaluation of CEOs and company performance and how 
shareholders’ wealth can be maximized (Blake, 1999; Westphal, 1999). 
 A board is presumed to carry out the monitoring function on behalf of 
shareholders, because the shareholders themselves may find it difficult to exercise 
control due to the wide dispersion of ownership of common stock.  The theoretical 
premise of the monitoring role comes from the agency perspective.  In this perspective, 
boards have to monitor the top managers in view of the potential conflicts between the 
shareholders (or owners) and the managers (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 
1983).   
 The problem of monitoring is hence endemic to most large corporations with 
diffused ownership, because an individual shareholder lacks sufficient stake in the firm 
to justify spending resources to closely monitor managers.  This often leads to a free 
rider problem, as shareholders, individually, attempt to "free ride" on others to monitor 
managers (John & Senbet, 1998).   
On the other hand, in such a situation, management may also cooperate with 
major shareholders for decisions which could be disadvantageous to the minority 
shareholders.  In countries with weak external mechanisms (for example, takeovers, 
divestures and ownership amendments) and presence of large blockholders, the 





 The board service role pertains to directors giving advice to top managers and 
promoting the reputation of the company externally (Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989).  Agency theory proponents argue that directors facilitate management 
decisions by providing valuable advice to CEOs and managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983).   
Stewardship theorists also argue that to enhance board-management relationship and 
decision-making, directors should offer candid advice and be confident that executives 
will consider their views (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). 
Based on accounts from directors and managers, directors do devote a 
considerable proportion of time and support to advising the CEO (Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989; Useem, 1993).  The service role is most visible in organizations where board 
monitoring is less required as a result of strong alternative monitoring forces such as 
product and managerial labour market (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  It may also be 
especially important in small and entrepreneurial firms.  Specifically, managers could 
benefit from the breadth of knowledge that outsider directors provide (Daily & Dalton, 
1992; Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave & Taylor, 1993). 
 
2.2.3 Strategy 
The board's role in strategy ranges from articulation of strategy mission to 
review of strategy implementation (Stiles & Taylor, 2000; Zahra, 1990).  The strategy 
role can be undertaken in four ways: (a) through setting and actively reviewing the 
corporate definition - the "what business are we in" question; (b) through the 
gatekeeping function - actively assessing and reviewing strategic proposals, and often 
changing proposals through comment and advice; (c) through confidence-building - 
encouraging managers with good track records in their strategic aims and (d) through 
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the selection of directors - the outcomes of which send strong signals to the rest of the 
organization concerning the type of person who succeeds and the standards others have 
to attain. 
Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) and resource-dependence theory proponents 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980) noted the usefulness of boards 
in contributing to the strategic discussions within a company.  Agency theory, for 
example, places a premium on a board's strategic contribution, specifically the board's 
involvement in the articulation of the firm's mission; the development of the firm's 
strategy and the setting of guidelines for implementation of the chosen strategy.  
Resource-dependence theory argues that, by increasing the size and diversity of the 
board, the links between the organization and its environment and the securing of 
critical resources (including prestige and legitimacy) will be strengthened.  This 
boundary-spanning activity can bring new strategic information. 
 However, as strategy is a broad term, directors are often unsure as what 
constitutes strategy.  For example, among the sample of directors from the U.K., 
opinions differed as to whether boards should have an initiating role, an approving role 
or a decision-making role in strategy (Demb & Neubauer, 1992).  It is also possible 
that strategy oversight could fall into board’s monitoring role.  Researchers such as 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Tricker (1994) have thus denoted the strategy role in 
terms of direction and planning (which will be used in this thesis).  Phan (1998) added 
that while directors cannot and should not take care of the company’s daily operations, 
they are ultimately responsible for setting the strategic direction. 
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2.2.4 Resource Provision 
The resource provision role refers to the ability of a board in bringing resources 
to the company.  Its theoretical underpinning can be traced to Pfeffer’s (1972; 1973), 
and Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) research on resource dependence.  The researchers 
argued that a director is expected to bring benefits to the organization.  These benefits 
include providing legitimacy (Selznick, 1949); providing experience (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990); linking the firm to important stakeholders or other important parties 
(Burt, 1980; Hillman et al., 2001; Pfeffer, 1973) and facilitating access to resources 
such as capital (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 1980). 
 
2.3 BOARD STRUCTURE 
 In a broad perspective, board structure refers to the organization of the board 
and the division of labour among directors (Tricker, 1994; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  
Board structure concerns the affiliations, position and power of the directors.  It thus 
deals with CEO-chairman duality; insider-outsider directorship and board size (Dalton 
et al., 1998; 1999; Tricker, 1994). 
 
2.3.1 CEO-Chairman Duality 
 The CEO is the top manager in a company, while the chairman is the leader of 
the board of directors.  Thus, the CEO and the chairman are presumably the two most 
powerful persons in an organization.  It is possible that the CEO is the same person as 
the chairman.  This situation is known as CEO-chairman duality.  Among U.S. 
corporations, the majority of companies have CEOs who are also the board chairmen.  
For example, in 75 per cent of companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500, the roles of 
chairman and CEO are combined (The Economist, 2003).  On the other hand, in U.K., 
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only about 10 per cent of the listed companies exhibit CEO-chairman duality (Higgs, 
2003). 
 Opponents of CEO-chairman duality believe that a chairman’s role should be 
different from that of a CEO (Cadbury, 2002; Dimma, 2002).  Separation of duties is 
assumed to lead to the following advantages: avoidance of CEO entrenchment; 
increase of board monitoring effectiveness; availability of chairman to advise the CEO 
and establishment of independence between board and management (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 2000).   
 In contrast, other researchers argue that if the CEO and chairman is the same 
person, the company could achieve strong unambiguous leadership; lead to internal 
efficiencies through unity of command; eliminate potential for conflict between CEO 
and chairman and avoid confusion of two public spokespersons addressing 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Allen & Berkley, 2003; Davis et al., 1997; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
 
2.3.2 Insider-Outsider Directorship 
 Perhaps the most researched issue with respect to board structure is on insider-
outsider directorship (Cochran & Wartick, 1988).  In the last several decades, there has 
been a dramatic shift from boards dominated by insider directors toward boards 
comprising outsider directors (Monks & Minow, 2004).  A principal reason for this 
change has been the growing concern that insider directors (i.e. corporate employees) 
tend to be self-serving. 
 Directors holding management positions are often known as executive directors 
in U.K., Australia and Singapore and insider directors in the U.S.  Conversely, those 
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without management positions are usually referred as non-executive directors in U.K., 
Australia and Singapore and outsider directors in the U.S.    
 A further distinction can be made between those outsider directors who are 
genuinely independent of the company affairs (Cadbury, 2002; Monks & Minow, 
2004).  They are known as independent directors.  On the other hand, there are outsider 
directors whose objectivity and independence can be questioned (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Monks & Minow, 2004).  For example, they might be former executives who are now 
retired from the company or the representative of a majority-shareholder, a significant 
supplier or a company banker.  While there may be a good reason for such directors to 
be on the board as they are likely to understand the company better (as compared to the 
independent directors), they are not deemed as independent because of sectional 
interests. 
 Independence is however not only a structural attribute, but also a 
psychological trait that gives rise to corresponding behaviours. Board structure may 
therefore be related to, but is not an adequate proxy for independence (Cadbury, 2002; 
Dalton et al., 1998).  The presence of independent board members does not imply that 
they have inherently higher standards of integrity than their executive colleagues.  It is 
simply that it is easier for them to take an objective view of whatever matters are under 
review.  They stand further back from the action; they bring outside standards on the 
issues and their interests are less directly at stake (Cadbury, 2002). 
Outsider directors are assumed to show more objectivity in their deliberations 
and more willingness to consider diverse views in making their decisions.  In addition, 
the presence of more outsiders in a board is presumed to be more conducive to debate 
and discussion of a firm’s mission, goals and appropriate strategy (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Rhoades et al., 2000).   
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 On the other hand, as outsider directors are part-timers with little knowledge of 
the firm, they may not have the time and expertise to do a good job (Rhoades et al., 
2000).  Insider directors have access to richer, fuller information about their firms.  
They may be in a better position to make decisions about many critical areas of firm 
operations.   
 
2.3.3 Board Size 
 The minimum and maximum numbers of members of the board are usually laid 
down in the company’s Articles of Association and can only be changed by a special 
resolution of the members (Tricker, 1994).  Board size can vary from two or three 
members up to large boards of twenty members or more.  Generally, the larger the 
company, the larger the board size (Dalton et al., 1999).  
 Board size is often taken to represent a firm’s ability to form environmental 
links to secure critical resources (Goodstein et al., 1994).  A large board is assumed to 
provide a firm with higher possibilities of resource acquisition and larger presence of 
skills (Dalton et al., 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).   
On the other hand, large boards can also result in a lack of focus; lack of 
participation and genuine debate and greater impediment to initiate strategic decisions 
(Dalton et al., 1999; Goodstein et al., 1994; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). 
 
2.4 BOARD PROCESS 
 In general, board process refers to the ways directors interact and behave as 
they aim to fulfill their duties (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003).  “Good” board process 
pertains to healthy and rigorous discussion on corporate issues and problems so that 
decisions can be reached and supported.  For this to happen, the board must be 
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characterized by a membership of able, independent people with different 
backgrounds, abilities and temperaments (Anderson & Anthony, 1988; Dulewicz, 
MacMillan & Herbert, 1995). 
 As boards meet periodically, there is always the possibility of process losses 
(Steiner, 1972).  This is the situation whereby the lack of interaction prevents boards 
from achieving their full potential. There is also the possibility of “social loafing” 
whereby individuals in the group fail to give their maximum effort to the task, perhaps 
thinking that they can rely on others in the group to do the group’s work (Williams, 
Harkins & Latane, 1981).  Boards are thus unable to achieve their full potential.  The 
effectiveness of the board is likely to depend greatly on socio-psychological processes, 
especially those related to group participation, interaction, exchange of information 
and critical discussion (Butler, 1981; Jackson, 1992; Milliken & Vollrath, 1991). 
 Unlike board structure, there are few detailed studies (including meta analyses) 
on board process (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Lack of 
attention to effective board process could be due to the difficulty in accessing board 
members for primary research.  Thus, the three aspects of board process chosen in this 
thesis are based on those advocated by researchers in group process:  effort norms; 
cognitive conflict and use of skills (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hackman, 1983; Jehn & 
Mannix, 2001; Shanley & Langfred, 1998). 
 
2.4.1 Effort Norms 
According to Wageman (1995), effort norms are the shared beliefs of groups 
for the performance of a task.  Effort, on its own, is an outcome of motivation and 
represents the vigour of an individual’s behaviour or total cognitive behaviour that one 
gives to the target task (Kanfer, 1992). Norms identify ways to channel this effort for 
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the group task (Goodman, 1986).  In essence, norms firstly represent a set of expected 
behaviour.  Secondly, these expectations are held and accepted by group members.  
Thirdly, group members will enforce the implementation of the expected behaviour.   
As such, norms are found to have a strong effect on member behaviour 
(Feldman, 1984; Steiner, 1972). Hence, strong effort norms are likely to strengthen the 
effort of individual group members which consequently enhance the performance of 
work-groups (Latane, Williams & Harkins, 1979; Steiner, 1972; Weldon & Gargano, 
1985). 
In general, the amount of time exerted has often been taken to represent the 
level of effort norms by directors (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Directors who put in 
sufficient time for board meetings tend to perform better.  It is because the most cited 
problem which directors face is the lack of time to carry out their duties (Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992).   
According to Monks and Minow (2004), the average Standard & Poor board 
met 7.5 times in 2002.   In contrast, for Singapore listed companies, the board met an 
average of 4.7 times a year in 2002.  Very large companies (more than S$750 million 
turnover) however held, on average, 6.8 meetings a year.  Board meetings were 
generally very well-attended, with about 53 per cent of boards having attendance rates 
of more than 90 per cent (Singapore Institute of Directors, Singapore Exchange Ltd, 
Egon Zehnder International, NUS Business School & PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003). 
However, time is not the only manifestation of effort.  Time spent on meetings 
may not be necessarily useful as CEOs almost always set the agenda (Jensen, 1993).  
Herman (1981) and Mace (1986) also cited empirical evidence to demonstrate that 
there are boards which go through the motions of attending meetings and registering 
votes, without careful consideration of issues facing the board.  Vafeas (1999) put forth 
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the quality of board meetings as an area for further research.  For example, the 
question of the availability of time for substantive issues beyond the routine, 
unproductive tasks remains a challenge to be examined.  
 
2.4.2 Cognitive Conflict 
Conflict is awareness on the part of the parties involved of discrepancies or 
incompatible wishes (Jehn & Mannix, 2001).  Jehn (1995) denoted cognitive conflict 
as the discord relating to the performance of tasks due to different viewpoints, ideas 
and opinions.  This results in critical analysis and discussion during meetings 
(Amason, 1996).  In such situations, CEOs/top managers may have to take a closer 
look at a company’s strategies through modification or improvement.  More 
importantly, the presence of cognitive conflict among directors serves as a reminder to 
management about the power structure of the board, that is, boards will not be simply 
“rubber stampers”. 
Moreover, examining alternatives and more careful evaluation of alternatives – 
methods which improve the quality of decision making – could arise from cognitive 
conflict.  Groups perform better when different viewpoints are exchanged during 
meetings (Watson & Michaelsen, 1988) and diversity of solutions is present 
(Schweiger, Sandberg & Ragan, 1986; Wanous & Youtz, 1986).  
 
2.4.3 Use Of Skills 
 In this thesis, the term “skills” denotes expertise, abilities and knowledge 
(Dawn & Helfat, 1997).  The use of skills will minimize process losses among 
members; encourage members to co-operate and subject members to joint action 
(Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Hackman, 1983; Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
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Directors need to use two types of skills to perform effectively.  One type of 
skills is functional skills and the other is firm-specific skills (Ancona & Caldwell, 
1988; Nonaka, 1994).  Functional skills pertain to the domains of businesses, including 
strategic thinking, analytical thinking and result-oriented outlook (Dulewicz et al., 
1995).  Boards, as the apex of a firm’s decision-making structure (Fama & Jensen, 
1983), must have directors with such functional skills.   
 The second type of skills relates to the firm.  Firm-specific skills pertain to 
detailed information about the firm, and an intimate understanding of its operation and 
internal management issues (Dulewicz et al., 1995).  Such skills include 
communications, interaction and management.  Board members need firm-specific 
skills to make informed decisions. 
 Outsider directors are likely to use skills different from insider directors.  
Although they may not bring firm specific skills they could have the contacts and 
reputation to build the businesses, as in the case of retired politicians. 
 
 2.5  IMPORTANCE OF STUDY VARIABLES 
 The principal driver for improvements in board structure, process and 
performance comes from the investment community and media.  In the last decade, 
there has been a dramatic rise in shareholder activism.  For example, Scherrer (2003) 
reported that U.S. institutional funds controlled 1.5 per cent of public listed stock in 
1975.  Ten years later, they owned about one-third of the shares.  In recent years, the 
figure has jumped to 50 per cent.  When boards do not improve their board structure or 
carry out their roles effectively, large institutional investors will move in and install 
new directors to take charge (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999).   
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Similarly, Coles, McWilliams and Sen (2001) argued that institutional 
investors, by virtue of the magnitude of their investments, have the capability to affect 
board behaviour.  The threat that such investors will sell large blocks of shares if the 
firm fails to provide an acceptable return, or is not responsive to governance issues that 
investors view as critical, is becoming a more significant factor in improving board 
accountability.  However, they do not have the time or resources to become closely 
involved in overseeing each firm.  The investment community hence has to depend on 
a strong board. They believe boards can directly enhance shareholder value because 
directors can intervene in crises, provide strategic guidance, and select, advise, and 
reward high performing CEOs.   
In surveys conducted by McKinsey, most investors noted that board practices 
are at least as important as financial performance when they evaluate companies for 
investment.  Over 80 per cent of the investors say that they would pay more for the 
shares of a well-governed company than for those of a poorly governed one with a 
comparable financial performance (Coombes & Watson, 2000).  A well-governed 
company is defined as one that has a majority of outsider directors with no 
management ties,2 undertakes formal evaluations of directors, and is responsive to 
requests from investors for information on governance issues. 
Institutional investors however may not always behave in the same way.  They 
could face different incentives/conflicts when voting on proposals (Brickley, Lease & 
Smith, 1988).  Institutional investors are divided into three categories with respect to 
their inclination to management influence.  The first group is the pressure-sensitive 
institutions – insurance companies, banks, and nonblank trusts owning at least one per 
cent of the firm’s stock.  The second group is the pressure resistant institutions – public 
pension funds, mutual funds, endowments and foundations owning at least one per 
                                                           
2 This is debatable as outsider directors may have social ties instead of management ties to insiders.   
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cent of the firm’s stock.  The third and final group is the pressure indeterminate 
institutions – corporate pension funds, brokerage houses, investment counsel firms, 
miscellaneous and unidentified institutions plus institutions owning less than one per 
cent of the firm’s stock.  The empirical results show that pressure resistant institutions 
are more likely to oppose management than pressure sensitive institutions as the latter 
could benefit frequently from business generated by management.   
In recent years, the media has been attacking the board and governance failures 
of companies like Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia and Global Crossing (Conger et 
al., 2001; Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2003).  Even within Japan, the role of the board has 
changed from passive to active.  Traditionally, directors are mostly made up of retired 
company executives and civil servants. The situation changed in the late 1990s with 
the collapse of Japanese stock markets and the continual poor performance of company 
corporations.  The media is demanding to know how the boards are making decisions 
(Yoshikawa & Phan, 2001). All the major business magazines also regularly feature 
articles on boards as well as publish special issues devoted to the assessing of 
governance practices (Stiles & Taylor, 2000).  For example, Business Week has a 
regular ranking of the top twenty-five and bottom twenty-five boards in America.  
Media coverage of boards is likely to continue to increase (Conger et al., 2001). 
While boards have previously been regarded as passive in previous decades 
(Mace, 1986), the growing power of investors and the media have to a larger extent 
pressured boards to play a more active role in company affairs (Coles et al., 2001; 
Judge & Reinhardt, 1997).  The demands made on directors have grown significantly 
and the issues with which they have to deal have widened by a great extent.  In an age 
of takeovers, mega mergers, and global competition, boards can no longer enjoy the 
luxury of passivity (Lorsch & Khurana, 1999).  They need to be active players in 
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shaping the companies.  Directors have no choice but to improve the board structure 
and board processes internally, and undertake their roles seriously (Cadbury, 2002). 
For example, the percentage of S & P companies conducting board evaluations 
surged from 37 per cent in 2002 to 87 per cent in 2003 (Felton, Berryman & 
Stephenson, 2004).  In the U.K., about 2/3 of the listed companies reviewed board 
performance annually in 2003 (RSM Robson Rhodes & London Stock Exchange, 
2003).  As for Singapore, about 20% and 84% of the listed companies formally 
appraise board performance in 2002 and 2003 respectively (Singapore Institute of 
Directors et al., 2003; Singapore Institute of Directors, Singapore Exchange Ltd, Egon 
Zehnder International, NUS Business School & PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004).  
Various performance criteria are used, such as measures pertaining to board processes 
(e.g. interaction among directors), board’s role towards development of company 
strategy, responses to crises and financial indicators (e.g. profits, returns on 
investment/sales and share price performance).  Overall, the empirical evidence hence 




CHAPTER 3:  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 In the previous chapter, a review of the literature on board structure, board 
process and board role performance was presented.  In this chapter, the relationship 
among the study variables, which forms the research question, is examined in terms of 
three conceptual models.  The hypotheses for this study are then developed accordingly.   
 
3.1 THE STRUCTURE MODEL 
 Pfeffer (1983) provided the basic rationale for expecting a direct relationship 
between board structure and board role performance.  The premise is that directors’ 
beliefs and behaviour can be inferred successfully from structural characteristics.  The 
argument is one of parsimony.  If research can explain that board structure affects 
board role performance, it may not be necessary to understand how the board works.  
This view is appealing, and has provided the basis for many studies on the effect of 
board structure.  The governance theories of agency, stewardship and resource 
dependence are used to develop the hypotheses in terms of the board roles of 
monitoring, service, strategy and resource provision.   
 
3.1.1 Monitoring 
 The hypotheses for the relationship between board structure and board 
monitoring role come from the agency perspective.  Agency theorists adopt a control 
approach aimed at cutting down the self-interests of managers (agents) that may 
negatively impact shareholders’ (principals) wealth (Eisenhardt, 1989).  A control 
approach stresses discipline (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  As noted by Fama 
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(1980: 294), the board is the “ultimate internal monitor . . . whose most important role 
is to scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm”.   
 Structurally, agency proponents thus argue that an impartial assessment of 
managers will occur more fully if the board is independent of executive management.  
Where the CEO is also the chairman (CEO-chairman duality), the impartiality of the 
board is compromised (Rechner & Dalton, 1991).  Similarly, since the insider directors 
are subordinates of the CEO, they will be either unwilling or in a very difficult position 
to perform a monitoring role.  On the other hand, as outsider directors are not part of 
the organization’s management team, they are less subjected to the same potential 
conflicts of interest that are likely to affect the judgments of insider directors (Kosnik, 
1987).  In addition, agency proponents such as Jensen (1993) argued that a small board 
is more effective for monitoring role.   When the boards get larger, they are less likely 
to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control the board.  Thus, under the 
agency theory, it is hypothesized that: 
H1: CEO-chairman duality and board size are negatively related to board 
monitoring role.  




 Board service role is advocated under the competing theories of agency and 
stewardship.  In terms of the agency theory’s board structure, a separate chairman 
position and the presence of outsider directors may serve as a sounding board for the 
CEO or source of confidential counsel.  For example, Daily and Dalton (1997) noted 
that under the agency theory, a separate chairman enables the board chair to function 
 37
as an advisor to the CEO.  Fama and Jensen (1983) noted that outsider directors may 
facilitate effective evaluation of management proposals by providing valuable advice.  
A small board size should be more beneficial for effective functioning.  As noted by 
Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994: 34), a small board size of eight or fewer members 
“engenders focus, participation, and genuine interaction and debate” for directors to 
advise management on company issues. Thus, under the agency perspective, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H3a: CEO-chairman duality and board size are negatively related to board 
service role.  
H4a: The proportion of outsider directors is positively related to board 
service role. 
 
While agency theorists see managers as self-serving, supporters of the 
competing stewardship theory argue that it is possible that managers’ interests are 
similar to those of shareholders.  Stewardship theorists thus suggest a collaborative 
approach between directors and managers.  Such an approach stresses service, calling 
for boards to advise the managers (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  Structurally, in 
terms of CEO-chairman structure, superior performance can be achieved if the CEO 
exercises complete authority over the corporation/board.  In this way, the firm’s 
leadership is unified.  There is no debate over any internal or external ambiguity 
regarding who is responsible for board outcomes (Davis et al., 1997; Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, 1994).    Furthermore, insider directors will be valued for their operational 
expertise (Baysinger, et al., 1991).  Outsider directors may not devote enough time to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the issues on which they make decisions (Cochran & 
Wartick, 1988).  As for board size, a larger board is expected to comprise directors of 
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different skills and backgrounds.  A larger number of directors will have more relevant 
experience and expertise to advise the CEO and managers (Dalton, et al., 1999).  Thus, 
under the stewardship theory, it is hypothesized that:  
H3b: CEO-chairman duality and board size are positively related to board 
service role.  




Both the agency and resource dependence theories cover strategy as a board 
role.  The two theories are similar in supporting a separate CEO-chairman leadership 
and outsider-dominated structures.  Agency theorists argue that separate board 
leadership is more conducive to debate and discussion of the firm’s mission, goals and 
appropriate strategy (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Outsider directors, in view of their 
industry exposure, are more likely to propose company strategies (Baysinger, et al., 
1991).  In contrast, while insider directors are likely to have better company 
information than outsiders, they may be reluctant to propose radical strategies as this 
may conflict with the CEO’s plan or it may seem that they are stealing the CEO’s 
limelight (Johnson, et al., 1996).  Resource dependence proponents see the advantages 
of having a separate chairman and outsider directors in a board’s link with the external 
environment for strategic information (Stiles & Taylor, 2000).  With this information, 
directors may be actively involved in the strategic arena by initiating their own 
analyzes or suggesting alternatives (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).   
 39
Hence, under both the agency and resource dependence perspectives, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H5: CEO-chairman duality is negatively related to board strategy role.  
H6: The proportion of outsider directors is positively related to board 
strategy role. 
 
Agency and resource provision theorists differ in their views about the impact 
of board size on board strategy role.  From an agency perspective, a large board can 
significantly inhibit a board’s ability to initiate strategic actions (Goodstein et al., 
1994).  Large boards are often overwhelmed by poor decision-making processes 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992).  In contrast, supporters of resource dependence theory 
argue that a bigger board size could serve as a wider link to extract strategic 
information from the environment. 
Thus, under the agency perspective, it is hypothesized that: 
H7a: Board size is negatively related to board strategy role.  
The competing hypothesis under resource dependence theory is: 
H7b: Board size is positively related to board strategy role. 
  
3.1.4 Resource Provision 
Resource dependence theory provides the theoretical foundation for directors’ 
resource role (Daily, et al., 2003).  Boards are important boundary spanners that secure 
resources for a company (Boyd, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  A board chairman 
who is different from the CEO of a company would serve as an additional link with the 
external environment.  This could reduce the level of uncertainty to the company.  
Moreover, a separate chairman can also bring resources to the firm, such as 
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information, skills, access to key constituents (for example, suppliers, buyers, public 
policy decision makers, social groups) and legitimacy.  As a result, in many boards, 
there is a prevalence of retired CEOs who serve as chairman of the board (Davis & 
Useem, 2002; Useem, 1993).  Similarly, outsider directors are crucial in securing 
essential resources for the firm.  They can bring more knowledge, efforts and debate to 
the board (Conger et al., 2001).  Outsider-dominated boards tend to attract more scarce 
resources (Provan, 1980).  By attracting or co-opting prominent members of the 
community to serve on their boards, companies are better placed to attract sources of 
funds.  Board size is often taken as a measure of an organization’s ability to form 
environmental links to secure critical resources (Goodstein et al., 1994).  A larger 
board is associated with a firm’s ability to extract critical resources such as amount of 
budget, external funding and leverage from the environment (Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 
1980).  Thus, under the resource dependence theory, it is hypothesized that: 
H8: CEO-chairman duality is negatively related to board resource 
provision role.  
H9: The proportion of outsider directors, and board size are positively 
related to board resource provision role. 
 
3.2 THE PROCESS MODEL 
The basic premise of the process model comes from Pettigrew (1992).  He 
asserted that it is necessary to go beyond the structure-performance approach in order 
to understand fully the performance implications of board characteristics.  As 
discussed under the structure model, there are conflicting hypotheses with regard to 
structure-performance relationships.  Furthermore, empirical evidence has questioned 
the assumptions of board structure-performance relationship (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
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1996; Lawrence, 1997).  At the same time, recent research has demonstrated the 
explanatory power of group studies on performance that incorporate process 
dimensions (Amason & Saprenz, 1997; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Cornforth, 2001; 
Smith et al., 1994). 
The theoretical basis for the process model is derived from social psychology 
research which analyzes interactions among group members (Smith et al., 1994).  As a 
board is essentially a group at the apex of a company’s decision control structure 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983), researchers have therefore hypothesized that an in-depth 
understanding of group process is important (Bettenhausen, 1991; Pierce, 1994). 
The process model will be explained in the following sub-sections in terms of 
the individual board process variables. 
 
3.2.1 Effort Norms 
Effort norms are a group-level construct that refers to the group’s shared beliefs 
on the level of effort each individual is expected to contribute towards a task 
(Wageman, 1995).  As directors only meet periodically, there is always a possibility of 
process losses (Steiner, 1972).  This is the situation whereby the lack of interaction 
may result in the board not reaching its full potential.  There is also the chance of 
“social loafing” whereby individuals in the group fail to give their maximum effort to 
the task, perhaps thinking that they can rely on the others to do the group’s work 
(Williams et al., 1981).  Strong effort norms among directors help to ensure board 
preparation, participation and analysis during meetings.  Developing strong effort 
norms is however difficult because boards usually spend little time together and have 
few opportunities to coalesce as a group (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003). 
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Some researchers thus reasoned that directors who devote sufficient time to 
their duties and seek out information they need are better able to perform their roles 
(Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).  Other researchers have gone a step further. They argued 
that effective usage of time during meetings is more critical.  Vafeas (1999) also noted 
that the quality of board meetings is an important area for further research.  Boards that 
spend similar amount of time can exhibit different levels of effort (Monks & Minow, 
2004).   
Thus, boards that have high-effort behaviour among members should be more 
able to perform their roles.  It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H10: Effort norms are positively related to the board role performance.   
 
3.2.2 Cognitive Conflict 
In cognitive conflict, open debate of different views in groups could lead to 
faster completion of tasks and more effective use of resources (Schwenk & Valacich, 
1994; Tjosvold, Dann & Wong, 1992).  Cognitive conflict within groups also 
encourages people to develop new ideas and approaches, hence enhancing group 
learning and assessment of situations (Baron, 1991; Foil, 1994; Jehn & Mannix, 2001).   
The presence of disagreement and criticism from the board may require CEOs 
to explain, justify and possibly modify their positions on important issues.  It serves to 
remind management of the power and role of the board and of the importance of 
considering shareholder interests.  This will improve the board’s performance of its 
monitoring role.   
In addition, the different views of directors should result in better guidance and 
counsel to the CEO and top management (Milliken & Vollrath, 1991). Cognitive 
conflict results in consideration of more alternatives and a more careful evaluation of 
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alternatives – processes that could contribute to the quality of strategic role of boards 
(Eisenhardt, Kahwajy & Bourgeois, 1997; Jackson, 1992). Finally, with cognitive 
conflict, firms may be able to obtain more valuable information (Amason, 1996).  This 
serves to reduce the transaction costs of dealing with uncertainties of the environment, 
thereby enhancing the resource provision role of boards (Conger et al., 2001). 
Thus, it is proposed that: 
H11: Cognitive conflict is positively related to the board role performance. 
   
3.2.3 Use Of Skills 
Boards must tap and apply a variety of skills to function effectively in today’s 
business environment.  Examples of such skills are (a) strategic thinking; (b) analytical 
thinking; (c) communications skills; (d) interaction skills; (e) management skills and 
(f) result-oriented perspective (Dulewicz et al., 1995).   
While skills may be present, the actual use of skills is of utmost significance.  
Anecdotal evidence from corporate failures has shown that boards with directors 
possessing excellent skills sets do not use them (Sonnenfeld, 2002).  In addition, the 
possibility of “social loafing” whereby individuals in the group fail to use their skills to 
the task provide further argument that the presence of skills does not automatically 
lead to the use of skills (Williams et al., 1981). 
The use of skills will thus provide the firm with timely information.  This 
reduces the transaction costs of dealing with uncertainties in the environment, 
therefore enhancing performance (Conger et al., 2001).  Boards are only as good as the 
people who sit on them (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Nadler, 2004). 
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If boards are to perform their monitoring role effectively, they must integrate 
their knowledge of the firm’s internal affairs with their expertise in areas such as law 
and strategy (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Forbes & Milliken, 1999).   
Similarly, if boards want to provide good service to CEOs/top managers, they 
must be able to combine their knowledge of various functional areas and apply that 
knowledge to firm specific issues (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). 
Boards – as elite, strategic-issue-processing groups – must have members who 
possess skills that they could utilize in information gathering and strategic evaluation 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1988).  Directors value strategically relevant experience as it will 
improve strategic skills. 
The availability of a higher level of skills among directors, which has been 
denoted as “human capital” in management research, would also lead to a higher 
provision of resources to a firm (Coleman, 1988; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Based on the above analysis, the hypothesis is: 
H12: The use of skills is positively related to the board role performance.   
 
3.3 THE MEDIATION MODEL 
Hypotheses 1-12 pertain to the hypotheses under the non-mediation structure 
and process models.  In this section, the mediating hypotheses are developed.  The 
mediation model is a combination of structure and process models.  It posits that board 
structure will affect process which in turn influences performance (that is, board 
structure → board process → board role performance).  In essence, board structure has 
no direct impact on board role performance. 
The mediation model follows the general argument in the input-process-output 
approach (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Gladstein, 1984; Hackman & Morris, 1975).  In such 
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an approach, the structural board characteristics will affect process before results 
appear.  Despite the intrinsic benefit of such mediation models, there is limited 
empirical attention (Stewart & Barrick, 2000).  The reason is possibly due to the lack 
of access to primary data from directors. 
The second part of the mediation model (board process→ board role 
performance) is similar to that covered in the process model in Section 3.2. Hence, 
before the development of hypotheses for the mediation model, the first part of the 
model (board structure → board process) will be explained.  Combining both the 
relationship of (a) board structure → board process and (b) board process→ board role 
performance leads to the hypotheses under the mediation model. 
 The development of mediation hypotheses is explained in terms of the three 
board process variables of effort norms, cognitive conflict and use of skills. 
 
3.3.1 Effort Norms 
The presence of a separate chairman will probably keep the CEO and top 
managers more on their toes.  Thus, a CEO-chairman duality situation is likely to 
reduce the effort norms of a board. 
The presence of outsider directors, on the other hand, will boost the level of 
effort norms as such directors view their roles differently from those of the insider 
directors.  In contrast, the insider directors are more likely to see their directors’ duties 
as an extension of their management functions.  Thus, with the presence of a separate 
chairman and outsider directors, insider directors (including CEOs) may be coerced 
into performing better.  Consequently, the level of effort norms within the board rises 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999).   
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Large boards may have difficulty in enhancing or even maintaining board effort 
norms. According to group dynamics theory, if a group grows too large, 
communication among directors become increasingly difficult; directors would find it 
harder to get to know each other and only a fraction of the board would be likely to 
participate in board discussions. If a director fails to prepare for a board meeting or to 
participate, the chances are that the lapse would go completely unnoticed (Gladstein, 
1984; Goodstein et al., 1994; Shaw, 1981).   This is the situation of “social loafing” 
that usually exists in large groups (Latane et al., 1979; Williams et al., 1981).  Social 
loafing refers to the decrease in group effort as the total number of people in the group 
increases.  Large boards tend to be more diverse, more contentious and more 
fragmented than smaller boards (Dalton et al., 1999).  Thus, a larger board will likely 
be associated with a lower level of effort norms within the board. 
Based on the above arguments, it is hypothesized that: 
H13: CEO-chairman duality and board size are negatively related to the 
level of board effort norms. 
H14: The proportion of outsider directors is positively related to the level of 
board effort norms.   
H15: Effort norms mediate the relationship between CEO-chairman duality; 
proportion of outsider directors and board size, and board role 
performance.  
 
3.3.2 Cognitive Conflict 
The presence of a separate chairman and outsider directors is likely to enhance 
the level of cognitive conflict in the board.  This is because this group of directors is 
likely to share significantly fewer experiences with management.  They are more likely 
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to think freely with regard to the firm’s goals and the range of alternatives available to 
them (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  Similarly, a larger board is likely to possess an 
abundance of differing perspectives.  This will enhance the level of cognitive conflict 
in boards.  It is thus hypothesized that: 
H16: CEO-chairman duality is negatively related to the level of cognitive 
conflict. 
H17: The proportion of outsider directors, and board size are positively 
related to the level of cognitive conflict.   
H18: Cognitive conflict mediates the relationship between CEO-chairman 
duality; proportion of outsider directors and board size, and board role 
performance.  
 
3.3.3 Use Of Skills 
The presence of a separate chairman and outsider directors is likely to increase 
the usage of skills within the board (Conger, Finegold & Lawler, 1998).  Outsider 
directors are often lawyers, financial representatives, top management of other firms, 
public affairs or marketing specialists, government officials and community leaders 
who bring with them important expertise, experience and skills (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003).   
Board size is often taken to represent an organization’s ability to link itself to 
the external environment for resources (Goodstein et al., 1994).  Larger boards are 
likely to possess more skills for use at their disposal in decision making (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999).  It is thus hypothesized that: 
H19: CEO-chairman duality is negatively related to the use of skills. 
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H20: The proportion of outsider directors, and board size are positively 
related to the use of skills.   
H21: Use of skills mediates the relationship between CEO-chairman duality; 
proportion of outsider directors and board size, and board role 
performance.  
 
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Understanding the nature of effective board role performance is among the 
most important areas in management research.  When boards of directors are seen as 
stewards of organizational resources that impact, for better or for worse, the whole of 
society, the importance of understanding and improving the way they discharge their 
roles becomes apparent.  Hence, by treating boards as decision-making groups and 
drawing in existing knowledge of board and group dynamics, researchers should focus 
directly on what boards need to do in order to perform their roles more effectively. 
Board role performance is a complex phenomenon.  In this chapter, three 
conceptual models are developed to explain the factors impacting board role 
performance.  The first model, the structure model, advocates the importance of board 
structure of CEO-chairman duality, outsider-insider directorship and board size.  The 
hypotheses are developed under the different theories of agency, stewardship and 
resource dependence.  The second model – the process model – tests the relationship 
between board process and board role performance.  Three board process dimensions - 
effort norms, conflicts, and use of skills, are examined.  The hypotheses are developed 
based on group research.  The third conceptual model is the mediation model.  In this 
model, there is a sequential element.  Board structure will firstly affect board process, 
which in turn influences board role performance.  The hypotheses are developed under 
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the premise of input-process-output argument.  Table 3.1 summarizes the hypothesized 
relationships among board structure, board process and board role performance. 
In the next chapter, the research methodology used to test the three conceptual 
models is discussed.  Issues on the operationalization of the constructs in the 
conceptual model, the research design and field research procedure will be examined. 
 
Table 3.1: Structure, Process and Mediation Models 
(A) Structure Model: Board Structure → Board Role Performance 
Board Roles 
Board Structure 
Monitoring Service Strategy Resource Provision 
1. CEO-chairman 
duality 
- +/- - - 
2. Proportion of 
outsider directors 
+ +/- + + 
3. Board size 
 
- +/- +/- + 
 
(B) Process Model: Board Process → Board Role Performance 
Board Roles 
Board Process 
Monitoring Service Strategy Resource Provision 
1.  Effort norms 
 
+ + + + 
2. Cognitive 
conflict 
+ + + + 
3. Use of skills 
 
+ + + + 
 
(C) Mediation Model: Board Structure → Board Process → Board Role Performance+ 
Board Process
Board Structure 
Effort Norms Cognitive Conflict Use Of Skills 
1. CEO-chairman duality 
 
- - - 
2. Proportion of outsider directors 
 
+ + + 
3. Board size 
 
- + + 





This chapter provides an overview of the research methodology used in this 
study and is divided into five sections.  In the first section, an outline of the research 
design and sample is discussed.  Section 2 deals with the stages of the research 
procedure.  The operationalization and source of the study measures are then presented 
in Section 3.  Section 4 gives a description of the data analyses to be conducted for this 
study.  Finally, some concluding remarks are made in Section 5. 
 
4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE  
4.1.1 Research Design 
 A researcher often has a choice of many alternatives when carrying out a piece 
of research (Simon, 1969).  To obtain a generally representative view of organizations, 
a reasonably large sample size is required before inferences can be considered valid.  
According to Zikmund (1997), the use of questionnaires allows for the collection of a 
large sample at relatively low costs.  Babbie (1990) also proposes that the use of 
questionnaires allows for a quantification of information collected for analysis.  In a 
review of research methods, Dillman (2000) concluded that in general respondents 
were most honest in mail surveys, least honest in the face-to-face interview, and 
intermediate in the telephone surveys. With regard to board research specifically, 
Kazanjian (2000) noted that survey analysis by third parties allow anonymity of 
specific commentators to achieve full and frank input.  As such, this study mainly 
adopts a self-administered questionnaire methodology (see Appendix A for the study 
questionnaire). 
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4.1.2 Research Sample 
This study was carried out using public listed companies in Singapore as the 
sample frame. As noted by O’Sullivan (2000), using this category of companies has 
two main advantages.  Firstly, recent corporate governance deliberations have focused 
specifically on such companies since these firms represent an environment where 
issues of control and accountability are likely to be most acute.  Secondly, the 
availability of annual reports and accounts, as well as their comprehensive disclosures 
on board information, suggest that public listed companies represent a suitable sample 
in which to test the hypotheses.  Conversely, private companies are not used, as it is 
often difficult to obtain data from them (Lawler, Chen & Bae, 2000).  Ooghe and De 
Langhe (2002) also put forth the same argument in that the information flow from 
listed firms is much bigger than that of private firms as the former is more exposed to 
the discipline of capital market.  The population of 424 Singapore-incorporated listed 
companies (as at 31 December 2001) was thus targeted for the study. 
 Being an open market seeking to attract international investment, Singapore is 
aware of the requirement for high standards of corporate governance.  World-wide, 
corporate governance practices are increasingly getting isomorphic.   Codes of conduct 
are promoted and standards of governance are developed by various globally oriented 
institutions such as Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG); 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN); Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) (Aguilera & Cuervo, 
2004; Monks & Minow, 2004; Phan, 1998).  
 The importance of corporate governance is heightened as Singapore evolves 
from a regulatory system to a more market-driven system where the aim is to achieve 
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greater transparency.  Investors are highly dependent on listed companies’ managers in 
running the firm and furnishing timely disclosure of material information.  Boards of 
directors of companies in Singapore have to be responsible to perform the primary role 
for the high level of corporate governance (Hu, 1994; Phan, 1998, 2000).  Board role 
performance, the crux of this thesis, is therefore a very important issue. 
Furthermore, the current governance emphasis is placed on investors who will 
decide the quality of corporate governance based on information availability.  One 
example is cited by Singh (1999) whereby in May 1998, the Singapore Stock 
Exchange adopted a Best Practices Guide, eliminating the mandatory Chapter 9B 
pertaining to the roles and duties of the audit committee from its Listing Manual.  Two 
other initiatives are the Code of Corporate Governance 2001 issued by the Council on 
Corporate Disclosure and Governance and Guidelines on Corporate Governance for 
Banks and Direct Insurers 2003 issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.   
Based on a study by research firm Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), 
Singapore was ranked as the highest for its environment in promoting corporate 
governance among ten Asian countries (Leong, 2003).  The country achieved a score 
of 7.7 out of a possible 10.  The country with the next highest score is Hongkong (7.3) 
while Indonesia has the lowest score (3.2).  On the other hand, the Singapore system of 
corporate governance is less well developed compared to those of U.K. and U.S. (Mak 
& Li, 2001). There are three main reasons.  First is the rarity of hostile takeovers in 
Singapore.  As argued by Chandrasegar (1995), the method of undertaking business in 
Asia is characterized by steering clear of aggression, confrontation and bitterness.  In 
addition, merchant bankers are more careful about supporting takeover deals and will 
seek clearance from relevant government authority before undertaking such business.  
As a result, when compared to the U.S., there is the lack of external mechanism of 
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takeovers to control managerial behaviour.  The second reason is the relatively high 
ownership of shares by blockholders in Singapore.  In their study of 147 listed 
Singapore companies, Mak and Li (2001) found that the mean and median share 
ownership by blockholders (denoted as those holding 5% or more of voting stock) are 
62 per cent and 63 per cent respectively.  Consequently, protection of minority 
shareholders can be expected to be lower in Singapore.  The third reason is the 
significant ownership of private sector by the government.  In Mak and Li’s study 
(2001), the Singapore government owned over 20 per cent in more than 10 per cent of 
Singapore listed companies.  With substantial government ownership, it is also more 
difficult to launch takeover attempts in this country.   
Mak and Li (2001) also argued that as compared to non-government linked 
companies (non-GLCs), GLCs may have weaker governance.  Firstly, GLCs will take 
cues from the government.  Such signals may concern the well being of the nation 
more than the company.  Secondly, being government-owned, GLCs are less 
pressurized to pay dividends to shareholders and obtain other sources of financing.  
Thirdly, as the government takes a long term view of investment in the GLCs, it is 
unlikely to support solicited takeover offers for GLCs and to monitor the investments 
in GLCs very actively.   
Corporate governance may be weaker in Singapore in view of the lack of 
takeover and high ownership of shares by blockholders.  Singapore, like Canada, has 
laws with oppression remedies to protect the rights of minority shareholders (Phan, 
1998).  But it may not be sufficient.  This has thus made boards of directors in 
Singapore to be a more important internal mechanism (Mak & Li, 2001; Phan, 1998).  
As argued by Phan (1998), directors, in evaluating the strategic decisions, must be 
transparent as to the effect on shareholder value.  They should not be compelled into 
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taking steps that will benefit the majority shareholder.  An effective board is an 
ingredient of good corporate governance in Singapore. 
Moreover, the collective shareholdings of the government make it a potent 
force for corporate governance reform.  The government through its various holding 
companies, for example, Temasek Holdings and The Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation, already has a big say in terms of board appointments.  The 
fact that many of the boards of the GLCs are staffed by high ranking civil servants, or 
ex-civil servants suggest the influence of the government (though after these board 
members are appointed, they are generally left to run the companies).  Since the GLCs 
are also frequently among the largest listed companies in Singapore, their structures 
and practices are in a position to be held as a model for other listed companies (Koh, 
1999). 
The legal focus is still on the directors, in particular their role in ensuring 
corporate governance practices.  First is that he/she has a duty to act in the best interest 
of the company.  Second is that he/she has a duty not to place himself/herself in a 
position where his/her duty to the company and his/her personal interests may conflict.  
Third is that he/she has a duty to act for proper purposes. 
The importance of international investors as a catalyst for change in corporate 
governance cannot be underestimated.  Individual shareholders usually face collective 
action problems in monitoring the companies they invest in.  This is because each 
shareholder owns only a small fraction of the benefits of monitoring but must bear the 
full cost of its own monitoring efforts.  As such passivity serves each shareholder's 
self-interest.  But by virtue of the size of their investment, institutional investors will 
have a better incentive to monitor.  Therefore foreign institutional shareholders are 
more likely to oversee the companies they invest in more closely.  In addition the usual 
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"exit" options may not be available to institutional shareholders, that is, they cannot 
easily sell to get out of a bad investment, as the process of selling a large tranche of 
shares may cause a fall in share price. 
With increasing globalization, the role and influence of foreign institutional 
investors will only get more prominent in Singapore.  As the government continues to 
open and develop the funds management industry, the ownership of companies by 
mutual funds will likely increase.  Consequently, the monitoring provided by these 
large institutional investors will possibly become more active (Mak & Phan, 2001).   
As foreign institutional shareholders are unlikely to possess similar national 
and cultural concerns as domestic shareholders, they will demand maximum 
shareholder returns.  There will be increasing pressure for board of directors to monitor 
and hold management accountable. At the same time, foreign shareholders will put 
forth their strong and unequivocal meaning of shareholder sovereignty.  The Singapore 
government is moving in the same direction.  Singapore firms, whether GLCs or non-
GLCs, will have to take note of this phenomenon (Phan, 1998) and thereby improve 
their corporate governance to world-class standards. 
In recent years, there have been calls for clearer definition of the roles of 
directors and board self-appraisal by Singapore listed firms themselves 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998).  A study of board structure, board process and board 
role performance in Singapore will enhance the understanding and possibly contribute 
to the knowledge of corporate governance. 
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4.2 RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
 The research procedure is divided into three main stages: 
4.2.1 Pre-Survey Interview Period 
As a first step, seven face-to-face interviews with 3 industry representatives3 
and 4 company directors were conducted.  The purpose is to understand better the 
general corporate governance scene and to obtain inputs for the development of 
questions for the study instrument.  Pre-survey is important as the members of this 
group have substantive knowledge of the survey topic (Dillman, 2000). 
Appendix B gives more information about these pre-survey interviews, such as 
the profile of the respondents and the gist of the interview notes.  The interviews were 
conducted over a seven-month period in view of the busy schedule of the respondents. 
Four main questions were asked during the interviews: 
(a) What is the state of corporate governance in companies/ your company? 
(b) What do you understand by board structure, board processes and board role 
performance? 
(c) How would you define an effective board? 
(d) Do you see any relationship among board structure, board processes and board 
role performance? 
While a tape recorder was brought along for the interviews, all respondents 
declined taping of the conversation possibly for confidential reasons.  Hence, notes 
were jotted down.  To reduce information loss, interview notes were written 
immediately after each interview. 
                                                           
3 The 3 industry representatives were from Securities Investors’ Association (Singapore), Singapore 
Exchange and Singapore Institute of Directors.  During these interviews, the necessity of interviewing 
other industry players was posted to the 3 representatives.  The advice from them was that participation 
from the three associations is sufficient. 
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Based on the interviews, an important advice is that a questionnaire approach is 
both appropriate and logical for the study.  For example, the industry representative 
from Singapore Exchange (labeled REP3 in Appendix B) noted that since no firm will 
allow an outsider to sit in a board meeting for confidential reasons, the best alternative 
to study board process and board role performance is to survey/interview the directors.  
More discussion of the pre-survey interviews will be presented in Chapter 6 
(discussion chapter). 
 
4.2.2 Survey Period  
Based on the interview feedback and literature review, a draft questionnaire 
was developed.  The questionnaire was sent to two directors 4  to determine the 
relevance and clarity of the questions in the Singapore context.  Their general 
comment is that it is “suitable”.  Hence, no amendment was made to the questionnaire.   
Booklet-form questionnaires were then randomly mailed to a pilot group of 20 
boards.  The objective is to check for unanticipated problems with question wordings 
and instruction.  A cover letter, explaining the purpose of the study and a self-
addressed return envelope were attached.  From each board, multiple respondents were 
targeted for the data collection.  Such an approach is likely to increase the validity and 
robustness of the findings (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).   
Four respondents from each company are thus targeted: (a) chairman of the 
board; (b) an insider (or executive) director; (c) an outsider (non-executive) director 
and (d) company secretary.  
According to Orlikoff and Totten (1999:1), the chairman is the person who 
“must accept the responsibility for the integrity of board processes and for the 
                                                           
4The draft questionnaire was not sent to the three industry representatives, as the targeted respondents 
are board representatives.  The other two directors could not be surveyed as they were overseas. 
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facilitation of effective and efficient board work”. The two directors (executive and 
non-executive) are chosen to provide a more balanced perspective of the survey 
findings.   
The company secretary, while unlikely to be a director in the listed company, 
was chosen largely on the recommendation from the pre-survey interviews.  This 
advice is similar to that mentioned by Cadbury (2002).  The company secretary plays a 
key role in ensuring that board procedures are followed and regularly reviewed.  
He/she should be in a position to give objective professional advice to the chairman 
and to other members of the board.  Also, Stiles and Taylor (2000) noted that as 
company secretaries are not typically directors, they can be expected to respond in a 
less self-serving fashion. 
Twenty directors/company secretaries from the 17 boards participated in the 
pilot-test.  No comments/errors were found in the returned questionnaires.  Thus, no 
further amendments were made to the questionnaire. 
After the pilot-test, the survey proper was carried out.  Telephone calls and two 
survey reminders were also conducted to encourage higher participation rates.  
Appendix C shows the survey letters.   
The first invitation letter was then sent to the remaining 404 boards (424 from 
the population less 20 in the pilot test) on 14 March 2002.  As directors/company 
secretaries are busy people, a 3-week waiting time was given.  Responses from 61 
directors/company secretaries from 50 boards were received. 
A survey reminder was thus sent out a month later, on 15 April 2002.   Again, a 
three-week grace is provided for the return of the completed questionnaires.  The 
results were poorer.  Forty-two directors/company secretaries participated in the 
second round of survey. 
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Telephone reminders were then made to all companies to encourage 
participation.  The process took about two months.  Two common comments from 
these companies are: the board will normally assign one person to take part in the 
survey and the board requests for more time to complete the questionnaire. 
Based on the telephone calls, ten companies specifically rejected to participate   
in the study.  A second survey reminder was sent on 18 June 2002.  About one-and-a-
half month grace period was decided for the return of the questionnaire.  When the 
whole survey closed on 31 July 2002, 292 directors/company secretaries from 212 
boards participated in the study. 
 
4.2.3 Post-Survey Interview Period  
 After the data are analyzed, 9 face-to-face interviews with 3 industry 
representatives, 1 company secretary and 5 directors were conducted.5  The purpose is 
to understand more about the research findings.  In this way, the study will be more 
concrete and complete.  The results could also be richer in this respect.   
As noted by Johnson (2002), conducting such interviews allow one to seek 
“deep” information and knowledge.  He added that profound information often could 
not be sought from questionnaire surveys.  Interviews allow the researcher to obtain 
insights from the specific experience of the respondent.  
In every interview, the concepts of board structure, process and role 
performance were firstly explained to the interviewees so that there is a common 
understanding of the terminology.  Based on the experience from the pre-survey 
interviews, interview notes were immediately written after each interview.  The post–
                                                           
5 Out of these nine respondents, the three industry representatives and one director were also interviewed 
during the pre-survey phase. 
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survey interview notes are compiled in Appendix D.  Discussion of the post-survey 
interviews is presented in Chapter 6 (discussion chapter). 
  
4.3 RESEARCH MEASUREMENTS 
 There are four sets of measures in this study: board structure; board process, 
board role performance and control variables.  The operationalization and source of 
these measurements are discussed below: 
 
4.3.1 Board Structure 
Board structure comprises CEO-chairman duality; outsider directorships 
(further divided into proportion of non-executive directors and proportion of 
independent directors) and board size.  
The first board structure variable - CEO-chairman duality - is coded as a 
dichotomous variable.  If the CEO of the company is also the chairman of the board, 
the variable is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.   
The operationalization of outsider directors comprises two variables.  In a 
meta-analytic review on measurements of board composition, Dalton et al. (1998) 
found that the most common measure of outsider directors is those directors who do 
not hold management positions in companies (Buchholtz & Ribbins, 1994; Dalton & 
Kesner, 1987; Goodstein et al., 1994).  In the Singapore context, they are known as 
non-executive directors.  Moreover, Dalton et al. (1998) added that operationalization 
of outsider directors should also capture independent directors.  Based on the 
Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2001, an independent director is defined as 
one who has no relationship with the company, its related companies or its officers that 
could interfere, or be reasonably perceived to interfere, with the exercise of the 
 61
director's independent business judgment with a view to the best interests of the 
company.  
Examples of such relationships, which would deem a director as not 
independent, include: 
(a) A director being employed by the company or any of its related companies for 
the current or any of the past three financial years; 
(b) A director who has an immediate family member who is, or has been in any of 
the past three financial years, employed by the company or any of its related 
companies as a senior executive officer whose remuneration is determined by 
the remuneration committee;  
(c) A director accepting any compensation from the company or any of its related 
companies other than compensation for board service for the current or 
immediate past financial year; or 
(d) A director being a substantial shareholder of or a partner in (with 5% or more 
stake), or an executive officer of, any for-profit business organization to which 
the company made, or from which the company received, significant payments 
in the current or immediate past financial year. As a guide, payments 
aggregated over any financial year in excess of S$200,000 should generally be 
deemed significant. 
As advocated by the agency theory, independent directors may be in the best 
position to undertake the monitoring role as they are not weighed down by personal 
and/or professional relationships with firm or management.  Thus, this study uses the 
proportions of both non-executive directors and independent directors to capture a 
fuller picture of outsider directors.  The former is the ratio of the number of non-
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executive directors and board size, while the latter is the ratio of the number of 
independent directors and board size. 
 The third and final board structure variable is board size.  It refers to the 
number of directors in a board. 
 Data on CEO-chairman duality, the number of non-executive directors and 
board size are available from the website of Singapore Exchange (www.sgx.com).  The 
main source for the number of independent directors is the above website.  Since not 
all companies reveal this information, two other sources are used: annual reports and 
study survey questionnaire.  
 
4.3.2 Board Process 
 Board process consists of effort norms, cognitive conflict and use of skills.  
Two different measures are used to operationalize effort norms.  First is meeting 
intensity, which is defined as the product of the number of board meetings within a 
year and the amount of productive time spent per meeting.  Productive time is defined 
as the time with debate and dialogue interaction during meetings.  Hence, 
Meeting intensity = Number of board meetings per year × Average amount of 
 productive time per meeting 
The number of board meetings per year is available from the annual reports of 
listed companies. The average amount of productive time per meeting is captured from 
questionnaire survey.  Meeting intensity hence represents the strength of effort norms. 
The second measure of effort norms makes use of Likert-scale statements.  To 
differentiate this variable from meeting intensity, it is denoted as general effort norms.  
Five items are adapted from Wageman (1995), and Shanley and Langfred (1998).  Two 
examples are “Board members go through information carefully before meetings” and 
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“Board members feel responsible for their work that needs to be done”. They are 
measured on a 5-item Likert-scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree”.  Data on general effort norms are captured from the survey questionnaire. 
Cognitive conflict is the second board process variable.  Five items are adopted 
from Jehn (1995) and Charan (1998) to measure the degree of cognitive conflict 
among board members.  Like general effort norms, the scales range from “Strongly 
disagree” to “Strongly agree”.  These statements include whether “This board 
considers viewpoints of different members before making final decision” and “The 
discussions are open and candid”.   
The measurement of the use of skills, the third board process variable, is 
adapted from the scale developed by Dulewicz et al. (1995).  Six items are used in this 
study.  Statements include whether board members use skills such as strategic 
perception; analytical thinking and result-oriented perspective.  They are measured on 
a Likert scale ranging from "Very low" to "Very high".   
For all measures of board process variables, higher scores mean higher level of 
board process.  Appendix E shows the various statements representing the research 
measurements and their sources. 
 
4.3.3 Board Role Performance 
Board role performance pertains to the ability of the directors in performing 
their four roles: monitoring; service; strategy and resource provision.  Monitoring 
refers to the checks and balances on managers of a company.  Ten items from 
Westphal (1999) and Blake (1999) are adapted to capture the board’s ability to perform 
its monitoring role.  They include, for example, the extent to which “Board monitors 
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top management decision making” and “Board formally evaluate the performance of 
top company executives”.  
The service role pertains to directors providing advice to top management and 
the external promotion of the company.   Five items from Westphal (1999) and 
Dulewicz et al. (1995) are adapted to measure the board’s ability to perform its service 
role.  Examples are the degree to which “Directors provide advice and counsel in 
discussions outside of board/committee meetings” and “Board takes into account the 
legitimate interests of organizations, groups and individuals (stakeholders) who have a 
direct interest in the achievement of company objectives”. 
Following the arguments by Fama and Jensen (1983), and Tricker (1994), the 
strategy role of the board is measured in terms of direction and planning.  Six items are 
adapted from Zahra (1990) and Blake (1999) to capture a board’s ability to carry out 
its strategy role.  These include the magnitude by which “Board articulates a 
company’s mission” and “Board identifies the strategic plan”.   
On the fourth and last board role of resource provision, five items from Pfeffer 
(1983) and Hillman et al. (2000) are adapted to measure the board’s ability to execute 
its resource provision role.  Two examples are “This board has outsider directors who 
possess expertise on skills relevant for the company’s operations” and “Board 
members are chosen for their influence in the community”.   
All board roles are measured on a Likert-scale, ranging from "Strongly 
disagree" to "Strongly agree".  Greater scores represent higher degree of involvement 




4.3.4 Control Variables 
 Three control variables are used in this study.  One is the company size.  In 
small firms, the governance should be less diverse vis-à-vis larger companies.  As 
small firms tend to be less diversified, less complex and less formalized, the service 
role may be especially important in small firms (Castaldi & Wortman, 1984; Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992).  Managers could benefit from the breadth of knowledge that outsider 
directors provide.  In addition, the access to resources may also be more difficult for 
small firms (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  Turnover of a company is used to measure 
company size.  This information is obtained from the annual reports of companies. 
 The second and third control variables pertain to the industry type of the 
company.  In industries whereby the business is risky, such as the finance sector, 
monitoring can be expected to be a more crucial board role.  In businesses where 
technology is pervasive and changes rapidly (for example, manufacturing and finance), 
skills of directors are likely to be more important.  The use of skills will probably 
figure more prominently in boards of manufacturing and finance vis-à-vis other 
industries such retail and hotels (Kotz, 1998). Companies are thus classified into 
manufacturing, financial and other firms.  Both manufacturing and financial firms are 
coded as dichotomous variables.  If the firm is from the manufacturing sector, it is 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, if the company is a financial company, it is 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.  The industry classification of companies is available from 
the Singapore Exchange website. 
 Thus, the study uses three control variables: revenue of company, whether the 
firm is from the manufacturing sector and whether the firm is from the finance sector. 
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4.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
 After data input, the following data analyses are conducted.  
4.4.1 Response Rate 
 Two aspects will be covered: the company/board response rate and the 
individual director/company secretary response rate. 
 
4.4.2 Comparison Between Survey Respondents And Non-Respondents 
 As population data are available for the three board structure variables 
(chairman-CEO duality; non-executive directors and board size), statistical tests can be 
conducted to check for any differences between the survey respondents and non-
respondents.  Conducting such tests is important as no significant differences give a 
researcher more confidence about the representativeness of the sample returns against 
that of the overall population.  Such an argument has been advocated by researchers 
like Carpenter and Westphal (2001), and Pearce and Zahra (1991).  
 Two such tests will be utilized.  One of them is the chi-square test.  This test 
procedure tabulates a variable into categories and computes a chi-square statistic. This 
goodness-of-fit test compares the observed and expected frequencies in each category 
to test either that all categories contain the same proportion of values or that each 
category contains a user-specified proportion of values. 





ff ) - (
  2χ  
 where fo = actual observed frequencies 
  fe = expected cell frequencies 
 For the chi-square test, the null hypothesis of no relationship between two 
variables will be rejected when the calculated value of the test statistic is greater than 
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the critical value of the chi-square distribution with the appropriate degrees of 
freedom.  It is important to note that the chi-square test is estimated only on counts of 
data. 
 In this study, the chi-square statistic is used to test the statistical differences 
between survey respondents and non-respondents in terms of frequency counts of 
CEO-chairman duality. 
 Another statistical test used to check for the representativeness of the sample 
returns is the independent sample t-test.  In this test, the means of a characteristic (for 
example average board size) are compared between the respondents and non-
respondents.   
 The t-test statistic for two samples (1 and 2) can be calculated as: 
 s - s
 )- (  
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 where X   = sample mean 
  xs  = standard deviation of the sample  
 
 The null hypothesis of no difference in means is rejected when the test statistic 
is greater than the critical value of the t-distribution. 
 For this study, the t-test is used to verify for any statistical difference for 
average number of non-executive directors and average board size. 
 
4.4.3 Aggregation Analysis 
 As the data analysis is conducted at group level, it is necessary to aggregate the 
individual responses to the board level.  This is because in some companies, more than 
one person participated in the survey.   
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 Aggregation is needed for the following variables in this study: 
(a) General effort norms; 
(b) Cognitive conflict; 
(c) Use of skills; 
(d) Board monitoring role; 
(e) Board service role; 
(f) Board strategy role and 
(g) Board resource provision role. 
 
To assess the appropriateness of aggregating individual responses to the board 
level, two techniques can be employed (Knight, Pearce, Smith, Olian, Sims, Smith & 
Floud, 1999).  Firstly, James, Demaree and Wolf (1984) suggested that an index of 
inter-rater reliability, rwg, be used to assess the homogeneity of members' perceptions.  
Inter-rater reliability refers to the extent to which raters are “interchangeable”.  The 
latter means the degree to which raters agree on a set of judgments.  In mathematical 
denotation, inter-rater reliability is defined as the proportion of systematic variance in a 
set of judgments in relation to the total variance in the judgments. 
 Inter-rater reliability index rwg is calculated as: 





















 where   J     = number of items of the same construct 
  2xjs   = mean of the observed variances on the J items 
  2euσ  = (A2-1)/12 [A is the number of responses in the response scale] 
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The rwg ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing zero agreement and 1 full 
agreement. Ensley and Pearce (2001) noted that a value of 0.7 demonstrates agreement 
within the team, giving the researcher more confidence to aggregate the individual 
responses to group level. 
 The second technique to check the appropriateness of aggregating individual 
responses is recommended by Dansereau, Alutto and Yammarino (1984).  In this 
method, a within-and-between analysis (WABA) is performed.  In order to justify 
aggregating individual level responses, the ratio of the calculated variance between the 
groups (ηb) to variance within each group (ηw) must be greater than 1. 























 where X = any variable 
  j = number of groups. 
 
4.4.4 Reliability And Validity 
 Statistical examination is carried out on the measurement scales to assess their 
reliability and validity.  Reliability is defined as the degree to which measures are free 
from error and therefore yield consistent results.   
  
 70
By far, the most popular reliability estimate is the Cronbach’s alpha α 
(Carmines & Zellner, 1979).  In mathematical formulae, 
∑−−= ]/ )(  1)[1(  22 xiYN
N
σσα  
 where   N         = number of items  
  ∑ )(2 iYσ   = sum of item variances 
  2xσ            = variance of total composite 
  
According to Nunnally (1978), a coefficient of 0.7 and above shows acceptable 
scale reliability.  And this suggests that the items can be kept under each response 
scale.  The Cronbach’s alpha is calculated for the following variables in this study: 
(a) General effort norms; 
(b) Cognitive conflict; 
(c) Use of skills; 
(d) Board monitoring role; 
(e) Board service role; 
(f) Board strategy role and 
(g) Board resource provision role. 
  
While reliability measures item consistency, validity is the ability of a scale to 
measure what it is intended to measure.  Validity means the extent to which a 
particular indicator (or a set of indicators) represents a given theoretical concept.  
Three types of validity relevant to this study are: construct validity; external validity 
and scale validity. 
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Construct validity is sought for this study by the use of existing literature to 
create the research measures.  This provides linkages and cumulativeness with 
previous work.  External validity is addressed by having the results “reality-checked” 
through post-survey interviews.  High agreement provides evidence of external validity 
of the results. 
Scale validity can be assessed by the Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff & 
Organ, 1984; Scott & Bruce, 1994).  For this method, responses to survey items are 
pooled and subjected to factor analysis.  If common method or single-source bias was 
present, correlations among all or most items would be high.  Under such a condition, 
one can expect a single underlying or dominant factor could be used to explain most of 
the variations in the questionnaire items.  If no single factor is apparent, it implies that 
scale validity is present.  In this case, this reduces concerns about common method 
bias.   
 
4.4.5 Transformation Of Variables 
All board structure variables and one board process variable are measured at 
the board level.  As the level of analysis is at the board level, there is no combination 
of individual items.   
The four board structure variables are: CEO-chairman duality; proportion of 
non-executive directors; proportion of independent directors and board size.  The 
board process of meeting intensity is also measured at the board level. 
All the other three board process and four board role performance variables 
consist of individual items.  The three board process variables are: general effort norms 
[5 items]; cognitive conflict [5 items] and use of skills [6 items].  The four board role 
performance variables are: monitoring role [10 items]; service role [5 items]; strategy 
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role [6 items] and resource provision role [5 items].  The value for each of these three 
board process and four board role performance variables is obtained by taking the 
average of the respective items.  Table 4.1 shows the various items under each 
construct. 
 
4.4.6 Descriptive Statistics And Correlations 
The descriptive statistics comprises the minimum, median, mean, maximum 
and standard deviation of the variables. 
The correlation value measures the strength of relationship between two 
variables.  High correlation could indicate the presence of multicollinearity among the 
two variables.  In such situations, the correlation results between the two variables 
could be biased (Gujarati, 2003).   As a general rule, Hatcher (1995) and Gujarati 




Table 4.1: Items Under Board Process And Board Role Performance 
Variable 
Board Process 
1.General effort norms 1 (5 items) 
Go through information carefully 
Participate actively in meetings 
Enjoy their work 
Feel responsible for work 
Satisfied when work accomplished well 
 
2. Cognitive conflict (5 items) 
Consider viewpoints of different members 
Decisions settled amicably 
Decisions open and candid 
Atmosphere encourages critical thinking 
Meetings often result in clear decision 
 
3. Use of skills (6 items) 
Use of strategic thinking 
Use of analytical skills 
Use of communications skills 
Use of interaction skills 
Use of management skills 
Use of result-oriented perspective 
 
Board Role Performance 
1. Monitoring role (10 items) 
Monitor top management in decision-making 
Evaluate performance of top executives 
Has internal mechanism to evaluate performance yearly 
Member formally evaluated by others 
Analyze budget allocation vs performance 
Require information showing progress 
Review performance against strategic plan 
Review financial information for important issues/trends 
Engage in succession planning for CEO 
Engage in succession planning for top managers besides CEO 
 
2. Service role (5 items) 
Provide advice and counsel to top managers 
Top managers solicit board assistance 
Ensure communications with stakeholders/public are effective 
Take into account interests of stakeholders 
Promote goodwill/support of stakeholders 
 
3. Strategy role (6 items) 
Aware of environmental trends 
Benchmark strategic plan with industry data 
Receive plan for strategy implementation from CEO 
Involve in mission articulation 
Debate on strategic plan 
Identify strategic direction for company yearly 
 
4. Resource dependency role (5 items) 
Comprises outside directors with skills relevant to company 
Outside directors provide alternative viewpoints 
Members chosen for influence in community 
Provide channels of communications between firms 
Serve as a link to government agencies 
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4.4.7 Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression is the method used to test the various hypotheses for both 
the structure and process models at the same time.  For both the structure and process 
models, the dependent variable is each of the board role performance variables, and the 
independent variables are the control variables, board structure variables and board 
process variables. The F and R2 statistics are used to assess the overall model fit while 
the individual t-statistic is used to check for the statistical significance of the individual 
independent variables.   
Multicollinearity check will be conducted using two collinearity statistics: 
variance inflation factors (VIF), and condition indices and variance-decomposition 
proportions.  The former measures the inflation in the variances of the parameter 
estimates due to collinearities that exist among the regressor (independent) variables. 
VIFs that are larger than 10 indicate presence of high multicollinearity among 
variables (Kleinbaum, Kupper & Muller, 1988).   
The formulae for VIF is 
r)-(1
1  VIF=  
where r  = coefficient of correlation between two independent variables 
  
 The condition indices (CI) are the square roots of the ratio of the largest 
eigenvalue to each individual eigenvalue.  In mathematical notation,  
eigenvalue Minimum
eigenvalue Maximum  CI =  
 A high condition index may suggest the presence of multicollinearity among 
the independent variables.  However, there is no agreement on what represents a high 
condition index (Pedhazur, 1997).  As a rule of thumb, condition indices of 5-10 
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constitute weak dependencies while 30-100 represent moderate to strong dependencies 
(Belsley, 1991). 
 Thus, to detect the presence of multicollinearity, it is recommended that high 
condition index be examined with large variance proportions of two or more 
coefficients (Belsley, 1991; Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 1980).  A collinearity problem 
occurs when a component associated with a high condition index contributes strongly 
(variance proportion greater than 0.5) to the variance of two or more variables (SAS 
Institute, 2003). 
 
4.4.8 Path Analysis 
Regression only tests the direct relationship among board structure, board 
process and board role performance.  To test for mediating relationships, one could use 
the method of path analysis.  Path analysis has a long established history.  It started 
independently in genetics (Wright, 1921).  Since the 1960s, the method became 
popular in sociology, economics and related fields (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 
2003). 
 Path analysis can be used to test theoretical models that specify causal 
relationships between a number of observed variables.  Path analysis determines 
whether a theoretical model successfully accounts for the actual relationships observed 
in the sample data. 
  Hence, the path analysis method also serves as a means to confirm the 
regression results.  As noted by Smith et al. (1994), path analysis allows one to 
examine the relationship among the independent, mediator and dependent variables in 
an integrative manner.   
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There are a number of assumptions for the implementation of the path model: 
(a) Theoretical foundation.  The path model must be grounded on a theory/theories.  
(b) Variable measurement.  Exogenous (independent) variables could be measured on 
a ratio, interval, ordinal or nominal scale.  Endogenous variables should be 
measured on a ratio, interval or ordinal scale. 
(c) Linear and additive relationships.  Relationships between variables should be linear 
and additive (that is, relationships between independent and dependent variables 
should not be curvilinear or interactive). 
(d) Absence of multicollinearity.  This assumption is violated if one or more variables 
exhibit very strong level of correlations (that is above 0.8) with one another. 
(e) Minimal number of observations.  A recommended sample size is 200 or more. 
  
To test for the mediation hypotheses in this study, the path analysis of direct 
and indirect effects is used.  In terms of path analysis terminology, a direct effect 
occurs when a single directed line or arrow connects two variables.  For example, as 
shown below, variable A has a direct effect on variable B. 
Variable A → Variable B 
 On the other hand, when variable A affects variable B through variable M, 
indirect effect occurs.  In this case, variable A has an indirect effect on variable B. 
Variable A → Variable M→ Variable B 
This indirect effect when present and significant is called mediation.  Full mediation 
occurs when variable A affects variable B only through variable M and variable A 
does not affect variable B.  Partial mediation arises when variable A affects variable B 
directly and also through variable M. The significance of effects can be analyzed by 
using the chi-square difference tests in path analysis. 
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 To explain the procedure further, the mediating board process between board 
structure and board role performance is used.  Following the method in Hatcher 
(1995)’s analysis, a direct effects model is firstly constructed.  This is shown in Figure 
4.1. 
Figure 4.1: Direct Effects Model 
 
Next, a direct and indirect model is constructed (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2: Direct and Indirect Effects Model  
 
If adding the board process variables results in a significant increase in the fit between 
the two models, this will provide the statistical support for the mediating board 
process.  This analysis is conducted by the chi-square difference test whereby 
∆χ2 = χ2direct model - χ2direct+ndirect model 
If ∆χ2 > χ2critical value, then one may conclude that there is a significant difference 
between the fit of the direct model, and the direct and indirect model.  In other words, 
the mediating role of board process is supported. 
 Based on the path coefficients of the exogenous variables, one can further 
deduce whether the mediation effect is full or partial.  Using a specific example of the 
relationship among CEO-chairman duality, general effort norms and monitoring, full 
mediation occurs if CEO-chairman duality affects general effort norms which in turn 






4.3).  Partial mediation is present if CEO-chairman duality affects general effort norms 
which in turn influence monitoring and CEO-chairman duality also affects monitoring 
(Figure 4.4). 
Figure 4.3: Example of Full Mediation 
 
Figure 4.4: Example of Partial Mediation 
 
All path analyses are conducted using the Statistical Analysis System’s CALIS 
procedure.  These analyses used the maximum likelihood method of parameter 
estimation, and all analyses were performed on the variance-covariance matrix. 
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to explain why structural 
equation modeling (SEM), which has the advantage of testing the construct validity of 
hypothesis (James, Mulaik & Brett, 1982), is not used in this study.    Firstly, there is a 
lack of theoretical support for the use of SEM as most of the variable items in this 
study are untested.  The second reason pertains to the insufficient sample size.  
According to Joreskog and Sorbom (1993), the following formula computes the 
minimum sample size (min n) for the use of SEM: 
2
)1( n  min −= kk  








This study has a total of 50 variable items comprising: 
(a) Control variables (3 items); 
(b) CEO-chairman duality (1 item); 
(c) Outsider directorship (2 items); 
(d) Board size (1 item); 
(e) General effort norms (5 items); 
(f) Meeting intensity (1 item); 
(g) Cognitive conflict (5 items); 
(h) Use of skills (6 items); 
(i) Board monitoring role (10 items); 
(j) Board service role (5 items); 
(k) Board strategy role (6 items) and 
(l) Board resource provision role (5 items). 
 
Hence, the recommended minimum sample size is 1,225.  This is far larger than 
the full population of 424 boards which was targeted for the study. 
 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 In this chapter, the use of a questionnaire as the main study instrument is 
explained.  Before the survey, face-to-face interviews with seven industry 
representatives/company directors, and pre-testing of the questionnaire with two 
directors, are conducted.  The questionnaire is then sent to the population of 424 listed 
companies in Singapore.   
To obtain a higher response rate, telephone calls were made and two survey 
reminders to companies were sent out.  After the data was analyzed, post-survey 
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interviews with 3 industry representatives, 5 directors and 1 company secretary were 
conducted mainly to understand the results better.   
In the next chapter, the results of the study are presented.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
RESULTS 
 
This chapter describes the data analysis results. There are nine sections in this 
chapter.  Section 1 discusses the response rate. The test comparison results between 
respondents and non-respondents are covered in Section 2.  The aggregation (inter-
rater reliability and variance) results are presented in Section 3.  Section 4 presents the 
reliability and validity findings.  In Section 5, the descriptive statistics and bivariate 
correlations of the variables are discussed. The regression and path analysis results are 
reported in Sections 6 and 7 respectively.  Section 8 provides the results of some 
further data analysis. A chapter summary is provided in the final section. 
 
5.1. RESPONSE RATE 
5.1.1 Company/Board Response Rate 
 A total of 212 companies/boards participated in the survey. Compared to the 
target population of 424 companies/boards, the response rate is 50 per cent.  Seventeen 
companies specifically rejected participation in the survey (through letters, e-mail or 
telephone calls).   
The 50 per cent return rate should be acceptable in this study.  It is higher than 
four other board surveys in Singapore (Singapore Institute of Directors & Egon 
Zehnder International, 2000; Singapore Institute of Directors, NUS Business School, & 
Egon Zehnder International, 2002; Singapore Institute of Directors et al., 2003, 2004).  
Their response rates averaged 30 per cent.   
According to Alreck and Settle (1995), it is rare to find mail surveys with 
response rates of over 30 per cent.  In contrast, they found that response rates are often 
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only about 5 to 10 per cent.  Carpenter and Westphal (2001) noted surveys of top 
managers in the U.S. suffer from low response rates, generally around 25 per cent. For 
example, in Pearce and Zahra’s (1991) study of CEOs-board relationship, a response 
rate of 20 per cent was achieved.   
 
5.1.2 Directors/Company Secretaries Response Rate 
 Multiple persons from each company were targeted for the survey.  In total, 
299 directors/company secretaries from 212 boards participated in the survey.  
Seventy-six per cent of the 299 respondents are directors while the remaining 24 per 
cent are company secretaries.  See Table 5.1.   
Table 5.1: Designation of Respondent (Directors/Company Secretaries) 
 
Position Number Per Cent 
(A) Director 226 75.6% 
- Board chairmen 50 16.7%
- CEOs 45 15.1%
- Other executive directors (besides exec chairmen and CEOs) 59 19.7%
- Other non-executive directors (besides non-exec chairmen) 72 24.1%
(B) Company Secretaries 73 24.4% 
Total 299 100% 
 
 In addition, 17 per cent of the respondents are chairmen, 15 per cent CEOs, 20 
per cent other executive directors (that is, besides executive chairmen and CEOs) and 
24 per cent other non-executive directors (besides non-executive chairmen). 
 The average number of respondents per firm is 1.41 (299/212).  Sixty-eight per 
cent of the 212 companies have 1 participant; 25 per cent 2 participants; 5 per cent 3 
participants and 2 per cent 4 participants. See Table 5.2. 
 Directors account for about 70-90 per cent of the total number of participants, 
with an overall average of 76 per cent.  See Table 5.3.  The overall response rate by 
respondent designation (76 per cent for directors and 24 per cent for company 
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secretaries) is close to the targeted respondent ratio of 3 directors (75 per cent) and 1 
company secretary (25 per cent) in the mail survey.   
Table 5.2: Number of Participants 
 
Companies with Number of Companies Per Cent 
4 participants 4 1.9% 
3 participants 11 5.2% 
2 participants 53 25.0% 
1 participant 144 67.9% 
Total 212 100% 
 
Table 5.3: Number of Participants by Directors/Company Secretaries 
Companies with Number of 
Companies 
Total No of 
Participants
Director  Company 
Secretary 
4 participants 4 16 12 (75.0%) 4 (25.0%) 
3 participants 11 33 29 (87.9%) 4 (12.1%) 
2 participants 53 106 77 (72.6%) 29 (27.4%) 
1 participant 144 144 108 (75.0%) 36 (25.0%) 
Total 212 299 226 (75.6%) 73 (24.4%) 
Percentage in parentheses refers to row-wise percentage in terms of total number of 
participants. 
 
5.2 COMPARISON BETWEEN SURVEY RESPONDENTS AND NON-
 RESPONDENTS 
 The responses pertain to the board level.  Since board data are available for the 
full target population6, chi-square and means analyses are conduced to test for any 
significant differences between the respondents and non-respondents (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Pearce & Zahra, 1991).  No significant statistical differences lend 
support to the representativeness of the sample returns. 
Table 5.4 shows the comparison test results for three board characteristics: 
CEO-chairman duality; average number of non-executive directors and average board 
size.  The chi-square and independent t tests yield no significant differences between 
respondents and non-respondents.  The null hypothesis of no relationship between the 
two variables is not rejected as the calculated value of both the chi-square and t test 
                                                           
6 Except for the number of independent directors as some companies do not reveal them. 
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statistics are smaller than their respective critical values.  In other words, the statistical 
results give researchers confidence in making inferences for the full population based 
on the sample returns.  
 










Board characteristics     
1. CEO-chair duality   Chi-square n.s. 
(a) Number of boards with same CEO-chair 86 80   
(b) Number of boards with separate CEO-chair 126 132   
     
2. Average no of non-exec directors 4.4 4.9 Independent t n.s. 
     
3. Average board size 7.3 7.2 Independent t n.s. 
 n.s. – non-significant. 
 
5.3 AGGREGATION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
About 32 per cent of the 212 boards have multiple participants who answered 
the various board process and board role performance questions.  The level of analysis 
for this thesis is at board (group) level. To assess the appropriateness of aggregating 
individual responses for the various board process and board role performance 
variables to the board level, two techniques are adopted as explained in the previous 
chapter.   
As illustrated in Table 5.5, the values of the inter-rater reliability index (rwg) 
vary from 0.93 to 0.99.  According to Ensley and Pearce (2001), a value of 0.7 can be 
taken to represent agreement within a group.  The results generally indicate high levels 
of agreement within teams, thus suggesting that aggregation is appropriate.  
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The second technique is the within-and-between analysis (WABA) method 
(Dansereau et al., 1984).  In this method, an analysis of variance of item scores within 
the board and between the boards is performed.  In order to justify aggregating 
individual level responses, the ratio of the calculated variance between groups (ηB) to 
variance within the group (ηw) must be greater than 1.  As shown in Table 5.5, the 
range is from 1.07 to 1.22. 
The survey data thus met the criteria for aggregation.  The method used is 
averaging the individual responses for the survey items under the relevant board 
process and performance variables. 
Table 5.5: Aggregation Analysis Results for Relevant Variables 
 
Variable rwg ηB/ηw 
   
1.General effort norms 0.96 1.14 
   
2. Cognitive conflict 0.94 1.10 
   
3. Use of skills 0.96 1.21 
   
4. Board monitoring role 0.99 1.22 
   
5. Board service role 0.93 1.07 
   
6. Board strategy role 0.96 1.13 
   
7. Board resource provision role 0.95 1.13 
 
5.4  RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY RESULTS 
 Cronbach’s reliability coefficient is calculated for the relevant board process 
and board role performance variables.  As illustrated in Table 5.6, the range is from 
0.71 to 0.91.  As these figures are above the 0.7 acceptable value suggested by 
Nunnally (1978), the items under each variable are kept.  It is however important to 
note that the reliability coefficient for board resource provision role at 0.71 is on the 
margin.   
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 Having established reliability, scale validity is then considered.  If common 
method and single-source problems were present, correlations among all or most items 
would be high.  Under those conditions, one can expect a single underlying or 
dominant factor that could be used to explain most of the variations in the 
questionnaire items.  Following Scott and Bruce (1994)'s suggestion, the Harman’s 
one-factor method is tested on the 26 items measuring board role performance.  
Extraction resulted in 4 factors for board role performance items, accounting for 63 per 
cent of the variance.  No single factor was apparent in the factor structure.  Hence, a 
single-factor measurement model is rejected in favour of a model that generally 
reflected theoretical expectations regarding the number of factors and the structural 
relationships between the factors and the observed measures. 




1.General effort norms 0.87 
  
2. Cognitive conflict 0.77 
  
3. Use of skills 0.90 
  
4. Board monitoring role 0.91 
  
5. Board service role 0.79 
  
6. Board strategy role 0.88 
  




5.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
To calculate the descriptive statistics and correlations, the average of the items 
for each board process (effort norms, cognitive conflict and use of skills) and board 
role performance variables (monitoring, service, strategy and resource provision) is 
used.  
Table 5.7 reports the variables (including their denotations) used for further 
data analysis.  The descriptive statistics and correlations of all the variables used in the 
study are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 respectively. 
 From Table 5.8, the revenue of respondent companies ranges from S$1.5 
million to S$30.6 billion, with a median of S$74.5 million and a mean of S$502.5 
million.  Thirty-eight per cent and six per cent of the companies are manufacturing and 
financial firms respectively.  For board leadership, 41 per cent of the boards have 
CEOs who are the board chairmen (CEO-chairman duality).  The proportion of non-
executive directors ranges from 25 per cent to 100 per cent, with a median and mean of 
57 per cent and 59 per cent respectively.  The proportion of independent directors 
ranges from 10 per cent to 100 per cent.  The median is 40 per cent while the mean is 
42 per cent.  The smallest board size is 4 while the largest is 15, with a median and 
mean of 7 members. 
 For board process variables, the values for general effort norms range from 2.2 
to 5 with a median and mean of 4.1.  In other words, a relatively high level of general 
effort norms is present in the boards. With regard to meeting intensity, the minimum 
hours of productive time spent during meetings is 1.75 hours while the maximum is 60 
hours.  Its median and mean are 10 hours and 12 hours respectively.  The range for 
cognitive conflict is from 1.9 to 5.  Both its median and mean have values of about 4.  
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The values for use of skills range from 1 to 5, with a median and mean of 3.8.  On 
average, the results show a relatively high level of cognitive conflict and use of skills. 
 In terms of board role performance variables, the range for the monitoring role 
is from 1.3 to 5.  The median and mean are 3.5 and 3.4 respectively.  Board service 
role has a minimum value of 1.40 and a maximum of 5.  The value for its median and 
mean is about 3.8.  The values for board strategy role range from 1.6 to 5.  The median 
and mean are 3.8 and 3.7 respectively.  Finally, for board resource provision role, the 
range is from 1.8 to 5, with a median and mean of 3.4.  On average, the results imply 
that directors carry out their various board roles. 
 From Table 5.9, there is no correlation statistic above the threshold of 0.8 to 
indicate the likely presence of serious multicollinearity among the independent 
variables (Hatcher, 1995; Gujarati, 2003).  But there is one case of relatively high 
correlation of 0.6 or more.  The bivariate correlation statistic between cognitive 
conflict and general effort norms is 0.66. 
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Table 5.7: Denotation of Variables 
 







is a manufacturing 
company) 
 
3.   FIN  
(Whether company 
is a financial 
company) 
1. CEO=CHAIR 
    (CEO-chairman 
duality) 
 
2. %NEDIR  








4. BSIZE  








     (Meeting intensity) 
     
3. COG_CONFLICT 
     (Cognitive conflict) 
 
4. USE_SKILLS 
     (Use of skills) 
1. MONITOR 
   (Board monitoring role)  
 
2. SERVICE 
   (Board service role) 
 
3. STRATEGY 
   (Board strategy role) 
 
4. RES_PROV 




%NEDIR = Number of NEDIR/BSIZE 
%INDIR = Number of INDIR/BSIZE 
 
 
Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics of Variables (n=212) 
  
Variables Min Median Mean Max SD 
REV(S$’mil) 1.53 74.51 502.52 30,614.19 2,278.94 
MFGa 0 0 0.38 1 0.49 
FINa 0 0 0.06 1 0.23 
CEO=CHAIRa 0 0 0.41 1 0.49 
%NEDIR 0.25 0.57 0.59 1 0.19 
%INDIR 0.10 0.40 0.42 1 0.15 
BSIZE 4 7 7.25 15 2.27 
GEN_EFFORTb 2.20 4.10 4.11 5 0.56 
MEETG_INTENY (hours) 1.75 10 12.11 60 8.72 
COG_CONFLICTb 1.90 4 3.91 5 0.53 
USE_SKILLSc 1 3.83 3.76 5 0.61 
MONITORb 1.30 3.50 3.41 5 0.62 
SERVICEb 1.40 3.80 3.75 5 0.51 
STRATEGYb 1.60 3.80 3.67 5 0.63 
RES_PROVb 1.80 3.40 3.40 5 0.56 
a For the binary variables, the mean represents the proportion of companies with value equals to 1 for the 
variable. 
b Scale of 1-5 (1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=agree; 5=strongly 
agree) 




Table 5.9: Correlations (n = 212) 
 Vi Variable V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
V1 REV 1.00        
V2 MFG -0.15 1.00       
V3 FIN 0.05 -0.19 1.00      
V4 CEO=CHAIR -0.22 0.08 0.01 1.00     
V5 %NEDIR 0.25 -0.05 0.18 -0.37 1.00    
V6 %INDIR 0.13 -0.05 0.16 -0.01 0.40 1.00   
V7 BSIZE 0.36 -0.18 0.19 -0.28 0.29 -0.18 1.00  
V8 GEN_EFFORT -0.02 -0.13 0.11 -0.11 0.13 0.05 0.06 1.00 
V9 MEETG_INTENY 0.26 -0.13 0.09 -0.09 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.11 
V10 COG_CONFLICT -0.05 -0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.66 
V11 USE_SKILLS 0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.08 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.64 
V12 MONITOR 0.09 -0.10 0.14 -0.12 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.66 
V13 SERVICE 0.05 -0.06 0.20 -0.09 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.56 
V14 STRATEGY 0.02 -0.05 0.11 -0.13 0.19 0.02 0.14 0.65 




Table 5.9 (con’t): Correlations (n=212) 
Vi Variable V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 
V1 REV        
V2 MFG        
V3 FIN        
V4 CEO=CHAIR        
V5 %NEDIR        
V6 %INDIR        
V7 BSIZE        
V8 GEN_EFFORT        
V9 MEETG_INTENY 1.00       
V10 COG_CONFLICT 0.03 1.00      
V11 USE_SKILLS 0.03 0.64 1.00     
V12 MONITOR 0.19 0.57 0.75 1.00    
V13 SERVICE 0.04 0.51 0.69 0.73 1.00   
V14 STRATEGY 0.14 0.66 0.75 0.76 0.76 1.00  
V15 RES_PROV 0.15 0.37 0.56 0.66 0.61 0.64 1.00 
 
Correlations with absolute values greater than 0.14 are significant at 0.05; those greater than 0.18 are significant at 0.01 (all two-tailed tests).
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5.6 REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The multiple regression method is used to test the 9 hypotheses under the 
structure model and the 3 hypotheses under the process model while the path analysis 
method (to be covered in the next section) is used to test the 9 hypotheses under the 
mediation model.   
The regression results are shown in Table 5.10.  The R2 for the four models 
range from 0.36 to 0.66 (all p<0.01).  The variance inflation factor (VIF) for all 
independent variables are less than 10.  There is therefore no statistical evidence to 
indicate the presence of serious multicollinearity (Table 5.11).   
There are two components (11 and 12) whereby the condition indices are above 
30 (Table 5.12).  This may indicate the presence of moderate dependencies among the 
independent variables.  It is therefore recommended to investigate the variance-
decomposition proportions of the independent variables (Belsley, 1991; Belsley et al., 
1980).  None of the components contribute more than 50 per cent of the variance of 
two variables.  Thus, based on the VIF and variance-decomposition proportions, 
serious multicollinearity is not detected among the independent variables. 
In terms of a board’s ability to perform its monitoring, service and strategy 
roles, none of the board structure variables are found to be significant.  See Table 5.10.  
Board size is positively related to board resource provision role (b=0.03, p<0.05).  
Thus, out of the 9 hypotheses under the structure model7, partial support is found for 
hypothesis 9 which states that “The proportion of outsider directors, and board size are 
positively related to board resource provision role”.  
Hypotheses 10-12 posit the relationship between board process and board 
performance roles.  Hypothesis 10 states that “Effort norms are positively related to the 
board role performance”.  The regression results show that general effort norms affect 
                                                           
7 The 9 hypotheses under the structure model are reported in pages 36-40. 
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the monitoring (b=0.31, p<0.01); service (b=0.17, p<0.05); strategy (b=0.20, p<0.01) 
and resource provision (b=0.17, p<0.05) roles.  Hence, Hypothesis 10 is supported. 
Hypothesis 11 states that “Cognitive conflict is positively related to the board 
role performance”.  Cognitive conflict is only found to be statistically related with 
board strategy role (b=0.28, p<0.01).  Thus, Hypothesis 11 is partially supported. 
 Hypothesis 12 states that “The use of skills is positively related to the board 
role performance”.  The use of skills is found to be statistically related with board 
monitoring (b=0.55, p<0.01); service (b=0.46, p<0.01); strategy (b=0.50, p<0.01) and 
resource provision (b=0.45, p<0.01) roles.  Thus, Hypothesis 12 is supported. 
 
Table 5.10: Multiple Regression Results 
Dependent variables MONITOR SERVICE STRATEGY RES_PROV 
Independent variables    
INTERCEPT 
 
-0.226 1.185** -0.156 1.095** 
REV 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MFG 
 
0.010 0.008 0.030 -0.028 
FIN 
 
0.131 0.025 0.147 -0.068 
CEO=CHAIR 
 
-0.023 -0.013 -0.047 -0.053 
%NEDIR 
 
-0.063 -0.002 0.140 0.085 
%INDIR 
 
-0.129 -0.042 -0.392 -0.143 
BSIZE 
 
0.019 0.006 0.014 0.031* 
GEN_EFFORT 
 
0.305** 0.166* 0.198** 0.174* 
MEETG_INTENY 
 
0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.003 
COG_CONFLICT 
 
0.046 0.036 0.276** -0.057 
USE_SKILLS 
 
0.550** 0.455** 0.495** 0.445** 
R2 0.637 0.524 0.657 0.360 
     
F 31.85** 20.02** 34.86** 10.24** 
     
d.f. 200 200 200 200 
     
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.11: Variance Inflation Factors 





































Table 5.12: Condition Index and Variance-Decomposition Proportions 
 
 








8.349 1.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 
 
1.134 2.713 0.00 0.33 0.07 0.28 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 
 
0.864 3.109 0.00 0.50 0.02 0.42 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 
 
0.606 3.712 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.03 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
5 
 
0.525 3.988 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
6 
 
0.287 5.397 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 
7 
 
0.107 8.828 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.47 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 
 
0.063 11.524 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.46 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 
9 
 
0.043 13.943 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.81 0.44 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 
 
0.011 27.64 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.53 
11 
 
0.007 35.067 0.47 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.54 0.00 0.42 0.43 
12 
 
0.006 38.544 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.57 0.01 
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5.7 PATH ANALYSIS RESULTS  
 Regression analysis is conducted to test the non-mediation hypotheses (H1-
H12) of the structure and process models.  To test the mediation hypotheses (H13-
H21) under the mediation model, another statistical method - path analysis – is used 
in the thesis.   
 Before discussing the statistical results, it is important to check if any of the 
assumptions for the use of path analysis is violated.  As covered in the previous 
chapter, there are five conditions to be fulfilled.  The details are as follows: 
(a)  Assumption 1 requires that the path model be constructed on the basis of a 
theoretical foundation.  As covered in Chapter 3, the models studied in this thesis 
are based on previous research.     
(b) Assumption 2 notes that the exogenous variables could be measured on a ratio, 
interval, ordinal or nominal scale.  Endogenous variables should be measured on a 
ratio, interval or ordinal scale.  These are applicable for the study variables. 
(c) Assumption 3 refers to the linear and additive relationships for path analysis.  The 
relationships between variables are both linear and additive.   
(d) Assumption 4 pertains to the absence of serious multicollinearity.  Examination of 
the bivariate correlation, VIF and variance-decomposition proportions do not 
detect the presence of serious multicollinearity among the variables.  As such, this 
assumption holds. 
(e) Assumption 5 recommends a minimum sample size of 200 for the use of path 
analysis.  This study has a sample size of 212. 
 In short, none of the required assumptions is violated. 
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As explained in Chapter 4, the mediation hypotheses can be tested by the use 
of direct and indirect effects models (Hatcher, 1995).  In the direct effects model, 
board structure and control variables are used as independent variables while board 
role performance variables are the dependent variables.  The direct and indirect 
effects model is similar to that of the direct model, except that the board process 
variables are inputted as mediating variables.  See Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
Figure 5.1: Direct Effects Model 1 
 
   Independent Variables                                                                        Dependent Variables  
   REV                                                                                                        MONITOR 
   MFG 
   FIN                                                                                                          SERVICE 
  CEO = CHAIR             
  %NEDIR                                                                                                  STRATEGY 
  %INDIR             
  BSZIE                                                                                                      RES_PROV 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Direct and Indirect Effects Model 
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The path analysis results are shown in Table 5.13.  The direct effects model 
demonstrates a model chi-square value of 421.96 with 6 degrees of freedom.  The 
model chi-square for the direct and indirect model is 347.89 with 12 degrees of 
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freedom.  The chi-square difference is 421.96 - 347.89 = 74.07 with difference test 
degrees of freedom equal to 12 – 6 = 6. 
The critical value of chi-square with 6 degrees of freedom is 18.55 for 
p<0.005.  There is statistical evidence for the board process variables mediate 
between board structure and board role performance.  The difference test thus shows 
that mediation is plausible. 
Table 5.13: Path Analysis Results 1 
Model Evaluation χ2 d.f. ∆χ2 
 Direct Effects Model 1 (Fig 5.1) 421.96 6 74.07** 
 Direct and Indirect Effects Model (Fig 5.2) 347.89 12  
  ** p<0.01 
 
To rule out other possibilities, one more chi-square difference test is required.  
Independent variables, mediating variables and dependent variables are used in the 
model.  The path between independent variables and mediating variables is 
eliminated.  The paths from independent variables to dependent variables and 
mediating variables to dependent variables are kept (Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3: Direct Effects Model 2 
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In other words, one is testing the so called “mediating variables” are not 
mediators but they might have some direct effects of their own on the dependent 
variables.  In essence, the test involves whether two sets of variables (independent 
variable set and mediator set) exhibit their own independent direct effects on the 
dependent variable set. 
Table 5.14 illustrates the results for the second difference test.  The direct 
effects model demonstrates a model chi-square value of 166.18 with 6 degrees of 
freedom.  The model chi-square for the direct and indirect model is 347.89 with 12 
degrees of freedom.  The chi-square difference is 347.89 – 166.18 = 74.07 with 
difference test degrees of freedom equal to 12 – 6 = 6. 
The critical value of chi-square with 6 degrees of freedom is 18.55 for 
p<0.005.  There is thus statistical evidence for the board process variables mediate 
between board structure and board role performance.  The second difference test thus 
shows that partial mediation model is superior. 
Table 5.14: Path Analysis Results 2 
Model Evaluation χ2 d.f. ∆χ2 
 Direct Effects Model 2 (Fig 5.3) 166.18 6 181.78** 
 Direct and Indirect Effects Model (Fig 5.2) 347.89 12  
  ** p<0.01 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the detailed path model.  Hypothesis 13 states that “CEO-
chairman duality and board size are negatively related to the level of board effort 
norms” while hypothesis 14 states that “The proportion of outsider directors is 
positively related to the level of board effort norms”.  No significant relationship is 
found between CEO-chairman duality and board size, and effort norms.  Hypothesis 
13 is thus not supported. 
In contrast, the proportion of non-executive directors (b=0.27, p<0.01) and the 
proportion of independent directors (b=0.31, p<0.01) affect general effort norms.  
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Hypothesis 14 is supported.  At the same time, general effort norms impact board 
monitoring (b=0.34, p<0.01), service (b=0.47, p<0.01), strategy (b=0.26, p<0.01) and 
resource provision (b=0.27, p<0.01) roles.  Thus, there is statistical evidence to show 
that general effort norms mediate the relationship between the proportion of outsider 
directors and board role performance.  This lends partial support to hypothesis 15 
which states that “Effort norms mediate the relationship between CEO-chairman 
duality; proportion of outsider directors and board size, and board role performance”. 
 Hypothesis 16 postulates that “CEO-chairman duality is negatively related to 
the level of cognitive conflict”.  This hypothesis is not supported.  Hypothesis 17 puts 
forward “The proportion of outsider directors, and board size are positively related to 
the level of cognitive conflict”.  From the results of the path model, the proportion of 
non-executive directors (b=0.31, p<0.01) and proportion of independent directors 
(b=0.46, p<0.01) are positively related to cognitive conflict.  Thus, hypothesis 17 is 
partially supported.  Cognitive conflict in turn has a positive relationship with the 
board’s ability to perform its strategy role (b=0.21, p<0.05).  There is therefore 
statistical evidence to suggest that cognitive conflict mediates between the proportion 
of outsider directors and board strategy role.  Thus, Hypothesis 18 which postulates 
that “Cognitive conflict mediates the relationship between CEO-chairman duality; 
proportion of outsider directors and board size, and board role performance” is 
partially supported. 
 Hypothesis 19, which states that “CEO-chairman duality is negatively related 
to the use of skills”, is not supported.  Hypothesis 20, which postulates that “The 
proportion of outsider directors, and board size are positively related to the use of 
skills” is partially supported.  From Figure 5.4, both the proportion of non-executive 
directors (b=0.35, p<0.01) and the proportion of independent directors (b=0.38, 
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p<0.01) affect the use of skills.  The use of skills in turn influences board monitoring 
(b=0.38, p<0.01), service (b=0.37, p<0.01), strategy (b=0.40, p<0.01) and resource 
provision (b=0.27, p<0.01) roles. Thus, there is statistical support to indicate that the 
use of skills mediates the relationship between the proportion of outsider directors and 
board role performance.  In other words, partial support is obtained for hypothesis 21 
which postulates that “Use of skills mediates the relationship between CEO-chairman 




Figure 5.4: Path Model Results For Mediation Model+ 
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+ For clarity, (a) only significant paths and (b) no direct paths are shown.   
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5.8 FURTHER ANALYSIS 
5.8.1 Breakdown Of Board Service Role Into Two Components 
The board service role in this study adopts the definition by Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) as “enhancing company reputation, establishing contacts with the external 
environment, and giving advice and counsel to executives” (1989: 292).  As a result, 
there could be two components to the service role: advice/counsel (ADV/COUNSEL) 
and reputation/contact building (REP/CONTACT).   
The multiple regression and path analysis methods are thus re-run with 
ADV/COUNSEL and REP/CONTACT as dependent variables.  As shown in Table 
5.15 for the multiple regression results, those variables which are significant remain 
the same irrespective of whether the board role of service or its two components are 
used as dependent variables. 
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Table 5.15: Multiple Regression Results (Board Service Role and Its Two 
Components) 
Dependent variables SERVICE ADV/COUNSEL REP/CONTACT 
Independent variables    
INTERCEPT 
 
1.185** 1.141** 1.214** 
REV 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
MFG 
 
0.008 -0.012 0.020 
FIN 
 
0.205 0.209 0.180 
CEO=CHAIR 
 
-0.013 0.004 -0.025 
%NEDIR 
 
-0.002 -0.060 0.036 
%INDIR 
 
-0.042 -0.031 -0.050 
BSIZE 
 
0.006 0.006 0.008 
GEN_EFFORT 
 
0.166* 0.161* 0.217** 
MEETG_INTENY 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
COG_CONFLICT 
 
0.036 0.093 -0.057 
USE_SKILLS 
 
0.455** 0.426** 0.475** 
R2 0.524 0.452 0.462 
    
F 20.02** 14.98** 15.62** 
    
d.f. 200 200 200 
    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Similarly, the path analysis method (Table 5.16 and Figure 5.6) produces the 
same result regardless of whether the overall board service or its two components are 
used.   
In addition, from the direct and indirect effects of both models, the chi square 
difference is 460.51-347.89 = 112.62 with difference test degrees equal to 16-12 = 4.  
The critical value of chi-square with 4 degrees of freedom is 14.86 for p<0.005.  
There is thus statistical evidence to suggest that the original model has a better fit than 
the decomposed model.   
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Table 5.16: Path Analysis Results (Board Service Role and Its Two Components) 
 
Original Model 1 (With Board Service Role 
As One Variable) 
χ2 d.f. ∆χ2 
 Direct Effects Model  421.96 6 74.07** 
 Direct and Indirect Effects Model  347.89 12  
    
Model 2 (With Board Service Role Broken 
Into Two Components) 
   
 Direct Effects Model  526.36 10 65.85** 
 Direct and Indirect Effects Model  460.51 16  








Figure 5.5: Path Model Results For Mediation Model (With Board Service Role Broken Into Two Components)+ 
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+ For clarity, (a) only significant paths and (b) no direct paths are shown.   
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.   
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5.8.2 Breakdown Of Full Sample Into Two Sub-samples 
One hundred and forty-four boards or 68% of the sample of 212 boards have 
one participant only.  There could be a possibility of sole respondent bias.  As such, 
the sample of 212 boards is divided into two sub-samples for data analysis.  One 
sample comprises the 144 boards (with 1 participant) and the other 68 boards (with 
more than 1 participant).  Multiple regression between the independent and dependent 
variables is conducted for the two sub-samples.  Path analysis method is however not 
recommended as one assumption for the testing of the path model is a minimum 
number of 200 observations.   Breaking the sample of 212 into two will result in the 
two sub-samples not fulfilling this assumption of path analysis. 
The regression results are shown in Tables 5.17-5.20. Independent variables 
which are significantly related to each board performance role are similar regardless 
of whether full sample (n=212) or the two sub-samples are used.  Thus, it may not be 
necessary to divide the full sample into two sub-samples for analysis. 
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Table 5.17: Multiple Regression Results for Board Monitoring Role (Full Sample 
and Sub-Samples) 
 






Independent variables   
INTERCEPT 
 
-0.226 -0.416 -0.047 
REV 
 




0.010 -0.035 0.107 
FIN 
 
0.131 0.073 0.272 
CEO=CHAIR 
 
-0.023 -0.012 -0.040 
%NEDIR 
 
-0.063 -0.232 0.144 
%INDIR 
 
-0.129 -0.007 -0.193 
BSIZE 
 
0.019 0.015 0.024 
GEN_EFFORT 
 
0.305** 0.314** 0.335* 
MEETG_INTENY 
 
0.001 0.007 0.014 
COG_CONFLICT 
 
0.046 0.023 0.197 
USE_SKILLS 
 
0.550** 0.643** 0.256* 
R2 0.637 0.655 0.658 
    
F 31.85** 22.78** 9.80** 
    
d.f. 200 132 56 
    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.18: Multiple Regression Results for Board Service Role (Full Sample and 
Sub-Samples) 
 






Independent variables   
INTERCEPT 
 
1.185** 1.511** 0.538 
REV 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
MFG 
 
0.008 -0.035 0.123 
FIN 
 
0.025 0.240 0.328 
CEO=CHAIR 
 
-0.013 -0.008 -0.043 
%NEDIR 
 
-0.002 -0.045 0.186 
%INDIR 
 
-0.042 -0.078 0.095 
BSIZE 
 
0.006 0.008 -0.006 
GEN_EFFORT 
 
0.166* 0.158* 0.283* 
MEETG_INTENY 
 
-0.002 -0.002 0.001 
COG_CONFLICT 
 
0.036 0.011 0.071 
USE_SKILLS 
 
0.455** 0.432** 0.433** 
R2 0.524 0.470 0.684 
    
F 20.02** 10.65** 11.03** 
    
d.f. 200 132 56 
    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.19: Multiple Regression Results for Board Strategy Role (Full Sample and 
Sub-Samples) 
 






Independent variables   
INTERCEPT 
 
-0.156 -0.371 0.262 
REV 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
MFG 
 
0.030 -0.020 0.135 
FIN 
 
0.147 0.128 -0.067 
CEO=CHAIR 
 
-0.047 -0.062 -0.123 
%NEDIR 
 
0.140 0.059 0.267 
%INDIR 
 
-0.392 -0.448 -0.246 
BSIZE 
 
0.014 0.021 -0.024 
GEN_EFFORT 
 
0.198** 0.151* 0.433** 
MEETG_INTENY 
 
0.005 0.006 0.004 
COG_CONFLICT 
 
0.276** 0.325** 0.240* 
USE_SKILLS 
 
0.495** 0.557** 0.308* 
R2 0.657 0.659 0.725 
    
F 34.86** 23.15** 13.41** 
    
d.f. 200 132 56 
    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
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 Table 5.20: Multiple Regression Results for Board Resource Provision Role (Full 
Sample and Sub-Samples) 
 






Independent variables   
INTERCEPT 
 
1.095** 0.997* 1.149* 
REV 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
MFG 
 
-0.028 -0.050 0.022 
FIN 
 
-0.068 -0.086 -0.224 
CEO=CHAIR 
 
-0.053 -0.066 -0.027 
%NEDIR 
 
0.085 -0.058 0.327 
%INDIR 
 
-0.143 0.020 -0.517 
BSIZE 
 
0.031* 0.033* 0.060* 
GEN_EFFORT 
 
0.174* 0.177* 0.187* 
MEETG_INTENY 
 
0.003 0.004 0.001 
COG_CONFLICT 
 
-0.057 -0.093 0.141 
USE_SKILLS 
 
0.445** 0.493** 0.377* 
R2 0.360 0.356 0.416 
    
F 10.24** 6.64** 3.63** 
    
d.f. 200 132 56 
    
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
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5.8.3 Extension of Conceptual Model To Firm Performance 
The study adopts a self-rating questionnaire.  Kula (2005) also conducted a 
somewhat similar study (to this thesis) using a self-rating instrument to capture board 
process, board roles and firm performance data.  As in both studies, to improve the 
survey methodology, assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, the aim of the study 
and the indication of no individual level of analysis are explained in cover letters to the 
targeted respondents.  Participants however may not have provided honest responses.  
Hence, some tests using firm performance data should be useful for the study. 
 
Relationship between Board Role Performance and Firm Performance 
Following the review of literature by Zahra and Pearce (1989) and the theoretical 
model proposed by Forbes and Milliken (1999), the conceptual model in this study is 
extended to firm performance (Figure 5.6).   
 
Figure 5.6: Revised Conceptual Model 
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Forbes and Milliken (1999) noted that board’s ability to perform its various roles 
will affect firm performance directly.  From the agency perspective, board contribution to 
firm performance occurs by reducing agency costs arising from established goals and 
procedures (board monitoring role); providing advice to the CEO and through strategic 
decision-making (Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  Under the stewardship 
perspective, board’s advisory service to enhance board-management ties and decision-
making could contribute to firm performance (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  Resource 
dependence theory views directors, because of their prestige in their professions and 
communities, are able to extract resources for company operations (Goodstein et al., 
1994; Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 1980).  In addition, boards are important boundary spanners 
that provide strategic information for companies to perform effectively (Stiles & Taylor, 
2001). 
In the revised conceptual model, no relationship is hypothesized between board 
structure and firm performance, and board process and firm performance.  As argued by 
Dalton et al. (1998; 1999), the results of board structure/financial performance meta-
analyzes suggested no relationship of a meaningful level.  Thus, the researchers indicated 
that they “are not optimistic that future research in the general areas of board 
composition/financial performance and board leadership/financial performance would be 
fruitful” (Dalton et al., 1998: 284).  Similarly, for board size/financial performance, 
Dalton et al. (1999: 674) noted that “There has also been no consensus regarding the 
direction of the performance relationship one would expect as a function of board size”. 
For board process/firm performance, no hypothesized relationship between these 
two variables is proposed.  As suggested by Forbes and Milliken (1999), the impact of 
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boards on firm performance will come from board roles directly.  In addition, the 
empirical results in this thesis support the mediating role of board process between board 
structure and board role performance.  Thus, it is hypothesized that the impact of boards 
on firm performance occurs through board roles: 
 H22: Board role performance is positively related with firm performance. 
Expanding from the hypotheses H10-H12 in the process model (pp. 42-44), 
another hypothesis to be tested in this section is: 
H23: Board role performance mediates the relationship between board process 
and firm performance. 
 
Firm Performance Measures 
Dalton et al. (1998) noted that existing research addressing firm performance has 
relied on accounting-based financial indicators (e.g. Boyd, 1995; Buchholtz & Ribbins, 
1994; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994), market-based indicators or a combination of both 
(e.g. Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994; Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993).   
For this study, following Bonn et al. (2004)’s research, two measures are used.  
The first firm performance variable is return on assets (ROA).  ROA is an accounting 
measure that assesses the efficiency of assets employed.  This indicator has been 
frequently used in other studies (e.g. Lincoln, Gerlach & Takahashi, 1992; Shrader, 
Blackburn & Iles, 1997).  The second firm performance variable is market-to-book ratio 
(MB).  MB is a commonly-used market-based indicator.  It is calculated as the ratio of 
market capitalization to the current book value of total assets (Vogt & Vu, 2000).   
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It is reasonable to assume that board role performance will have a lead impact on 
firm performance.  Adapting from Bonn et al. (2004), firm performance data are collected 
for year 2002 vis-à-vis 2001 for all other data.  Firm performance data are available from 
annual reports of the companies and Pulses, a publication by Singapore Exchange. 
On the other hand, firm performance data are not available for six companies in 
2002.  They were delisted from the stock exchange due to reasons of acquisition and 




The same control variables in this thesis – firm size and industry effects - are also 
used on firm performance.  According to Hannan and Freeman (1989), smaller firms 
change more readily and that larger firms inhibit creativity and innovation.  While change 
is not universally related with positive impact, it would appear that the relatively early 
adoption of innovation by small firms can be a significant characteristic of organizational 
progress and renewal, leading to better firm performance (Rogers, 1995).  Similarly, 
industry-level controls are included to remove any potential industry effects on firm 
performance (Smith et al., 1994).  
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 5.21 shows the descriptive statistics of variables (n=206), including the two 
new firm performance variables.  For ROA, the range is between -60 per cent and 38 per 
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cent, with a median and mean of about 1 per cent.  The lowest value of MB is 0.0003 and 
the highest 5.62.  The median and mean MBs are 0.34 and 0.52 respectively. 
In addition, an examination of the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables 
for the original n=212 and new n=206 show little differences. 
Table 5.22 reports the bivariate correlation statistics.  There is no value above 0.8 
to suggest the likely presence of serious multicollinearity among the independent 
variables (Hatcher, 1995; Gujarati, 2003).  However, there are 14 (13 per cent) out of 105 
cases of relatively high correlation of 0.6 and above. Three examples are: 
(a) Between cognitive conflict and general effort norms (0.66) 
(b) Between use of skills and board strategy role (0.75) and 
(c) Between board service role and board strategy role (0.76). 
 
Moreover, regardless the sample size of 212 or 206, the correlation statistics 
exhibit little differences. 
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Table 5.21: Descriptive Statistics of Variables (n=206) 
  























































































































































ROA -0.5910 0.0050 0.0148 0.3798 0.1123 
MB 0.0003 0.3454 0.5156 5.6160 0.6164 
Numbers in parentheses in table pertain to the original descriptive statistics of variables of n=212, p. 88. 
a For the binary variables, the mean represents the proportion of companies with value equals to 1 for the 
variable. 
b Scale of 1-5 (1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree) 
c Scale of 1-5 (1=very low; 2= low; 3=neither low nor high; 4=high; 5=very high) 
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Table 5.22: Correlations (n = 206) 
 Vi Variable V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 
V1 REV 1.00 
(1.00) 
  
   
   





   
   





(1.00)    
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0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.02 
V17 MB 
 
-0.09 0.02 -0.10 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 -0.05 
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Table 5.22 (con’t): Correlations (n=206) 








































     
V9 MEETG_INTENY 
    































































-0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 1.00  
V17 MB 
 
0.04 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.09 1.00 
 
Numbers in parentheses in table pertain to the original bivariate correlation statistics of variables of n=212, pp. 89-90. 
Correlations with absolute values greater than 0.14 are significant at 0.05; those greater than 0.18 are significant at 0.01 (all two-tailed tests).
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Regression Analysis Results 
The multiple regression method is used to test hypothesis 22, “Board role 
performance is positively related with firm performance”.  As illustrated in Table 5.23, 
this hypothesis is not supported.  None of the board role performance variables are 
found to be significant. 
 
Table 5.23: Multiple Regression Results For Firm Performance 
 
Dependent variables ROA MB 














































RES_PROV 0.000 0.101 
   
R2 0.037 0.070 
   
F 0.493 0.953 
   
d.f. 205 205 
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Path Analysis Results 
Using the methodology explained in Chapter 4, hypothesis 23: “Board role 
performance mediates the relationship between board process and firm performance” 
can be tested by the use of direct and indirect effects models (Hatcher, 1995).  In the 
direct effects model, board structure and control variables are used as independent 
variables while firm performance variables are the dependent variables.  The direct and 
indirect effects model is similar to that of the direct model, except that the board 
process and board role variables are inputted as mediating variables.  See Figures 5.7 
and 5.8. 
 
Figure 5.7: Direct Effects Model For Firm Performance 
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Figure 5.8: Direct and Indirect Effects Model For Firm Performance 
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The path analysis results are shown in Table 5.24.  The direct effects model 
demonstrates a model chi-square value of 2.0319 with 1 degree of freedom.  The 
model chi-square for the direct and indirect model is 6.1287 with 13 degrees of 
freedom.  The chi-square difference is 6.1287-2.0319 = 4.0968 with difference test 
degrees of freedom equal to 13 – 1 = 12. 
The critical value of chi-square with 12 degrees of freedom is 21.0261 for 
p<0.05.  Thus, hypothesis 23 “Board role performance mediates the relationship 
between board process and firm performance” is not supported. 
 
Table 5.24: Path Analysis Results For Firm Performance  
Model Evaluation χ2 d.f. ∆χ2 
 Direct Effects Model 1 (Fig 5.7) 2.0319 1 4.0968 




Firm performance is a very complex construct (Rhoades et al., 2000).  Kosnik 
(1987: 163) for example points out that a firm’s financial performance is likely to be 
affected by a “multitude of endogenous and exogenous factors” which makes isolation 
of board factors extremely difficult.  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) also argued that as 
there are various factors affecting stock performance (a firm performance indicator), it 
is incorrect to deduce that excellent U.S. corporate governance accounted for better 
performance in U.S. than that of France, Germany, U.K. and Japan.   
Hendry and Kiel (2004) added that the ability of the board to impact on firm 
performance is a problematic one.  Based on their review of existing literature, they 
identified two major challenges on this topic: (1) the reliance on proxies for board 
roles rather than direct measures and (2) the lack of quantitative data linking board 
roles to firm performance.   
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This study has measured the various board roles directly and in this section, an 
attempt is made to examine the relationship between board role performance and firm 
performance.  Despite the latter attempt, no significant relationship is found.  A 
possible reason could be the nature of data.  In attempting to measure board process 
and board role performance directly, a cross-sectional approach is used in this study.8  
More time-series of board process and role performance data will be needed before a 
more rigorous test between board role performance and firm performance could be 
attempted. 
 
5.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The research question in this thesis pertains to whether board structure and/or 
board process affects board role performance.  This chapter presents the research 
findings.  The general conclusion is that both board structure and board process affect 
board role performance.  However, in view of its stronger impact on board role 
performance, process appears to be a more important determinant than structure. 
The data analysis comprises two main types: multiple regression and path 
analysis.  Regression is used to test both the structure and process models.  The results 
show that board size affects the board resource provision role.  Two board process 
variables (general effort norms and use of skills) are positively related with the board 
role performance (monitoring, service, strategy and resource provision).  In addition, 
cognitive conflict, another board process variable, impacts board strategy role. 
Results from another statistical technique – path analysis – are generally similar 
to those found under the regression method.  The path analysis results conclude that 
general effort norms and use of skills also influence the board’s ability to perform its 
four roles of monitoring, service, strategy and resource provision; and cognitive 
                                                           
8 The cross-sectional approach of this study is noted as a limitation in the concluding chapter. 
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conflict is positively related with the board strategy role.  A new finding from the path 
analysis method is that both the proportions of both non-executive directors and 
independent directors affect the three board process variables of general effort norms, 
cognitive conflict and use of skills.   
In addition, three cases of further data analysis are conducted.  One involves 
the breakdown of the board service role into the two sub-roles of advice/counsel and 
reputation/contact building.  The other concerns the division of the full sample into 
two sub-samples.  The first sub-sample consists of the 144 boards which have 1 
participant only while the second sub-sample comprises the 68 boards with more than 
1 participant.  The results from these further analyses do not differ from the initial 
findings with respect to the significant variables.  Hence, it is decided to retain the 
initial results which will be discussed in the next chapter.   
For the third case of further analysis, the original conceptual model is extended 
to firm performance as a dependent variable.  Two firm performance measures are 
used: return on assets and market-to-book ratio. The results show no relationship 
between the various independent variables (board structure, board process and board 
role performance) and firm performance.  A possible reason could be the nature of 
data.  In attempting to measure board process and board role performance directly, a 
cross-sectional approach is used in this study.   More time-series of board process and 
role performance data will be needed before a more rigorous test between board role 
performance and firm performance could be attempted. 
 






 There are three sections in this chapter.  The first section presents a discussion 
of the findings.  Insights from the 16 interviews conducted will be incorporated as they 
may provide partial validation to the results.  In the second section, the implications of 
the findings are deliberated.  Some concluding remarks are then covered in the third 
and final section. 
 
6.1 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
6.1.1 Board Size And Board Resource Provision Role  
 Based on the multiple regression results in Chapter 5, the study shows that 
board size in Singapore listed companies is positively related to a board’s resource 
provision role.  From the resource dependence theory perspective, a larger board 
brings greater opportunity for more environmental links and hence more access to 
resources.  Larger boards could mean more directors with diverse expertise and 
multiple perspectives that improve the quality of actions taken by the firm.  As noted 
by Goodstein et al. (1994), board size is often taken to be a measure of an 
organization’s ability to form environmental links to secure critical resources.  Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978: 172) also argued that “The greater the need for effective external 
linkage, the larger the board should be”. 
 The Singapore finding is similar to those found in the literature.  Pfeffer (1972, 
1973) and Provan (1980), for example, concluded that board size was associated with a 
firm’s ability to extract critical resources such as skills and leverage from the 
environment.  Booth and Deli (1996) found that the size of a board would reflect the 
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extent of a firm’s linkage with the environment.  Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004) 
noted that a larger board enables a company to co-opt multiple aspects of the firm’s 
environment thus securing resources for the company.  Mak and Rosch (2000) have 
therefore remarked that past studies suggest that larger boards are beneficial from the 
resource dependence perspective. 
However, any argument for bigger board size should be treated with caution.  
Research has shown that an effective board size ranges from 7 to 9 (Firstenberg & 
Malkiel, 1994; Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  Yermack (1996) and Vafeas 
(1999) have also documented an inverse relationship between board size and firm 
value.   
According to group dynamics theory, if a group grows too large, 
communication among directors would likely become increasingly difficult; directors 
would find it harder to get to know each other and only a fraction of the board would 
participate in board discussions. If a director fails to prepare for or participate in a 
board meeting, the chances are that the lapse would go completely unnoticed 
(Gladstein, 1984; Goodstein et al., 1994; Shaw, 1981).   
Board size in Singapore companies is relatively small.  The average size is 7.  
Only about 15 per cent of the Singapore boards have board size of 10 or more.  This 
suggests that Singapore boards on the whole are of effective size. 
 
6.1.2 General Effort Norms And Board Role Performance 
Both the multiple regression and path analysis results in Chapter 5 show a 
positive relationship between general effort norms and all four board performance 
roles of monitoring, service, strategy and resource provision.  General effort norms 
pertain to a board’s preparation for meetings; participation in meetings; analysis of 
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information and a sense of responsibility for work.  As norms are shared beliefs 
developed over time, they often exert strong impact on member behaviour (Wageman, 
1995).  Strong effort norms therefore enhance effort of individual members to 
undertake their roles seriously (Latane et al., 1979; Steiner, 1972; Weldon & Gargano, 
1985).  For example, a norm whereby directors go through the meeting agenda 
carefully will enable the board to be in a better position to monitor the performance of 
managers; advise the managers; debate on the various strategic options/opportunities 
and know what resources the company will need.   
Similarly, by analyzing the information, directors are able to perform the 
service role of advice and counsel more effectively by questioning/advising the 
CEOs/senior executives (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).   Boards that are not able to co-
operate may end up under the CEO control; less effective in providing advice/counsel; 
less willing to participate in strategic decision-making and less motivated to secure 
resources for the company. 
Some support for having good effort norms in the boards of Singapore listed 
companies comes from the interviews.  Examples include: 
The presence of certain board norms is useful.  They enable directors to 
perform their given roles better.  Traditionally in the board, the agenda 
and reports are given on the day of the meeting itself.  As such, non-
executive directors are not able to contribute much. Worse still, they 
may even look “stupid” at times.  Now, as information is given ahead of 
all meetings, directors are in a better position to question the managers 
of certain decisions.             (Independent director) 
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Proper documentation of information is stressed in boards.  With the 
correct information at hand, the company can be continuously 
monitored.  In addition, this practice is advantageous to the service role 
of advising management and strategic role in terms of strategy 
evaluation.     (Non-executive chairman) 
 
Good effort norms have developed over the years, leading to the 
prevalence of service in the company. This is particularly so in the 
areas of law and finance, and evaluation of new projects.      
                 (Executive director) 
The above citations show that certain norms such as preparation for meetings; 
active participation in meetings; proper documentation and analysis of information and 
a sense of work responsibility should enable the boards to perform their roles better.  
 
6.1.3 Use Of Skills And Board Role Performance  
Similar to the impact of general effort norms on board role performance, use of 
skills was found to exhibit a positive effect on all the four board roles of monitoring, 
service, strategy and resource provision among Singapore listed companies.   
Based on the literature on group research, a greater level of skills enables 
boards to increase the number of items of information that can be absorbed and 
recalled; expand the number of critical judgments available to correct errors in 
inference and analysis; boost the number of potential solutions and multiply the range 
of perspectives on a task (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993).  An increase in capabilities 
could account for higher-quality decisions in groups (Cummings, Huber & Arendt, 
1974; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). 
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Skills which are important for board role performance, which is studied in this 
thesis, are: strategic thinking; analytical thinking; communications skills; interaction 
skills; management skills and result-oriented perspectives.  By integrating the various 
skills, boards are in a better position to monitor the performance of the managers.  For 
the service role, directors combine their knowledge of various functional areas and use 
this skill on firm-specific issues.  As a result, the board is able to offer valuable 
counsel and service to managers. 
In the area of strategy, the board will need to have a detailed understanding of 
how new and existing businesses would complement each other in order to make 
informed decisions regarding diversification or acquisition.  Board members’ 
knowledge and skills complementing that of the CEO and top management provide a 
richer consideration and resolution of strategic issues. 
From the resource dependence theory, skills are the most valuable assets for a 
company (Carter & Lorsch, 2003).  It will be very difficult for a single person or a 
small group of individuals to understand all the board issues.  A board should thus 
comprise of directors with skills that are diverse and complement one another.  Boards 
are only as good as the people who sit on them. 
The importance of skills for board role performance may also be illustrated 
from the face-face interviews.  Two specific mentions are: 
It is important to find the right directors with the right skills for the job 
in a board.  For example, for a tobacco company, a non-smoker may be 
a wrong choice.  Similarly, asking someone with an engineering 
background for a marketing plan is likely to be doomed. 




As the independent directors are members of the audit and 
remuneration committees, they monitor the performance of the 
managers and the company.  With their relevant skills in law and 
finance, the lawyer and accountant could advise the CEO and other 
board members (all with engineering degrees) on such matters.  The 
other non-executive director, the business associate, was brought into 
the board this year as he has good experience in doing business in 
China.  The business associate now handles the company’s expansion 
plans in Asia. Furthermore, as all three non-executive directors are 
experts in their respective fields, they often provide alternative views for 
company operations.  All directors have to make use of their skills to 
help the company.                               (CEO) 
 
In other words, directors should utilize their skills for the benefit of the 
company.  The positive relationship between the use of skills, and board role 
performance among Singapore boards is also similar to two studies in the U.S. 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Finegold, Benson, Lawler & Conger, 1998).    Using a 
random sample of 228 companies from Forbes 1000 companies, Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) argued that directors might not perform their monitoring and service 
roles well if they do not use the necessary skills for decision-making.  The two 
researchers concluded that any model of board effectiveness should consider the 
abilities of directors.  In another study, based on 300 U.S. companies, Finegold et al 
(1998) found a positive relationship between the use of technical expertise of 
directors, and the board’s monitoring ability of company performance; strategic 
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effectiveness in shaping long-term strategic plans and networking effectiveness in 
bolstering the company’s image. 
 
6.1.4 Cognitive Conflict And Board Strategy Role  
 The data analysis results in Chapter 5 show a positive relationship between 
cognitive conflict and board strategy role among Singapore listed companies.  
Cognitive conflict refers to the task-oriented differences among group members (Jehn, 
1995).  It pertains to the differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions.  Such diversity 
may encourage good debate among members (Amason, 1996).  In terms of board role 
performance, this process is especially beneficial for the discussion of strategic issues 
whereby alternative perspectives and courses of action are often required.  It improves 
the board’s strategic mental map.   
Thus, cognitive conflicts may lead to the consideration of more alternatives and 
the careful analysis of these alternatives (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Jackson, 1992).  This 
enhances the board’s ability to produce quality strategic decision-making. 
The importance of cognitive conflict for a board’s strategy role can be seen 
from the views provided in two face-to-face interviews: 
Conflicts should be seen in a positive manner.  One is free to agree or 
disagree with board decisions.  This is because conflicts allow various 
viewpoints and perspectives, and are especially important for decisions 
whereby there is a great degree of uncertainty.  A good example is 
overseas expansion whereby returns are never guaranteed and there 




In a well-managed company, there are differing views.  This is expected 
with different backgrounds of directors, leading to quality debate and 
decisions.                      (Independent director) 
 
Thus, different opinions and views should be encouraged during board 
meetings.  This should provide an impetus for careful consideration of strategic plans.   
 
6.1.5 Outsider Directors And Board Process (General Effort Norms, Cognitive 
Conflict and Use of Skills) 
Based on the path analysis results in Chapter 5, it is found that among the 
Singapore listed companies, outsider directors enhance the effort norms of the boards; 
contribute to cognitive conflict and increase the use of skills. This is because outsider 
directors see their roles differently from those of management (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999).  As such, they tend to prepare for board meetings, participate actively in 
discussions and analyze the information in advance.  They may feel responsible for the 
work and possess a sense of satisfaction for the work done.  At the same time, the high 
standards exhibited by outsider directors may set a good example for the other 
executive directors. Consequently, a high level of effort norms may occur. 
In addition, boards value outsider directors because such members are likely to 
engage in cognitive conflict by providing informed but differing points of views.  
Being not part of management, outsider directors are likely to debate more freely with 
regard to the company’s performance and offer a wider range of decision alternatives 
(Monks & Minow, 2004).  Such debate help the board to better understand issues 
surrounding the decision context.  This further synthesizes the multiple points of views 
into a decision that is often superior to any individual perspective. 
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As argued by Zahra and Pearce (1989), outsider directors may provide top 
management with skills of a quality unobtainable from company executives.  Lorsch 
and MacIver (1989) reported that many outsider directors are themselves CEOs, who 
have the necessary expertise to be effective.  As CEOs understand the complexity of 
running a firm, they are more likely to utilize their skills for the benefit of the 
companies. 
In another study, Hillman et al. (2000) remarked that outsider directors 
comprise three main groups: business experts (e.g. CEOs of other companies); support 
specialists (e.g. lawyers and accountants) and community leaders (e.g. politicians and 
university professors).  Each group brings a different type of skills to be used in the 
board. 
 Some insights on the relationship between outsider directors and board process 
may be deduced from two face-to-face interviews: 
The presence of non-executive directors will put management on their 
toes.  With their industry knowledge, non-executive directors could also 
assess whether strategic plans of the company are viable.  A company 
whereby the board members are professionals will see a high level of 
board processes.                           (Non-executive chairman) 
 
How to have quality debate if there are no or few non-executive 
directors?  How to have skills like law and accounting if there are no 
outside professional directors?          (Independent director) 
  
Thus, outsider directors could be important for bringing about a high level of 




 Based on the various findings in the study, four implications arise: 
(a)  the importance of studying separate board roles; 
(b) the importance of studying board process;  
(c) the potential of extending the agency and resource dependence theories and 
(d) the possibility of introducing a code of board process. 
 
6.2.1 Importance Of Studying Separate Board Roles 
 The dependent variable in this thesis is board role performance.  Instead of 
investigating performance in general, four specific board roles are examined: 
monitoring, service, strategy and resource provision.  As argued by Daily et al. 
(2004:375), “In addition to the monitoring role, directors fulfill resource, service, and 
strategy roles”.   
The results in this study show that it is important to study separate board roles 
as the roles can be affected by different independent variables.  Board monitoring and 
service roles are impacted by general effort norms and use of skills.  As for board 
strategy role, besides these two independent variables, cognitive conflict is also an 
independent variable.  On the other hand, three independent variables – board size, 
general effort norms and use of skills – are positively related to board resource 
provision roles.  Thus, by studying all four different board roles together in a study, a 
better understanding of the factors influencing board role performance can be obtained.    
 
6.2.2 Importance Of Studying Board Process 
In this study, not much support was found for the argument underlying the 
structure model, in which board structure rather than process affects board role 
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performance.  The present finding contradicts Pfeffer’s (1983) contention that process 
measures can be dismissed because they account for little of the variation in outcomes. 
Although researchers have long recognized the importance of board process, 
most have taken the approach by emphasizing board structure and inferring process 
relationships.  The direct measurement of process variables has been by-passed in 
many earlier studies, perhaps because such data are difficult to obtain from the 
directors.  The finding that process accounts for the bulk of board role performance 
highlights the need for more process-centred research. 
Of particular importance is the two board process variables of general effort 
norms and use of skills.  Both variables are found to affect all four board roles.  
However, developing strong effort norms takes time.  As directors spend little time 
together, there are few opportunities to coalesce as a team (Finkelstein & Mooney, 
2003).  While a logical solution is for directors to spend more time together, this is 
difficult as the majority of them are busy executives.   
Moreover, it is the quality of time and not the quantity of time that could be 
more important (Vafeas, 1999).  Studies in the U.S. have shown that directors 
undertake their duties with varying degree of attentiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
Some boards simply go through the motion (Mace, 1986).  Others undertake serious 
research and participate actively in board discussions (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). 
Since effort norms have a significant impact on board role performance, boards 
should thus demand adequate time for preparation of meeting; ensure that meetings are 
not overscheduled and clarify behavioural expectations on such matters as attendance 
at board meetings, confidentiality of discussion and involvement of discussions. 
 As for the use of skills, there are two related trends.  One is the shortage of 
good qualified directors and the other is the difficulty of recruiting them (Nadler, 2004; 
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The Economist, 2004).  Within Asia for example, a McKinsey study has found that the 
pool of qualified directors is typically small (Barton, Coombes & Wong, 2004).  
Secondly, recruiting directors has also become a tough job as a result of the perceived 
increase in both responsibilities and risks.  In the U.S., the added responsibilities have 
increased the time workload of a director by about 25 per cent (The Economist, 2003).   
The duration and frequency of board meetings have also increased in recent years.  
Besides, there has been a rise in the perceived risk of sitting on a corporate board.  In 
the U.S. and U.K., lawsuits against directors have been rising both in number and size.  
The situation is made more difficult as many companies are unwilling to allow their 
managers to sit on more than one corporate board (The Economist, 2004).   
Since skills are important but limited, more research into how the pool of 
directors could be increased should be undertaken.  For example, a board could widen 
the age group and experience criteria for board members, and examine this impact on 
board role performance.   
 
6.2.3 Potential Of Extending Agency And Resource Dependence Theories  
 One result in this thesis shows that the proportion of outsider directors affects 
board role performance indirectly through the mediating board process variables of 
general effort norms, cognitive conflict and use of skills.  This may provide some 
potential to incorporate board process variables more explicitly into current 
governance theories.  For example, Pye and Pettigrew (2005) noted that a lack of 
theoretical framework often undermines the impact of process studies into governance 
theories which tend to centre on board structure. 
Both the agency and resource dependence theories advocate the importance of 
outsider directors.  For example, agency theorists argued that outsider directors will be 
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in a better position to provide checks and balances to monitor the performance of 
managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Fama and Jensen (1983) 
also emphasized that outsider directors may facilitate effective evaluation of 
management proposals by providing valuable advice.  Resource dependence 
proponents noted that outsider directors serve as a board’s link with the external 
environment for access to resources such as skills and information (Hillman et al, 
2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  The provision of these resources in turn enhances 
organizational functioning and survival (Daily, et al., 2003).   
In general, compared to board structure, board process is much less emphasized 
in governance theories.  This could be due to the lack of access to primary research for 
board process studies.  The Singapore data may have thus provided some evidence to 
the importance of board process as a link between outsider directors and board role 
performance.  It suggests further research by incorporating board process more 
explicitly into the agency and resource dependence theories.   
 
6.2.4 Possibility Of Introducing A Code Of Board Process  
The various codes of corporate governance worldwide have led to a set of “best 
practices”.  But the initiatives do not seem to have brought about sustained effective 
actions overall (Carter & Lorsch, 2003).  One reason is that the recommendations are 
based on characteristics of boards that are visible to outside parties.  They say little 
about what actually happened inside the boardroom (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 
2005).   
Hence, an implication is to develop a code which incorporates and emphasizes 
the importance of board process.  Directors themselves should uphold the importance 
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of board process.  They should participate actively in board meetings, possess and use 
the necessary skills and contribute to the growth of companies. 
But the implementation of such a code could be difficult.  Firstly, companies 
may not be willing to disclose how board decisions are made.  Secondly, shareholders 
– the owners of the firms – may not demand for such a code.  What shareholders want 
is that the ultimate decisions made by the companies are beneficial to them.  They are 
unlikely to be very interested in the detailed board processes.  Thirdly, the code of 
board process may be seen as another “form-ticking” exercise.  Practising the 
substance of corporate governance may require a long time.   
Nevertheless, a code of board process appears to be essential and useful for the 
next stage of corporate governance development.  Based on the survey and interview 
findings of this study, four propositions can be advocated to enhance the quality of 
board process in a company: 
(a) The chairman, being the top person in the board, should take the lead in promoting 
good effort norms.  These include absorbing the details of meeting agendas before 
meetings, taking responsibilities for his/her role and participating actively in 
meetings. 
(b) The chairman should engage all directors in productive debate/discussion.  He/she 
should allow cognitive conflicts, whereby there are different viewpoints and 
critical thinking, to flourish in meetings.   
(c) The chairman should ensure that the board has a proper mix of skills.  More 
importantly, he/she should make sure that the right skills are used. 
(d) All other directors should support board process actively.  The board is like an 
orchestra. The chairman is the conductor. Without the participation from the 
directors, nothing is achieved.  
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6.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Board role performance is often considered to be a complex phenomenon.  This 
study goes further by empirically verifying the argument.  By integrating various 
governance and social psychology perspectives, board role performance is modelled on 
three different conceptual models (structure, process and mediation).   
Two board structure variables (the proportion of outsider directors and board 
size) and three board process variables (general effort norms, cognitive conflict and 
use of skills) are crucial determinants of board role performance.  Arising from the 
findings, the implications are: (a) the importance of studying separate board roles; (b) 
the importance of studying board process; (c) the potential of incorporating board 
process more explicitly into the agency and resource dependence theories and (d) the 
possibility of introducing a code of board process. 
The next chapter will conclude the thesis.  In that chapter, an overview of the 
study, the limitations of the study, areas for future research and contributions of the 
study will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
CONCLUSION 
 
Boards sit at the apex of organizations and have to deal with complex business 
problems in a short time-span and often with incomplete information.  The roles are 
multiple and often conflicting.  In major organizations, boards control huge resources 
and employ large a number of people.  Board role performance is therefore of major 
significance, not just to the individual companies but to the wider society (Stiles & 
Taylor, 2000). 
This study has examined the factors affecting board role performance.  Board 
role performance is hypothesized to be a function of board structure and/or board 
process.  Based on a survey of 212 listed companies in Singapore and 16 face-to-face 
interviews with industry representatives/directors/company secretaries, the findings 
suggest that both board structure and board process affect board role performance.  
However, in view of its stronger impact, board process appears to be a more crucial 
determinant than board structure in the Singapore context.   
 
7.1 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
7.1.1 Second-Best Method   
 The best method to examine the research question is to sit in the board 
meetings and observe the group dynamics.  But it is not possible in view of the 
confidentiality of board meetings.  Schutt (2001) has noted that observing the social 
interaction in boards can be considered as taboo.  Failing this, a mail questionnaire 
survey, supplemented by face-to-face interviews, was used to capture the necessary 
data in this study. 
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Researchers using questionnaires examine few variables and utilize many 
cases, and analyze organizations from a distance.  The advantages of such studies are 
the potential generalizability of the results and the replicability of the methods.  As 
argued by Lawler (1985), some kinds of knowledge and theory can be generated only 
by comparative study of populations of persons, groups, and organizations rather than 
a single case; some require distancing from and abstractions from the phenomena 
under study. 
However, questionnaires capture only a small segment of organizational 
complexity, thereby lacking, in the eyes of practitioners, a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon under study.  Furthermore, in this study, the 
variables are measured on a self-rating basis which raises questions about the validity 
of the findings.  To minimize the survey bias, it is thus explained in the invitation 
letters assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, the aim of the study and 
emphasizing that no individual cases will be identified.   
Moreover, to reduce the survey bias, an attempt is also made to extend the 
original conceptual model with firm performance as a dependent variable.  No 
significant relationship between the independent variables (board structure, board 
process and board role performance) is found.  A possible reason could be the nature 
of data.  In attempting to measure board process and board role performance directly, a 
cross-sectional approach is used in this study.   More time-series of board process and 
role performance data will be needed before a more rigorous test between board role 




7.1.2 Constraints Imposed By Sample  
Another major limitation of the study pertains to the constraints imposed by the 
sample.  While the response rate of 50 per cent may be regarded as acceptable, 68 per 
cent of the companies surveyed has only one respondent.  Attempts to increase the 
number of respondents per company through telephone calls and survey reminders 
were not successful.  Companies often noted that they will assign one board member to 
take care of such surveys.  As a result, there is a high possibility of sole respondent 
bias.  To check for this possibility, the full sample (n=212) was split into two for 
further data analysis. One sample comprises those boards with 1 respondent (n=144) 
and the other comprises those with more than 1 respondent (n=68).  When multiple 
regression analysis was conducted, the independent variables which are significantly 
related to each board performance role are similar regardless of whether full sample or 
the two sub-samples are used.  Split sample analysis is not performed on the path 
analysis as one assumption for the implementation of the path model is a minimum 
number of 200 observations.   The two sub-samples do not fulfill the requirement of 
this assumption.  Thus, the full sample of 212 responses is used in the study.  
To validate some of the findings, face-to-face interviews were conducted.  But, 
in view of the small number of respondents (3 industry representatives, 1 company 
secretary and 5 directors), these selective interviews can only be regarded as partial 
validation.   
 
7.1.3 Cross-sectional Design 
 The design of this study is cross-sectional.  This limits the ability to determine 
conclusively causation among board structure, board process and board role 
performance.  Tecker, Frankel and Meyer (2002) provided an example of a possible 
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two-way relationship between structure and process.  They noted that in the traditional 
view, board structure will affect the process of the board.  On the other hand, a good 
board process can have an impact on who is willing to serve on the board.   
 Similarly, effective board role performance can also induce more competent 
people to serve on the board and bring about quality board process.  However, to test 
for such causality relationships, longitudinal studies are needed (Engle & Granger, 
1987). 
 
7.1.4 Generalizability Of Findings  
 The empirical study was carried out using publicly listed companies in 
Singapore. As noted by O’Sullivan (2000), using this category of companies has two 
main advantages.  In the first place, corporate governance reforms have been focused 
on such companies since these companies face an environment where issues of control 
and accountability are likely to be most acute.  Secondly, as listed companies are 
required to provide annual reports and accounts, as well as their comprehensive 
disclosures on board information, they serve as a suitable sample to test the research 
hypotheses.  Other types of organizations may not have the same characteristics as 
listed companies.  In view of this, generalizing the study findings to other types of 





7.2 Areas For Future Research 
7.2.1 Application To Other Countries 
This study is built largely from research in the U.S. and to a lesser extent, the 
U.K.  This is unavoidable as the bulk of current board research is centered in these two 
countries.  An important question is thus its application to other countries.   
There is a convergence of corporate governance practices worldwide.  As noted 
by Monks and Minow (2004), corporate governance has gone global.   They added that 
in the last few years, a remarkable acceleration in governance activity can be seen in 
both the developed markets (particularly U.K. and France) and emerging ones (Eastern 
Europe and Asia).   
Davis and Useem (2002) also argued that variety in national governance 
practices may well diminish for two reasons.  Firstly, as equity markets 
internationalize, with companies seeking capital from all corners of the globe, 
investors predictably prefer relatively consistent governance models that they believe 
will optimize shareholder value and performance transparency.  Secondly, certain 
practices do engender better performance regardless of the national setting.  As 
companies increasingly compete worldwide for customers and investors, they are 
likely to adopt what indeed prove to be the best.  A case in point is the number of 
directors on the board.  Research on team success suggests that bigger is not better.   
For example, as suggested by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), the optimal board size is 7 to 
9 directors. 
In addition, Gregory (2004) argued that board role performance in both 
developed and developing world have been receiving greater attention due to the 
increasing recognition that corporate governance affects a company's ability to access 
capital.  Examination of board roles of various countries reveals that monitoring, 
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service, strategic planning and resource provision are universal tasks of directors.  In a 
study involving 200 directors across eight countries (Canada, France, Germany, 
Finland, Switzerland, The Netherlands, the U.K. and Venezuela), Demb and Neubauer 
(1992) concluded that contrary to conventional wisdom, board roles are generally quite 
similar.  For example, two-thirds of the interviewees noted "setting corporate strategy, 
overall direction, mission or vision" as the uppermost priority for the board.  Second 
and third in ranking are the responsibilities of "succession - the hiring and firing of 
CEO" and "controlling, monitoring or supervising of top management".  The functions 
of “reviewing and approving the use of resources” and “caring for shareholders” are 
named respectively as the fourth and fifth most important roles of boards.   
The influence of international markets and globalization has thus led to the 
convergence of corporate governance. This study framework thus has the possibility of 
application to other countries.   
 
7.2.2 Application To Non-profit Organizations 
Most of the literature on boards of directors has relied on samples of 
commercial companies.  This focus is natural given the visibility and importance of 
such companies.  In this sub-section, the application of the study to non-profit 
organizations is discussed. 
Cornforth (2003) noted that traditionally, the corporate governance of profit 
and non-profit organizations is different.  Hence, one should be cautious in the 
generalization of this study to non-profit boards.  However, with the increasing 
government reforms of the public sector and the introduction of business practices to 
non-profit organizations, the line for corporate governance between the two types of 
organizations have become blurred.  Waters (2001) noted that directors in both 
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organizational settings have fiduciary duty and have to act prudently for the benefit of 
the organization.  He further warned that having the designation of the director for a 
non-profit organization carries the same legal liabilities and responsibilities though 
such a post may be voluntary and without pay.  Hence, the roles of a director in either 
a non-profit or corporate outfit are essentially similar.   
Even then, there are some structural differences between profit and non-profit 
boards.  The CEO-chairman duality and distinction of insider-outsider directors may 
not be very important in non-profit organizations as the boards generally comprise 
outsider directors (Greer, Hoggett & Maile, 2003).  On the other hand, board diversity 
is a significant study variable in the literature.  It is found that non-profit organizations 
in the U.S. have more women and minorities than commercial firms (Oster, 1995).  In 
addition, between 1992 and 2000, the proportion of women on public boards in U.K. 
grew from 26 per cent to 33 per cent and those from ethnic minorities increased from 
3.6 per cent to 4.4 per cent (Cabinet Office, 2000).  Similarly, in Australia, a survey of 
118 non-profit organizations by Steane and Christie (2001) showed that 53 per cent of 
the boards comprise directors from the minority groups (indigenous, disability, non-
English speaking) and 40 per cent of the respondents (questionnaire was addressed to 
“chair” or “CEO”) were female.   
Hence, to apply the conceptual models in this study to non-profit organizations, 
board diversity should be added in as an independent variable. 
 
7.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This study has examined various aspects of board role performance among 
Singapore listed companies.  These are the monitoring, service, strategy and resource 
provision roles of boards.  This is in contrast to previous research which largely 
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investigates board role performance in general or those that are conducted under the 
dominant agency perspective which emphasizes the board’s monitoring role.  
Examining various board roles together in a single study furnishes a richer perspective 
into governance theories.  In addition, each governance theory tends to emphasize a 
particular board role (for example, agency theory emphasizing monitoring and 
resource dependence theory, resource provision).   Studying the various board theories 
simultaneously will allow a researcher to have a better understanding of board role 
performance.   
 This study has shown the importance of incorporating board process into board 
research.  Board process in general is found to be more important than board structure 
in influencing board role performance.  General effort norms and use of skills have 
positive impact on the performance roles of monitoring, service, strategy and resource 
provision.  Cognitive conflict also exhibits a positive impact on board strategy role.   
In contrast, only one board structure variable affects one specific performance 
role directly.  Board size is positively related to board resource provision role.  
Another board structure variable – outsider directors - indirectly affects board role 
performance through board process.  As the agency and resource dependence theories 
have long advocated the importance of outsider directors and relatively quiet on the 
role of board process, the Singapore data may suggest the need for a more explicit 
incorporation of board process variables into both governance theories. Nevertheless, 
one should not overwhelming emphasize the importance of board process over board 
structure.  The conclusion should be that board role performance is a function of both 
board structure and board process. 
In conclusion, the study has thus enabled one to better understand board 
process and the factors affecting board role performance.  The corporate board and 
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governance failures of companies coupled with increasing pressure from the media, 
institutional investors and government, have heightened the urgency for boards to 
perform better.  As boards lie at the apex of decision making in companies, 
understanding which board structure/process dimension affect role performance will 
allow directors to discharge their roles more effectively.   
   
 
 





Aguilera, R., & Cuervo, A.  2004.  Codes of good governance worldwide: What is the 
trigger.  Organization Studies, 25: 415-443. 
Alreck, P., & Settle, R.  1995.  The survey research handbook.  Chicago: Irwin. 
Allen, W., & Berkley, W.  2003.  In defense of the CEO Chair.  Harvard Business 
Review, 81: 24-25. 
Amason, A.  1996.  Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict 
on strategic decision making: Resolving a paradox for top management teams.  
Academy of Management Journal, 39: 123-148. 
Amason, A., & Sapienza, H.  1997.  The effects of top management team size and 
interaction norms on cognitive and affective conflict.  Journal of Management, 23: 
495-516. 
Ancona, D., & Caldwell, D.  1988.  Beyond task and maintenance: Defining external 
functions in groups.  Group & Organization Studies, 13: 468-494. 
Ancona, D., & Caldwell, D.  1992.  Bridging the boundary: External process and 
performance in organizational teams.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 527-548. 
Anderson, C., & Anthony, R.  1988.  The new corporate directors. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Babbie, E.  1990.  Survey research methods.  Belmont: Wadsworth. 
Baron, R.  1991.  Positive effects of conflict: A cognitive perspective.  Employees 
Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 4: 25-36. 
Barton, D., Coombes, P., & Wong, S.  2004.  Asia’s governance challenge.  The 
McKinsey Quarterly, No. 2: 54-61. 
  150
 
Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson, R. 1990. The composition of boards of directors and 
strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of Management Review, 15: 
72-87. 
Baysinger, B., Kosnik, R., & Turk, T.  1991.  Effects of board and ownership structure 
on corporate R&D strategy.  Academy of Management Journal, 34: 205-214. 
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Roell, A.  2002.  Corporate governance and control.  
Working Paper.  Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Belsley, D.  1991.  Conditioning diagnostics: Collinearity and weak data in 
regression.  New York: Wiley. 
Belsley, D., Kuh, E., & Welsch, R.  1980.  Regression diagnostics: Identifying 
influential data and sources of collinearity.  New York: Wiley. 
Berle, A., & Means, G.  1932.  The modern corporation and private property.  New 
York: MacMillan. 
Bettenhausen, K.  1991.  Five years of group research: What we have learned and what 
needs to be addressed.  Journal of Management, 17: 345-381. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B.  1999.  The uncertain relationship between board composition 
and firm performance.  The Business Lawyer, 54: 921-963. 
Blake, A.  1999.  Dynamic directors: Aligning board structure for business success.  
Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
Blair, M, & Stout, L.  2001.  Corporate accountability: Director accountability and the 
mediating role of the corporate board.  Washington University Law Quarterly, 79: 
403-447. 
Bonn, I., Yoshikawa, T., & Phan, P.  2004.  Effects of board structure on firm 
performance: A comparison between Japan and Australia. Asian Business & 
Management, 3: 105-125. 
  151
 
Booth, J., & Deli, D.  1996.  Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held 
by CEOs.  Journal of Financial Economics, 40: 81-104. 
Boyd, B.  1995.  CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic 
Management Journal, 16: 301-312. 
Brancato, C. 2003.  Singapore corporates and investor confidence.  New York: The 
Conference Board, Inc. 
Brickley, J., Lease, R., & Smith, C.  1988.  Ownership structure and voting on 
antitakeover amendments.  Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 267-291. 
Buchholtz, A., & Ribbins, B.  1994.  Role of chief executive officers in takeover 
resistance: Effects of CEO incentives and individual characteristics.  Academy of 
Management Journal, 37: 554-579. 
Burt, R. 1980.  Cooptive corporate action networks: A reconsideration of interlocking 
directorates involving American manufacturing.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 
25: 557-581. 
Butler, R.  1981.  Innovations in organizations: Appropriateness of perspectives from 
small group studies for strategy formulation.  Human Relations, 34: 763-788. 
Cabinet Office.  2000.  Public bodies 2000.  London: The Stationery Office. 
Cadbury, A.  2002.  Corporate governance and chairmanship: A personnel view.  
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Carmines, E., & Zeller, R.  1979.  Reliability and validity assessment.  California: 
Sage Publications, Inc. 
Carpenter, M., & Westphal, J.  2001.  The strategic context of external network ties: 
Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic 
decision making.  Academy of Management Journal, 44: 639-660. 
  152
 
Carter, C., & Lorsch, J.  2003.  Back to the drawing board.  Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Castaldi, R., & Wortman, M.  1984.  Boards of directors in small corporations: An 
untapped resource.  American Journal of Small Business, 9(2): 1-10. 
Chandrasegar, C.  1995.  Take-overs and mergers.  Singapore: Butterworths. 
Charan, R.  1998.  Boards at work: How corporate boards create competitive 
advantage.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Cochran, P. & Wartick, S. 1988. Corporate governance: A review of the literature. 
New York: Financial Executives Research Foundation.  
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S., & Aiken, L.  2003.  Applied multiple 
regression/correlation analysis for behavioral sciences.  New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.  
Cohen, S., & Bailey, D.  1997.  What makes teams work: Group effectiveness research 
from the shop floor to the executive suite.  Journal of Management, 23: 239-290. 
Coleman, J. 1988.  Social capital in the creation of human capital.  American Journal 
of Sociology, 94(Supplement): S95-S120. 
Coles, J., McWilliams, V., & Sen, N.  2001.  An examination of the relationship 
between governance mechanisms to performance. Journal of Management, 27: 23-50. 
Conger, J., Finegold, D., & Lawler, E.  1998.  Appraising board performance.  
Harvard Business Review, 76: 136-148. 
Conger, J., Lawler, E., & Finegold, D.  2001.  Corporate boards: Strategies for adding 
value at the top.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. 
Coombes, P., & Watson, M.  2000.  Three surveys on corporate governance. The 
McKinsey Quarterly, No. 4: 74-77. 
  153
 
Cornforth, C.  2001.  What makes boards effective? An examination of the 
relationships between board inputs, structures, processes and effectiveness in non-
profit organizations. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9(3): 217-227. 
Cornforth, C.  2003.  Introduction: The changing face of charity governance – 
Emerging issues and paradoxes.  In C. Cornforth (Ed.), The governance of public and 
non-profit organizations: What do boards do?  London: Routledge. 
Cummings, L., Huber, G., & Arendt, E.  1974.  Effects of team size and spatial 
arrangements on group decision making.  Academy of Management Journal, 17: 460-
475. 
Daily, C., & Dalton, D.  1992.  The relationship between governance structure and 
corporate performance in entrepreneurship firms.  Journal of Business Venturing, 7: 
375-386. 
Daily, C., & Dalton, D.  1997.  CEO and board chair roles held jointly or separately: 
Much ado about nothing? Academy of Management Executive, 11: 11-20. 
Daily, C., Dalton, D., & Cannella, A.  2003.  Corporate governance: Decades of 
dialogue & data.  Academy of Management Review, 28: 371-382. 
Dalton, D., Daily, C., Certo, S. & Roengpitya, R.  2003.  Meta-analyses of financial 
performance and equity: Fusion or confusion? Academy of Management Journal, 46: 
13-26. 
Dalton, D., Daily, C., Ellstrand, A. & Johnson, J.  1998.  Meta-analytic reviews of 
board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 19: 269-290. 
Dalton, D., Daily, C., Johnson, J., & Ellstrand, A.  1999.  Number of directors and 




Dalton, D., & Kesner, I.  1987.  Composition and CEO duality in boards of directors: 
An international perspective.  Journal of International Business Studies, Fall: 33-42. 
Dansereau, F., Alutto, J., & Yammarino, F.  1984.  Theory testing in organizational 
behaviour: The variant approach.  Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Davis, G., & Useem, M.  2002.  Top management, company directors and corporate 
control.  In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas, & R. Whittington (Eds.), Handbook of strategy 
and management.  London: Sage Publications. 
Davis, J., Schoorman, F., & Donaldson, L. 1997. Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22: 20-47. 
Dawn, H., & Helfat, C. 1997.  Specificity of CEO human capital and compensation. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18: 895-920 
Demb, A., & Neubauer, F.  1992.  The corporate board: Confronting the paradoxes.  
Long Range Planning, 25: 9-20 
Dillman, D.  2000.  Mail and telephone surveys: The total design method.  New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Dimma, W.  2002.  Excellence in the boardroom.  Ontario: John Wiley & Sons 
Canada Ltd. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J.  1991.  Agency theory or stewardship theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns.  Australian Journal of Management, 16: 49-64. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J.  1994.  Boards and company performance: Research 
challenges the conventional wisdom.  Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 2: 151-160. 
Dulewicz, V., MacMillan, K., & Herbert, P.  1995.  Appraising and developing the 




Eisenhardt, K.  1989.  Agency theory: An assessment and review.  Academy of 
Management Review, 14: 57-74. 
Eisenhardt, K., Kahwajy, J., & Bourgeois, L.  1997.  How management teams can have 
a good fight.  Harvard Business Review, 75: 77-85.   
Engle, R., & Granger, C.  1987. Co-intergation and error correction representation: 
Estimation and testing.  Econometrica, 66: 251-276. 
Ensley, M., & Pearce, C.  2001.  Shared cognition in top management teams: 
Implications for new venture performance.  Journal of Organizational Behavior.  22: 
145-160. 
Fama, E.  1980.  Agency problems and the theory of the firm.  Journal of Political 
Economy, 88: 288-307. 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M.  1983.  Separation of ownership and control.  Journal of Law 
& Economics, 26: 301-325. 
Feldman, D.  1984.  The development and enforcement of group norms.  Academy of 
Management Review, 9: 47-53. 
Felton, R., Berryman, K., & Stephenson, T.  2004.  A new era in corporate governance.  
McKinsey Quarterly, No. 2: 28-41. 
Finegold, D., Benson, G., Lawler, E., & Conger, J.  1998.  Inside the black box: The 
factors that lead to effective corporate boards.  Paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the Academy of Management.  CA: San Diego. 
Finkelstein, S., & D’Aveni, R.  1994.  CEO duality as a double-edge sword: How 
boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command.  Academy 
of Management Journal, 37: 1079-1108. 




Finkelstein, S., & Mooney, A.  2003.  Not the usual suspects: How to use board 
process to make boards better.  Academy of Management Executive, 17: 101-113. 
Firstenberg, P., & Malkiel, B.  1994.  The twenty-first century boardroom: Who will 
be in charge? Sloan Management Review, 36: 27-35. 
Foil, M.  1994.  Consensus, diversity, and learning organizations.  Organization 
Science, 5: 403-420. 
Forbes, D., & Milliken, F.  1999. Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding 
boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups.  Academy of Management 
Review, 24: 489-505. 
Fox, M., & Hamilton, R.  1994.  Ownership and diversification: Agency theory or 
stewardship theory.  Journal of Management Studies, 31: 69-81. 
Gladstein, D.  1984.  A model of task group effectiveness.  Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 29: 499-517. 
Goodman, P.  1986.  Designing effective work groups.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers. 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W.  1994.  The effects of board size and 
diversity on strategic change.  Strategic Management Journal, 15: 241-250. 
Greer, A., Hoggett, P., & Maile, S.  2003.  Are quasi-governmental organisations 
effective and accountable?  In C. Cornforth (Ed.), The governance of public and non-
profit organizations: What do boards do?  London: Routledge. 
Gregory, H.  2004.  Overview of corporate governance guidelines and code of best 
practice in developing and emerging markets. In R. Monks, & N. Minow (Eds), 
Corporate governance.  Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
Gujarati, D.  2003.  Basic econometrics.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
  157
 
Hackman, J.   1983.  A normative model of work team effectiveness – Tech report 2.  
New Haven, CT: Yale School of Organization and Management. 
Hackman, J., & Morris, C.  1975.  Group tasks, group interaction, and group 
performance effectiveness:  A review and proposed integration.  In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 8: 45-99.  New York: Academic 
Press. 
Haleblian, J., & Finkelstein, S.  1993.  Top management team size, CEO dominance, 
and firm performance: The moderating roles of environmental turbulence and 
discretion.  Academy of Management Journal, 36: 844-863. 
Hambrick, D., & Mason, P.  1984.  Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of 
its top managers.  Academy of Management Review, 9: 193-206. 
Hannan, M., & Freeman, J. 1989. Organizational ecology.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Hatcher, L.  1995.   A step-by-step approach to using the SAS system for factor 
analysis and structural equation modelling.  Cary: SAS Institute. 
Heracleous, L.  2001.  What is the impact of corporate governance on organizational 
performance? Corporate Governance:  An International Review, 9(3): 165-173. 
Hendry, K., & Kiel, G.  2004.  The role of the board in firm strategy: Integrating 
agency and organizational control perspectives.  Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 12(4): 500-520. 
Herman, E. 1981.  Corporate control, corporate power.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Higgs, D.  2003.  Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors.  
London: The Department of Trade and Industry. 
  158
 
Hillman, A., & Dalziel, T.  2003.  Board of directors and firm performance: Integrating 
agency and resource dependency perspectives.  Academy of Management Review, 28: 
383-396. 
Hillman, A., Cannella, A., & Paetzold, R.  2000.  The resource dependence role of 
corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to 
environmental change.  Journal of Management Studies, 37: 235-255. 
Holmstrom, B., & Kaplan, S.  2003.  The state of U.S. corporate governance: What’s 
right and what’s wrong?  Working Paper.  Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Hoskisson, R., Johnson, R, & Moesel, D.  1994.  Corporate divesture intensity in 
restructuring firms: Effects of governance, strategy, and performance.  Academy of 
Management Journal, 37: 1207-1251. 
Hu, R.  1994.  Proceedings of the conference on corporate governance: Expectations 
and reality.  Keynote address. Singapore: Institute of Public Accountants of Singapore 
and Stock Exchange of Singapore. 
Jackson, S.  1992.  Consequences of group composition for the interpersonal dynamics 
of strategic issue processing.  In J. Dutton, A. Huff, & P. Shrivastava (Eds.), Advances 
in strategic management, Vol. 8: 345-382.  Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
James, L., Demaree, R., & Wolf, G.  1984.  Estimating within-group interrater 
reliability with and without response bias.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 69: 85-98. 
James, L., Mulaik, S., & Brett, J.  1982.  Causal analysis.  Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications. 
Jehn, K.  1995.  A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of 
intragroup conflict.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 256-282. 
  159
 
Jehn, K., & Mannix, E.  2001.  The dynamic nature of conflict: A longitudinal study of 
intragroup conflict and group performance.  Academy of Management Journal, 4: 
238-251. 
Jehn, K., Northcraft, G., & Neale, M.  1999.  Why differences make a difference: A 
field study of diversity, conflict, and performance in workgroups.  Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 44: 741-763. 
Jensen, M.  1993.  The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems.  Journal of Finance, 48: 831-880.   
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W.  1976.  Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency 
costs and ownership structure.  Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360. 
John, K., & Senbet, L.  1998.  Corporate governance and board effectiveness.  Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 22: 371-403. 
Johnson, J.  2002.  In-depth interviewing.  In J. Gubrium, & J. Holstein (Eds.), 
Handbook of interview research.  Calif: Sage Publications. 
Johnson, J., Daily, C., & Ellstrand, A.  1996.  Boards of directors: A review and 
research agenda.  Journal of Management, 22: 409-438. 
Johnson, R., Hoskisson, R., & Hitt, M.  1993.  Board of director involvement in 
restructuring: The effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics.  
Strategic Management Journal, 14: 33-50. 
Jones, T., & Goldberg, L.  1982.  Governing the large corporation: More arguments for 
public arguments.  Academy of Management Review, 7: 603-611. 
Joreskog, K., & Sorbom, D.  1993.  LISREL 8: Structural equation modeling with 
the SIMPLIS command language.  Chicago, IL: Scientific Software International. 
Judge, P., & Reinhardt, A.  1997.  Seething shareholders.  New York: Business Week. 
  160
 
Judge, W., & Zeithaml, C.  1992.  Institutional and strategic choice perspectives on 
board involvement in the strategic decision process.  Academy of Management 
Journal, 35: 766-794. 
Kanfer, R.  1992.  Motivation theory and industrial and organizational psychology.  In 
M. Dunette, & L. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial and organizational 
psychology, Vol. 3: 75-170.  Palto Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
Kazanjian, J.  2000.  Assessing boards and individual directors.  Ivey Business 
Journal, 64: 45-50. 
Kesner, I., & Johnson, R.  1990.  An investigation of the relationship between board 
composition and stockholder suits.  Strategic Management Journal, 11: 327-336. 
Kleinbaum, D., Kupper, L., & Muller, K.  1988.  Applied regression analysis and 
other multivariate methods.  Boston: PWS-Kent. 
Knight, D., Pearce, C., Smith, K., Olian, J., Sims, H., Smith, K., & Floud, P.  1999.  
Top management diversity, group process and strategic consensus.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 20: 445-465. 
Koh, C.  1999.  Corporate governance: Finding an appropriate model for Singapore. 
Unpublished Dissertation. Singapore: National University of Singapore. 
Kosnik, R.  1987.  Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate governance.  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 163-185. 
Kotz, R.  1998.  Technology company boards: A new model.  Directors and Boards, 
22(3): 26-28. 
Kula, V.  2005.  The impact of the roles, structure and process of boards on firm 
performance: Evidence from Turkey.  Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 13: 265-276.  
  161
 
Lane, P., Cannella, A., & Lubatkin, M.  1998.  Agency problems as antecedents to 
unrelated mergers and diversification: Amihud and Lev reconsidered.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 19: 555-578. 
Latane, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S.  1979.  Many hands make light the work: The 
causes and consequences of social loafing.  Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 37: 822-832. 
Lawler, E.  1985.  Doing research that is useful for theory and practice.  San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Lawler, J., Chen, S., & Bae, J.  2000.  Scale of operations, human resource systems 
and firm performance in East and Southeast Asia. Research & Practice in Human 
Resource Management, 8: 3-20. 
Lawrence, B.  1997.  The black box of organizational demography.  Organization 
Science, 8: 1-22. 
Leong, C-T.  2003.  Corporate governance climate in Singapore is tops.  Singapore: 
The Straits Times. 
Lincoln, J., Gerlach, M., & Takahashi, P.  1992. Keiretsu networks in the Japanese 
economy: A dyad analysis on intercorporate ties.  American Sociological Review, 57: 
561-585. 
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J.  1992.  A modest proposal for improved corporate 
governance.  Business Lawyer, 48: 59-77. 
Lorsch, J.  1997.  Should directors grade themselves?  Across The Board, 34: 40-44. 
Lorsch, J., & Khurana, R.  1999.  Changing leaders: The board’s role in CEO 
succession.  Harvard Business Review, 77: 96-105. 
Lorsch, J., & MacIver, E.  1989.  Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s 
corporate boards.  Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
  162
 
Lynall, M., Golden, B., & Hillman, A.  2003.  Board composition from adolescence to 
maturity: A multitheoretic view.  Academy of Management Review, 28: 416-431. 
Mace, M.  1986.  Directors: Myth and reality.  Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Mak, Y-T., & Li, Y.  2001.  Determinants of corporate ownership and board structure: 
Evidence from Singapore.  Journal of Corporate Finance, 7: 235-256. 
Mak, Y-T., & Phan, P. 2001.  Corporate governance in Singapore: Current practice and 
future developments. Corporate governance in Asia: A comparative perspective.  
Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Mak, Y-T., & Rosch, M.  2000.  Factors influencing the characteristics of board of 
directors: An empirical study of New Zealand initial public offering firms.  Journal of 
Business Research, 47: 147-159. 
Melone, N.  1994.  Reasoning in the executive suite: The influence of role/experience-
based expertise on decision processes of corporate executives.  Organization Science, 
5: 438-455. 
Milliken, F., & Vollrath, D.  1991.  Strategic decision-making tasks and group 
effectiveness: Insights from theory and research on small group performance.  Human 
Relations, 44: 1-25. 
Mizruchi, M.  1983.  Who controls whom? An examination of the relationship between 
management and boards of directors in large American corporations.  Academy of 
Management Review, 8: 426-435. 
Mizruchi, M., & Stearns, L. 1988.  A longitudinal study of the formation of 
interlocking directorates.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 33: 194-210. 




Nadler, A.  2004.  Building better boards.  Harvard Business Review, 82: 102-111. 
Nonaka, I.  1994.  A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation.  
Organization Science, 5: 14-37. 
Nunnally, J.  1978.  Psychometric theory.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
O’Sullivan, N.  2000.  The determinants of non-executive representation on the boards 
of large U.K. companies.  Journal of Management and Governance, 4: 283-297. 
Ooghe, H., & De Langhe, T.  2002.  The Anglo-American versus the Continental 
European corporate governance model: Empirical evidence of board composition in 
Belgium.  European Business Review, 4: 437-449. 
Orlikoff, J., & Totten, M.  1999.  Leading the leaders: The role of the board chair.  
Trustee, November/December 1999. 
Oster, S.  1995.  Strategic management of non-profit organizations.  New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Pearce, J., & Zahra, S.  1991.  The relative power of CEOs and boards of directors: 
Associations with corporate performance.  Strategic Management Journal, 12: 135-
153. 
Pedhazur, E.  1997.  Multiple regression in behavioural research.  New York: Holt. 
Perrow, C.  1986.  Complex organizations: A critical essay.  New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Pettigrew, A.  1992.  On studying managerial elites.  Strategic Management Journal, 
13: 163-182. 
Pfeffer, J.  1972.  Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The 
organization and its environment.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 17: 218-228. 
  164
 
Pfeffer, J.  1973.  Size, composition and function of hospital boards of directors: A 
study of organization-environment linkage.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 18: 
349-364. 
Pfeffer, J.  1983.  Organizational demography.  In L. L. Cummings, & B. M. Staw 
(Eds.), Research in organizational behavior, Vol. 5: 299-357.  Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G.  1978.  The external control of organizations: A resource-
dependence perspective.  New York: Harper & Row. 
Phan, P.  1998.  Effective corporate governance in Singapore: Another look.  
Singapore Management Review, 20(2): 43-61. 
Phan, P.  2000.  Taking back the boardroom.  Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 
Pierce, C.  1994.  The competencies of future company directors.  In T. Clarke, & E. 
Monkhouse (Eds.), Rethinking the company.  London: Pitman Publishing. 
Podsakoff, P., & Organ, D.  1986.  Self-reports in organizational research: Problems 
and prospects.  Journal of Management, 12: 531-544. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.  1998.  Standards of corporate governance in Singapore.  
SES Journal, May 1998: 6-13, 16. 
Provan, J. 1980.  Board power and organizational effectiveness among human service 
agencies.  Academy of Management Journal, 23: 221-236. 
Pye, A., & Pettigrew, A.  2005.  Studying board context, process and dynamics: Some 
challenges for the future.  British Journal of Management, 16: S27-S38. 
Rechner, D., & Dalton, D.  1991.  CEO duality and organizational performance: A 
longitudinal analysis.  Strategic Management Journal, 12: 155-160. 
  165
 
Rhoades, D., Rechner, P., & Sundaramurthy, C.  2000.  Board composition and 
financial performance: A meta-analysis of the influence of outsider directors.  Journal 
of Managerial Issues, 12: 76-91. 
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., & Stiles, P.  2005.  Beyond agency conceptions of the work 
of the non-executive directors: Creating accountability in the boardroom.  British 
Journal of Management, 16: S5-S27. 
Rogers, E.  1995.  Diffusion of innovation.  New York: Free Press. 
Rosenstein, J., Bruno, A., Bygrave, W., & Taylor, N.  1993.  The CEO, venture 
capitalists, and the board.  Journal of Business Venturing, 8: 99-113. 
RSM Robson Rhodes, & London Stock Exchange.  2003.  Board effectiveness survey.  
United Kingdom. 
SAS Institute. 2003.  SAS/STAT user’s guide.  Cary. 
Scherrer, P.  2003.  Directors’ responsibility and participation in the strategic decision 
making process.  Corporate Governance, 3: 86-90. 
Schutt, R.  2001.  Investigating the social world: The process and practice of 
research. Boston: Pine Forge Press. 
Schweiger, D., Sandberg, W., & Ragan, J.  1986.  Group approaches for improving 
strategic decision making: A comparative analysis of dialectical inquiry, devil’s 
advocacy and consensus.  Academy of Management Journal, 28: 51-71. 
Schwenk, C., & Valacich, J.  1994.  Effects of devil’s advocacy and dialectical inquiry 
on individuals versus groups.  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 59: 210-222. 
Scott, S., & Bruce, R.  1994.  Determinants of innovative behaviour: A path model of 




Selznick, P.  1949.  TVA and the grass roots: A study of the sociology of formal 
organizations.  New York: Harper & Row. 
Shanley, M., & Langfred, C.  1998.  The importance of organizational context, II: An 
empirical test of work group cohesiveness and effectiveness in two government 
bureaucracies.  Public Administration Quarterly, 21(4): 465-485. 
Shaw, M.  1981.  Group dynamics: The psychology of small group behaviour.  New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D.  1999.  CEO involvement in the selection of new board  
members: An empirical analysis.  The Journal of Finance, 54: 1829-1853. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishy, R.  1997.  A survey of corporate governance.  Journal of 
Finance, 52: 737-783. 
Shrader, C., Blackburn, V., & Iles, P.  1997.  Women in management and firm 
financial performance: An exploratory study.  Journal of Managerial Issues, 9: 35-
372. 
Simon, J.  1969.  Basic research methods in social science: The art of empirical 
investigation.  New York: Random House. 
Singapore Institute of Directors, & Egon Zehnder International, 2000. Singapore 
Board of Directors Survey 2000. Singapore. 
Singapore Institute of Directors, NUS Business School, & Egon Zehnder International, 
2002. Singapore Board of Directors Survey 2001. Singapore. 
Singapore Institute of Directors, Singapore Exchange Ltd, Egon Zehnder International, 
NUS Business School, & PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003. Singapore Board of 
Directors Survey 2002. Singapore. 
  167
 
Singapore Institute of Directors, Singapore Exchange Ltd, Egon Zehnder International, 
NUS Business School, & PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004. Singapore Board of 
Directors Survey 2004. Singapore. 
Singh, K.  1999.  Corporate governance: Some changes.  The Singapore Law Gazette, 
Feb 1999: 20-24. 
Smith, K., Smith, K., Olian, J., Sims, H., O’Bannon, D., & Scully, J.  1994.  Top 
management team demography and process: The role of social integration and 
communication.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 39: 412-438. 
Sonnenfeld, J.  2002.  What makes great boards great?  Harvard Business Review, 80: 
106-113. 
Spencer, A.  1983.  On the edge of the organization: The role of outside director.  
New York: Wiley. 
Steane, P., & Christie, M.  2001.  Non-profit boards in Australia: A distinctive 
governance approach.  Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9(1): 48-58. 
Steiner, I.  1972.  Group process and productivity.  New York: Academic Press. 
Stewart, G., & Barrick, M.  2000.  Team structure and performance: Assessing the 
mediating role of intrateam process and the moderating role of task type.  Academy of 
Management Journal, 43: 135-148. 
Stiles, P., & Taylor, B.  2000.  Boards at work.  Oxford: University Press. 
Sundaramurthy, C., & Lewis, M.  2003.  Control and collaboration: Paradoxes of 
governance.  Academy of Management Review, 28: 397-415. 
Tecker, G., Frankel, J., & Meyer, P. 2002.  Toward better governance. Association 
Management, 54: 46-56. 
The Economist. 2003.  The way we govern now.  London: Economist Newspaper Ltd. 
The Economist. 2004.  Where’s all the fun gone? London: Economist Newspaper Ltd. 
  168
 
Tjosvold, D., Dann, V., & Wong, C.  1992.  Managing conflict between departments to 
serve customers.  Human Relations, 45: 1035-1054.  
Tricker, R.  1994.  International corporate governance.  Singapore: Prentice-Hall. 
Useem, M.  1993.  Executive defence: Shareholder power and corporate 
reorganization.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Vafeas, N.  1999.  Board meeting frequency and firm performance.  Journal of 
Financial Economics, 53: 113-142. 
Vogt, S., & Vu, J.  2000.  Free cash flow and long-run firm value: Evidence from the 
value lime firms.  Journal of Managerial Issues, 12: 188-207. 
Wageman, R.  1995.  Interdependence and group effectiveness.  Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 40: 145-180. 
Wanous, J., & Youtz, M.  1986.  Solution diversity and the quality of group decisions.  
Academy of Management Journal, 29: 149-159. 
Waters, W.  2001.  A critical analysis of the directors’ protocol in New York’s not for 
profit and business organizations.  Corporate Governance, 1: 20-23. 
Watson, W., & Michaelsen, L.  1988.  Group interaction behaviors that affect group 
performance on an interactive task.  Group & Organization Studies, 13: 495-516. 
Weick, K., & Roberts, K.  1993.  Collective mind in organizations: Heedful 
interrelating on flight decks.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 38: 357-381. 
Weldon, E., & Gargano, G.  1985.  Cognitive effort in additive task groups: The effects 
of shared responsibility on the quality of multiattribute judgments.  Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 36: 348-361. 
Westphal, J.  1999.  Collaboration in the boardroom: The consequences of social ties in 
CEO-board relationship.  Academy of Management Journal, 42: 7-24. 
  169
 
Williams, K., Harkins, S., & Latane, B.  1981.  Identifiability as a deterrent to social 
loafing: Two cheering experiments.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
40: 303-311. 
Williamson, O.  1984.  Corporate governance.  Yale Law Journal, 93: 1197-1229. 
Wright, S.  1921.  Correlation and causation.  Journal of Agricultural Research, 20: 
557-585. 
Yermack, D.  1996.  Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of 
directors.  Journal of Financial Economics, 40: 185-211. 
Yoshikawa, T., & Phan, P.  2001.  Alternative corporate governance systems in 
Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centred corporate governance.  
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18: 183-205. 
Zahra, S.  1990.  Increasing the board’s involvement in strategy. Long Range 
Planning, 23: 109-117. 
Zahra, S., & Pearce, J.  1989.  Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: 
A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15: 291-334. 
Zang, X.  2000.  Intercorporate ties in Singapore.  International Sociology, 15(1): 87-
105. 
Zikmund, W.  1997.  Business research methods.  Chicago: The Dryden Press. 
  170
 
APPENDIX A: STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 
A STUDY ON BOARD STRUCTURE, PROCESSES AND FUNCTIONS 
SECTION A 
Instructions 
(I) For the following statements, circle the most appropriate number using the scale below.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
          Agree 
1. Board members go through information carefully before 
meetings. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Board members participate actively in meetings. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Board members enjoy their work. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Board members feel responsible for their work that need to 
be done. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Board members are satisfied when work is accomplished 
well. 1 2 3 4 5 
 (II) For the following statements, circle the most appropriate number using the scale below.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
           Agree 
1. This board considers viewpoints of different members before 
making final decision. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. There are personality clashes among directors in decision-
making. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Board members tend to debate on the way things are done. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Decisions are always settled amicably. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Board members get along together very well. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Procedures on how work to be done are often disputed 
during board meetings. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. The discussions are open and candid. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Board members often feel that work allocated is unfair. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. The board members are always ready to co-operate and help 
each other. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. When final decisions are reached, it is common for at least 
one director to be unhappy with the decision. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. The atmosphere in this board encourages critical thinking. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Board meetings often do not result in a clear decision. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Relationships among directors are best described as “win-
lose”, that is, if he/she wins, I lose. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Board members accept their task responsibilities amicably. 1 2 3 4 5 
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(III) For the following statements, circle the most appropriate number using the scale below.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Low Low Neither Low Nor 
High 
High      Very High 
 
Please rate the presence and usage of the following skills in this board. 
 
Presence Usage 
1. Strategic thinking 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Analytical thinking 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Communications skills 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Interaction skills 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Management skills 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 





For the following statements, circle the most appropriate number using the scale below.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
          Agree 
 
1. This board monitors top management decision-making. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Directors provide advice and counsel to top managers in 
discussions outside of board/committee meetings. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Board members are aware of environmental trends. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. This board formally evaluates the performance of top 
company executives. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. This board possesses an internal mechanism to evaluate its 
performance yearly. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. This board has outsider directors who possess expertise on 
skills relevant for the company’s operations. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Each board member is formally assessed by the other 
directors in this board. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Top managers do not solicit board assistance in the 
formulation of corporate strategy. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. This board analyses budget allocation against performance. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. This board ensures the communications with stakeholders 




1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 





11. This board requires information showing progress (or 
otherwise) against corporate objectives. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. This board benchmarks the strategic plan with industry 
comparative data. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. This board reviews company performance against strategic 
plan. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. This board takes into account the legitimate interests of 
organizations, groups and individuals (stakeholders) who 
have a direct interest in the achievement of company 
objectives. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. This board receives plans for the implementation of strategy 
from the CEO. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. This board promotes the goodwill and support of relevant 
stakeholders. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Outsider directors provide alternative viewpoints for 
company operations. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. This board is involved in the articulation of the company 
mission. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. This board reviews financial information for important 
issues and trends. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. This board debates on the strategic plan for the company 
yearly. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. Board members are chosen for their influence in the 
community. 1 2 3 4 5 
22. This board identifies the strategic direction for the company 
yearly.  1 2 3 4 5 
23. Outside board members provide channels of communication 
between firms. 1 2 3 4 5 
24. This board is actively engaged in succession planning for the 
CEO of this company. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. Outside board members serve as a link to government 
agencies. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. This board is actively engaged in succession planning for the 




SECTION C: Other Information 
 
The questions in this section ask about board characteristics in this company. We need this 
information for the study to be useful.  Please write in the spaces provided or circle the 
appropriate answer.  
1. Number of executive directors in this board: ______ 
2. Number of non-executive directors in this board: _____ 
3. Number of independent*directors in this board: _____ 
4. Average number of board meetings held per year: _____ 
5. Average length of productive time (with debate and interaction dialogue) per meeting: _____ 
hours 
6. Is the chairman in this board the same person as the CEO of the company?  Yes / No 
  







THE QUESTIONNAIRE IS COMPLETED. PLEASE RETURN IT IN THE SELF-ADDRESSED 
ENVELOPE.  WE WILL SEND YOU A COPY OF THE SURVEY FINDINGS ONCE READY. THANK 
YOU. 
 
* Explanation of Independence: 
According to the Code of Corporate Governance (see www.sgx.com for more details), an "independent" director is 
one who has no relationship with the company, its related companies or its officers that could interfere, or be 
reasonably perceived to interfere, with the exercise of the director's independent business judgement with a view to 
the best interests of the company. Examples of such relationships, which would deem a director not to be 
independent, include: 
a) a director being employed by the company or any of its related companies for the current or any of the past three 
financial years; 
b) a director who has an immediate family member who is, or has been in any of the past three financial years, 
employed by the company or any of its related companies as a senior executive officer whose remuneration is 
determined by the remuneration committee;  
c) a director accepting any compensation from the company or any of its related companies other than 
compensation for board service for the current or immediate past financial year; or 
d) a director being a substantial shareholder of or a partner in (with 5% or more stake), or an executive officer of, 
any for-profit business organization to which the company made, or from which the company received, 
significant payments in the current or immediate past financial year. As a guide, payments aggregated over any 




APPENDIX B: PRE-SURVEY INTERVIEWS 
1. Respondent Profile9 
No Name Designation Organization Classification Label  




























4 - Independent 
Director 
3 Listed Firms 
from 
Transportation (2) 































                                                           
9 The four directors requested for full anonymity while the industry representative from SGX allows the 
organization name to be quoted. 
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2. Interview Questions 
Four main aspects are asked10: 
(1) What is the state of corporate governance in companies/ your company? 
(2) What do you understand by board structure, board processes and board 
performance? 
(3) How would you define an effective board? 
(4) Do you see any relationship among board structure, board processes and board 
performance? 
 
3. Interview Notes 
These pertain to the gist of the interviews.  I brought along a tape recorder for 
the interviews but all respondents declined taping of conversation.  I jotted down the 
points.  To ensure freshness of conversation and minimum information loss, I wrote 
down the interview notes immediately after the interview. 
 
                                                           
10 While I tried my very best to cover all these four aspects, I emphasized on one/two aspects during the 
interviews (depending on the interests of the interviewees). 
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3.1 Interview with Industry Representative 1 (SIAS) –  
 
Name of Interviewee: 
Mr David Gerald Jeyasegaram 
President, Securities Investors Association (Singapore) 
138 Cecil Street #06-03 
Singapore 069538 
 
Date of Interview: 25 July 2001 
 
Time of Interview: 9.30 am - 11.00 am 
 
Venue: SIAS Office 
 
(a)  Corporate Governance in General 
- Corporate governance is relatively new in Singapore and is currently only at its 
embryonic stage.   
 
(b) Board Structure 
- Mr Gerald paid particular emphasis to the recently released code of corporate 
governance on this topic. 
- He noted that one should give time (at least 2 years) for what is recommended in the 
code before measuring its effectiveness.  These include the separation of CEO-
Chairman duties; the appointment of more independent directors and disclosure of 
full directors' pay package.  He also mentioned the difficulty of defining 
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"independence" in Singapore as it is a relatively small country.  It is possible to 
"know other directors at least by name, especially if one is already a director".  To 
him, it is not independent in the strictest sense.  What is important is that directors 
must be willing to protect and promote shareholders' rights; question the executive 
management and discuss actively on business issues during board meetings.    
- On a related issue of directors' share-holdings, Mr Gerald noted that while it could 
lead to risk-averseness and short-term thinking of directors, it will make directors 
"work harder since they now owned the company". Not only will the directors work, 
they will also make sure the other directors and management do their jobs.  
However, Mr Gerald cautioned that no director should become a majority 
shareholder of the company; in Singapore, the majority shareholder always wins.  
And it is very likely that a director who owns a major share of the company will 
become "complacent". As to how much shareholding a director should own, Mr 
Gerald noted that it is up to the board to decide. 
 
(c) Board Processes 
- Mr Gerald noted that board processes (and also board performance) would become 
more important in Singapore due to shareholders being more educated and media 
coverage.  Shareholders are more willing to speak out.  They include Mr Narayan 
Narayan, Mr Simon Ng and Mr Denis Distant.  He also gave a successful example 
whereby minority shareholders were able to influence and prevent the payment of 
retirement benefits to the retiring non-executive directors in Fraser & Neave 
Limited.  On media influence, Mr Gerald added that the media should be regarded as 
a friend and is always ready to help minority shareholders.  This has made directors 
to be "on their toes more often". 
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- There are two extreme forms of board meetings in Singapore.  In small family-
owned companies, there is hardly any discussion.  Board meetings are simply 
"rubber-stamping".  In such meetings, if conflict does occur, it is more personal in 
nature.  On the other extreme, there are well-governed companies whereby board 
meetings are well-prepared and run.  In these companies, directors are interested in 
the company's plans, prospects and problems.  There is a lot of discussions and 
questioning.  Such companies include ST Engineering, DBS Group, CapitaLand and 
Neptune Orient Lines.  
 
(d) Board Performance 
- Mr Gerald said that there is a reluctance of directors (even non-executive directors) 
to monitor the performance of CEO and senior management in Singapore.  There are 
two related reasons for this: the embryonic stage of corporate governance and more 
importantly the issue of face.  To him, "nobody likes to be questioned, especially in 
Asia".  On the other hand, Mr Gerald sees that as shareholders become more 
powerful, directors will have little choice - they will need to see that top 
management does their work.   
- With regard to the role of effective communications to shareholders (I termed this as 
the service role), Mr Gerald noted that this needs to be improved greatly.  Currently, 
shareholders do not often know what is happening.  Directors must communicate the 
issues to shareholders promptly and simply. 
- Mr Gerald added that on the other hand, directors seem to be doing a good job in 
strategic planning for the company.  He noted that it could be due to the fact that this 
is what directors in Singapore like and what they think they should be doing. 
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- Having more non-executive directors help a company.  Because they have different 
skills/knowledge, they could make better strategic plans. 
- Mr Gerald noted that the best way to measure a board performance is the company's 
financial results because "facts and figures speak for themselves".  When asked 
whether it is unfair to equate board performance and financial performance since the 
latter depend on many other factors, Mr Gerald said that that is a fair argument. But 
he added that in view of the current state of corporate governance in Singapore, 





3.2  Interview with Industry Representative 2 (SID) 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
Mr John Lim Kok Min 
Honorary Secretary, Singapore Institute of Directors 
2 Finlayson Green #07-01/02  
Asia Insurance Building  
Singapore 049247 
 
Date of Interview: 8 August 2001 
 
Time of Interview: 3.15 pm - 4.30 pm 
 
Venue: SID Office 
 
(a) Board Structure 
- Mr Lim noted that the recently released code of corporate governance comprises of a 
set of good practices, which promotes objectivity and focus.  He added that it is 
important to see how well the code will be followed.  While it is possible that many 
companies will comply in form, they may not comply in the substance or spirit of 
the code. 
- Mr Lim warned that the code is only a set of guidelines for companies.  It is not a 
"one-size-fit-all" system.  Giving the example of Creative Technology whereby the 
CEO and Chairman is the same person, Mr Lim stressed that the Creative board may 
feel that it is currently the best system as Creative is in a business whereby change is 
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fast and enterprising spirit is required.  But, the board structure may change in the 
future.  Again, Mr Lim provided the example of Microsoft whereby the leadership 
structure has changed from same CEO/Chairman to a different CEO/Chairman. 
- When asked to comment on the issue of independence in board, Mr Lim emphasized 
that it is more important that directors should behave on high morale grounds.  The 
director should act in good faith for the company, know his/her roles and 
responsibilities and contribute to the company. 
 
(b) Board Processes 
- Mr Lim noted that there is no such thing as a typical board meeting.  There are 
various kinds of board meetings.  In some, there are no agenda and/or distribution of 
discussion papers.  Meetings are short, management is powerful, board is controlled 
by majority shareholders and board members do not ask questions.  On the other 
hands, on boards of government-linked companies, meetings are more professionally 
run.  This is because directors need to perform as they are being "seen".  There is 
reasonably good discussion and questions asked.  The process is "spirited".  
However, Mr Lim noted that such boards lack enterprise.  Mr Lim foresees that 
meetings will be more professionally run in the future in view of the increasing 
number of professional managers in companies. 
- On the issue of conflicts in boards, Mr Lim noted that it happened very often.  What 
is important is that whenever there are polarized views, directors should sit back and 
think. Very often, conflicts occur in boards because of personal misunderstanding.  
At times, it is not that directors do not speak their minds in board meetings; it is that 
they do not know how to say it.  On the other hand, Mr Lim noted that there is fairly 
good management of conflicts in boards because directors want to get things done.   
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- With regard to the selection of non-executive directors to the board, Mr Lim agreed 
that one reason is in view of the professional skills of these directors.  Many non-
executive directors are CEOs/directors of other companies. They bring in intimate 
knowledge of the industry and what they learnt from other firms.  He added that 
companies may also bring in non-executive directors to show that they are 
independent.  At least, with non-executive directors, it shows that the board has 
directors with the necessary paper qualifications.  However, Mr Lim emphasized 
that it is important to have the substance than the form. 
 
(c) Board Performance (Board Roles) 
- A board should provide direction for the company.  It should come up with the 
strategy for the company. 
- On the monitoring function, Mr Lim noted that a board is supposed to monitor the 
performance of the results and not the methodology.   Directors often fail to 
distinguish the difference between management and directing.  When asked about 
CEO/top management compensation, Mr Lim noted that the board approves it 
though at times, boards also recommend.  CEO pay is likely to be based on 
discussion between the chairman and CEO, and compensation research. 
- With respect to the board's service role of providing advice/counselling to CEO, Mr 
Lim noted that this function is not so prominent in Singapore.  It is because CEOs 
are already competent.  On the other hand, Mr Lim sees strategic mentoring taking 
place in smaller companies whereby boards provide advice to management. 
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(d) Effective Board 
- Finally, when asked how he would denote an effective board, Mr Lim gave the 
following criteria:  (1) The directors must be able to contribute to the growth and 





3.3 Interview with Industry Representative 3 (SGX) 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
Interviewee requested for anonymity. For discussion purposes, I will name the 
representative as Mr REP3. 
 
Date of Interview: 30 August 2001 
 
Time of Interview: 4.30 pm - 5.30 pm 
 
Venue: SGX Office 
 
(a) Corporate Governance in General 
- The standard of corporate governance in Singapore is good in the region.  But it is 
not of world-class standards.  It lags behind Australia, U.S. and U.K.  Two reasons 
are the (1) high percentage of ownership by family and (2) the prominence of 
government-linked companies.  For the latter, Mr REP3 explained that some policies 
are more for national interests instead of shareholders.  The situation is aggravated 
by the high presence of interlocks among GLCs.  And because of this, some 
directors are able to influence the decisions of others. 
- SGX performs a variety of roles for corporate governance in Singapore.  For 
example, it (1) checks whether listed companies follow the best practices guidelines 
listed in the Listing Manual; (2) spearheads the committee on the code of corporate 
governance and (3) reviews the disclosure requirements of listed companies.  Mr 
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REP3 noted that while SGX monitors the listed companies, the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore monitors SGX. 
 
(b) Board Structure 
- Using the recently-completed code of corporate governance as a reference point, Mr 
REP3 noted that the code is a set of carefully-thought guidelines.  He admitted that 
companies may be forced to comply with the code.  But he disagreed that the code is 
biased in that in following the code, it is assumed that there will be better outcomes 
for the company. 
- On the issue of independence, Mr REP3 emphasized that independence is a state of 
the mind.  It is better to have a family-related board director who questions/discusses 
during meetings than a non-executive director who sits through the whole meeting.  
While it is fine that the latter may have kept quiet because he is agreeable to the 
CEO or chairman, it is possible that he is afraid/unwilling to speak up.  The worst 
situation will be the case whereby the director is quiet because he "does not know 
what the hell is happening". 
- When asked about the number of independent directors on a board, Mr REP3 
explained that it depends on the place of incorporation.  In the case of Singapore, all 
listed companies must have at least two independent or non-executive directors.  On 
the other hand, independent directors may not be required in other countries. 
- Mr REP3 also confirmed that it is not a rare occurrence in Singapore whereby a 
CEO is not a board member.  Similarly, while very rare, it is also possible that a 
board may not have a chairman.  In such cases, the role of chairman is likely to be 
rotated among the board members. 
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(c) Board Processes 
- Mr REP3 noted that the best theoretical method to study board processes is to 
observe what happens during board meetings.  However, the "sad" thing is that no 
company will allow an outsider to sit in a board meeting for confidential reasons.  
As such, Mr REP3 suggested that the feasible way to study board processes is to 
survey/interview the directors. 
- Adding further, Mr REP3 explained as he has never attended any other board 
meetings except that of SGX, he is not able to comment on board processes. 
 
(d) Board Performance (Board Roles) 
- Mr REP3 noted that the board has a very important role for corporate governance in 
Singapore.  This is because (1) Singapore has limited legal laws (unlike the Class 
Action in U.S.) to protect the shareholders, especially the minority shareholders and 
(2) institutional shareholders are less willing to exercise their rights. 
- When asked about the strategic role of board, Mr REP3 noted that one must be very 
careful.  While there is no debate that strategic direction is the role of board and 
strategic implementation the role of management, strategic planning is a grey area.  
In big companies, it is very likely that the management is heavily involved in 
strategic planning and hence the role of board becomes strategic evaluation.  On the 
other hand, in small companies, directors may be intimately involved in strategic 
planning due to the lack of manpower or the fact that directors have substantial 
stakes in the company.  Either way, strategic decisions in terms of 




- With regard to the board role of monitoring, Mr REP3 noted that directors are to 
monitor the performance of top management and not everyone in the company. 
- On the service role of advice/counsel to CEOs/top management, Mr REP3 
commented that he is not sure about it. 
 
(e) Effective Board 
- Effectiveness can be measured in terms of quantitative and qualitative criteria.  The 
former pertains to financial performance such as ROE, ROA and share price.  Mr 
REP3 said that qualitative criteria is a better measure as quantitative performance is 
dependent on a host of outside factors.  He gave a few examples of qualitative 
yardsticks: (1) whether board has differing views; (2) whether board handles 




3.4  Interviews with Directors  
[As I found a number of similar points given by these four directors, I decided to group 
them into one group]  
 
Name of Interviewees: 
All directors requested anonymity. For discussion purposes, I will name them as Mr 
DIR1-DIR4. 
 
Period of Interview: February 2001 – April 2001 
 
(a) Board Processes 
There appears that there is lots of power politics between boards and management.   
- Mr DIR2 noted that his CEO used to call him at 3 a.m. so that he could go to office 
with the work done for his CEO.   
- Mr DIR1 claimed that in a number of times, his board only endorsed the 
management's decisions.  The management would simply come to the meetings with 
their decisions and "ask for xx millions of dollars".  Non-executive board members 
normally "do not know what is going on". 
 
How the board works depend on a number of factors: 
- Two directors (DIR3 and DIR4) noted that shareholding by Chairman is very 
important.  One of them (DIR4) noted that in many board meetings, board members 
keep quiet and let the Chairman runs the show, as he is the major shareholder of the 
company.  The other director (DIR3), however, noted that there will always be a 
strong man on the board, but this man may not be the chairman.   
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- All directors noted that in most meetings, they got the agendas ahead of time.  But 
whether they read them is another matter. 
- It is possible that conflicts in meetings are deliberately made.  Not all boards aim for 
harmony (DIR3).  The Chairman might want to bring on board someone just to keep 
the pot bubbling over.  Or he could bring in someone who can be an effective 
lobbylist to swing other board members on important and controversial issues. 
- Conflicts are seldom blown-out, because of controlling power by certain board 
members, the importance of "face" and the need to ensure success of company's 
operations (DIR1).  One director (DIR3) noted that board room battles are seldom 
fought over the interests of the shareholders but almost always over preservation of 
self-interests. 
- All four directors agreed that it is better to have a diversity of skills/talents within 
the board.  One (DIR1) however noted that some board members are appointed 
because of necessity - because of laws [e.g. the audit committee must have at least 2 
independent directors] or mergers/acquisitions [the company which is acquired may 
request for a board seat as part of the takeover terms]. 
- All four directors noted that board meetings are highly confidential.  DIR1 noted 
that if one is allowed to sit in for a board meeting, the company will probably need 
to live-telecast or web-cast the meeting.  In this way, the company will not be 




(b) Effective Board 
All also agreed that an effective board is important.  One noted that an effective board 
comes with proper monitoring and service to top management (DIR3).  Another director 
(DIR4) noted that no effective board works to a set of predictive rules regardless of what 




APPENDIX C: SURVEY LETTERS 
1.  Initial Letter 






Request for Participation 
 
I am a part-time student pursuing a PhD degree in the School of Business, National University 
of Singapore. 
 
My dissertation focuses on various aspects of corporate governance of listed companies in 
Singapore.  Corporate governance has become more critical in Singapore as the trading becomes 
more sophisticated, investors become more educated and competition becomes keener.  More 
specifically, for my study, I want to test if any significant relationship exists among board 
structure (e.g. proportion of outsider directors on the board), board processes (e.g. how boards 
decide on a certain strategy) and board performance (e.g. the ability of boards to perform their 
roles/functions). 
 
Hence, I would like to invite you to participate in my study by filling up the enclosed 
questionnaire.  I have interviewed directors and industry representatives for their inputs/advice 
for the questionnaire design.  I believe that the questionnaire is very applicable and relevant in 
the Singapore context. 
 
The questionnaire will take only 5-10 minutes to complete as I recognize that your time is 
valuable.  After completion, please return the questionnaire using the self-addressed envelope. 
All information provided will be aggregated and will be treated in the strictest confidentiality.  I 
will send you a summary report once the data are analyzed. 
  
Looking forward to your kind participation.  For any clarification, I can be contacted at 065-6-
8746399 (O), 065-96818602 (mobile) or e-mail bizongch@nus.edu.sg.  Alternatively, you may 
contact my academic supervisor, Dr David Wan, at 065-6-8743389. 
 






Ong Chin Huat (Mr) 
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2. Reminder Letter 1 






Request for Participation for Study on Board of Directors  
 
My name is Ong Chin Huat. I am a fourth-year PhD student in the School of Business, National 
University of Singapore.  I am currently embarking on my dissertation. About a month ago, I 
sent a survey form to you. I have not heard from you since that time. It is possible that the letter 
did not reach you due to some misplacement in the mail. To facilitate your participation in this 
survey, I am enclosing a second copy of the survey. I shall appreciate it if you can fill it up and 
send it back to me as soon as possible. A self-addressed envelope is enclosed with the survey for 
your convenience. 
 
The information you provide will be held strictly confidential and it will not be used for any 
other purpose besides this particular study. Your participation in the study will be anonymous. I 
hereby formally undertake personal responsibility for maintaining the confidentiality of your 
individual identity and responses. 
 
My research aims to unveil an important aspect of corporate governance of listed companies in 
Singapore.  More specifically, I want to test if any significant relationship exists among board 
structure (e.g. proportion of outsider directors on the board), board processes (e.g. how boards 
decide on a certain strategy) and board performance (e.g. the ability of boards to perform their 
roles/functions).  To make my study relevant to the Singapore context, I have interviewed 
directors and industry representatives for their inputs/advice.   
 
It is possible that the company secretary and other directors from this board may have 
participated in this survey.  However, I hope that you also participate so that I will have a fuller 
view of the board.  The questionnaire takes only about 5-10 minutes to complete. 
 
If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me at 6-874-6399 or 9-6818 
602 or e-mail me at bizongch@nus.edu.sg. Alternatively, you may contact my academic 
supervisor, Dr David Wan, at 6-8743389.  Once again, thank you very much for helping me 









3.  Reminder Letter 2 






Study on Board of Directors  
 
My name is Ong Chin Huat. I am a fourth-year PhD student in the School of Business, National 
University of Singapore.  During the last two months, I have sent mailings about an important 
research study I am undertaking for my PhD dissertation. 
 
Its purpose is to understand the process of boards – that is, how boards in Singapore listed 
companies work.   The research findings, to be provided to all respondents, will serve good 
inputs and understanding of an effective board. 
 
The study is coming to a close, and this is the last contact that will be made.  I hope to hear from 
everyone so that the survey results will be as accurate as possible. The information you provide 
will be held strictly confidential and it will not be used for any other purpose besides this 
particular study. Your participation in the study will be anonymous. I hereby formally undertake 
personal responsibility for maintaining the confidentiality of your individual identity and 
responses. 
 
If you have any questions or comments, I can be contacted at 6-874-6399 or 9-6818 602 or e-
mail: bizongch@nus.edu.sg. Alternatively, you may contact my academic supervisor, Dr David 







Ong Chin Huat (Mr) 
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APPENDIX D: POST-SURVEY INTERVIEWS 
1. Respondent Profile11 
No Name Designation Organization Classification Label  








Industry Rep REP1+ 













































1 listed finance 
company) 
5 Listed Firms 




















4 Listed Firms 
from 
Manufacturing (2), 






Note:  * The number starts from “5” so as to differentiate from the four directors interviewed in the  
 pre-survey phase. 
          + Also interviewed during the pre-survey phase.  
  
                                                           
11 The company secretary and six directors requested for full anonymity while the industry representative 
from SGX allows the organization to be quoted. 
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2. Interview Questions 
Two main aspects are asked: 
a. Are the results similar to your board experience? 
b. What do you think about the idea of having a code of board process in addition to 
the current code of corporate governance?  
 
3. Interview Notes 
These pertain to the gist of the interviews.  The approach is similar to that done 
during the pre-survey phase.  During the interview, I jotted down the points.  To ensure 
freshness of conversation and minimum information loss, I wrote down the interview 




3.1 Interview with Industry Representative 1 (SIAS)  
 
Name of Interviewee: 
Mr David Gerald Jeyasegaram 
President, Securities Investors Association (Singapore) 
138 Cecil Street #06-03 
Singapore 069538 
 
Date of Interview: 9 April 2003 
 
Time of Interview: 3.00 pm – 4.00 pm 
 
Venue: SIAS Office 
 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- Mr Gerald noted that he is not surprised by the lack of relationship between board 
structure and board processes/performance.  It is because board structure is company-
specific.  He noted that before a company is listed, the board would have worked 
together for a number of years.  The board will have working structure before listing.  
When the company is to be listed, the change in board structure, if any, will involve 
the addition of one/two independent directors at most. 
- On the other hand, Mr Gerald advised that one should give time to the recommended 
principles in the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance, especially on the 
separation of CEO/Chairman duties.  He agreed despite the code coming into this 
year, boards with CEO/chairman continue with such a structure.  And the fact that 
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companies is willing to give reasons for not following the recommendation generally 
shows that they are either not ready or feel that this principle is not required.  Either 
way, one must be willing to give time to companies to see whether they will want to 
adopt the code. 
 
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- Mr Gerald noted that he is not surprised by the strong relationship between board 
process and board performance.  It is because how the board works (that is board 
process) will naturally affect the functioning of the board (that is board performance).  
- Mr Gerald felt that a code of board process and/or board performance is a good 
initiative.  But its implementation will be difficult.  No company will ever release how 
the board comes up with the decisions.  Shareholders will not require it too.  What 
shareholders want is that the ultimate decisions made by the companies are beneficial 
to them.  They will not want to bother on the detailed board processes/performance. 
- On the other hand, directors themselves should uphold the importance of board 
process.  They should participate actively in board meetings, contribute to the growth 
of the companies, and possess and use the necessary skills. 
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3.2 Interview with Industry Representative 1 (SID)   
 
Name of Interviewee: 
Mr John Lim Kok Min 
Honorary Secretary, Singapore Institute of Directors 
2 Finlayson Green #07-01/02  
Asia Insurance Building  
Singapore 049247 
 
Date of Interview: 30 April 2003 
 
Time of Interview: 10.30 am – 11.45 am 
 
Venue: SID Office 
 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- Mr Lim noted that in theory, board structure will affect board process to some extent.  
For example, a board with a majority of independent directors will be in a better 
position to monitor the performance of the company and top management.  On the 
other hand, while there is such an opportunity, the independent directors may not have 
the courage to act independently accordingly.  This is in view of our Asian culture that 
courage is often compromised by conflict prevention.  The independent directors may 
not want to be seen as playing the roles of “bad people” – questioning the CEO and 
the management on various issues.  Hence, more often than not, the independent 
directors may be willing to go with the wishes of the CEO. 
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- Mr Lim however cautioned that the above does not mean that the board simply 
“rubber-stamp” management decisions.  Those days are definitely gone.  In the 
growing importance of corporate governance and the willingness of authorities to 
clamp down irresponsible directors, the board members are getting more diligent and 
cautious in their roles. 
- While Mr Lim agreed that board structure does not affect board processes much in 
Singapore context, he dwelled in great lengths the importance of director training as a 
possible reason influencing board process.  He noted that only with education, 
directors will then have the necessary intellect/skill sets to act according to their roles.  
He added that certain skill sets are easy to define.  For example, finance literacy is 
need in an audit committee.  In contrast, some skills, such as business strategy and risk 
management, musts in boards, are lacking.  To Mr Lim, these two skills only come 
with continuous training and experience.  With proper training, board will (1) 
maximize their knowledge for the benefit of the company; (2) realize the importance 
of preparing for meetings; (3) achieve quality debate over business decisions.  On the 
latter, Mr Lim mentioned that it is a mixture of diligence and judgment.  And every 
board needs a balance of both.  In any decision, the “knowns must be made known” 
(diligence) and the “unknowns must be evaluated carefully” (judgment).  Mr Lim 
stressed that without any doubt,  such a process only comes with proper training on a 
continuous basis. 
 
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- With the right processes in place, a board will perform accordingly. 
- Mr Lim however warned that the current and near-future corporate governance 
guidelines will only spell out what needs to be done.  This pertains to the form of 
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corporate governance.  Conformation to the form is easy.  On the other hand, 
practising the process or substance of corporate governance will require a long time.  
Again, Mr Lim emphasized that board processes need a lot of training.  This will 
require a change of mindset 
- Mr Lim welcomed the possibility of a code of board processes.  While it is essential 
and useful for the next stage of corporate governance development, Mr Lim noted that 
such a code should be both (1) generic and (2) flexible enough to fit the requirements 
of individual companies.  At the same time, Mr Lim noted that it will take at least a 
generation for board processes to be fully ingrained in Singapore boards. 
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3.3 Interview with Industry Representative 3 (SGX) 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
Interviewee requested for anonymity. For discussion purposes, I will name the 
representative as Mr REP3. 
 
Date of Interview: 29 May 2003 
 
Time of Interview: 103.0 am – 11.30 am 
 
Venue: SGX Office 
 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- Mr REP3 felt that the study conceptual model provides an excellent theoretical 
overview of corporate governance.  Hence, he believed that board structure should 
affect board process.  If it does not, then Singapore corporate governance may have 
a serious problem.  He explained that it is because the current Singapore corporate 
governance system is “borrowed” heavily from a set of best practices in the West, 
especially the U.S. and U.K 
-  To Mr REP3, meetings are generally cordial in nature.  On the one hand, this may 
mean that the working relationship in the board is good.  On the other hand, it may 
mean that the independent directors are reluctant to create “waves” in meetings.  
Independent directors should see cordial relationship in a bright perspective – in that 
it is easier to bring up questions during meetings.  Mr REP3 added that a possible 
reason for this peculiar characteristic (in that board meetings are cordial) in 
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Singapore/Asia is the large percentage of company ownership in the hands of family 
or government.  As a result, unlike the West, directors in Singapore represent the 
interests of the majority shareholders instead of all shareholders.   
- Mr REP3 emphasized that Singapore corporate governance measures are relatively 
new, and hence it would be fairer to evaluate the current code of corporate 
governance in three to five years.  Should the model be tested five years later, there 
could be a possibility of a stronger relationship between board structure and process. 
 
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- Mr REP3 noted that naturally there should be a relationship between board process 
and board performance.  He added that it is also logical that certain board process 
variables will affect specific board performance measures. 
-  Mr REP3 felt that having a code of board process is not a bad idea.  On the other 
hand, he is not for the word “code”.  The word “code”, though supposedly 
voluntarily, does imbed a sense of jurisdiction.  He noted that the current code of 
corporate governance in Singapore is more like a “rule” in that it requires (1) every 
board to address every principle in the code and (2) the board to give reasons for not 
following the recommendations.  Instead of a code of corporate governance, a better 
term may be a set of best board process practices/guidelines.  At the same time, Mr 
REP3 hoped that it is not a form-ticking exercise.  The substance of corporate 
governance should always be emphasized.  On substance, he noted that there are two 
strongly-related ingredients: whether (1) the directors are honest and (2) the company 
is managed properly.  He coined the idea of engaging outside consultant to assess the 
level of substance of corporate governance.  However, for this idea to succeed, it is 
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necessary to legalize the suggestion as no company in the world would openly 
welcome an outside party to examine the performance of the board. 
  204
 
3.4 Interviews with Company Secretaries/Directors (6 of them) 
 
Name of Interviewee: 
All interview respondents requested anonymity. For discussion purposes, I will name 
them as CoySec1, DIR3, DIR5, DIR6, DIR7 and DIR8. 
 
Period of Interview: January 2003 – March 2003 
 
3.2.1 Interview with CoySec1 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- Mr CoySec1 noted that board structure is generally a set of best practices.  
Independence is a structural characteristic.  Having more independent directors does 
not mean more effective boards. 
- Board structure tends to be of a given structure.  In family-owned companies the 
CEO tends to be the Chairman or a family member of the Chairman.  The Chairman 
will also own the largest chunk of shares though this is changing.  In his company, 
while the board chairman and CEO are different persons, they possess father-son 
relationship. 
- Generally, board structure has limited impact on board processes and board 
performance. 
 
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- Mr CoySec1 noted that in his company, agenda is always given ahead of time.  It is 
his job to ensure this practice.  And he found that over time, certain norms 
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developed. Having agendas ahead of time may seem to be a simple task, but it has 
allowed directors to come to meetings more prepared.   
- Conflicts are minimal in this company board because of the Asian culture.  
- Monitoring is important with the recent U. S. corporate scandals, e.g. Enron case. 
- The chairman of the company has realized the importance of non-executive directors 
and has bought professional directors into the board.  Board meetings have become 
more “consultative”. 
 
3.2.2 Interview with DIR3 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- To quote the words of Mr DIR3, “Board structure is a necessary evil.” Mr DIR3 
pointed out that although board structure does not serve any useful purpose, it is an 
essential requirement.   
-  
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- Board matters are trashed out during Executive Committee meetings.  This is a 
rigorous process, which involves top management and directors.  Instead of starting 
from scratch, board meetings have moved towards concentrating on the 
recommendations of the Executive Committee This saves a lot of time in the 
process.  But Mr DIR3 emphasized that this does not mean that board meeting are 
easier resulting in rubber-stamping of documents.  It is just that board meetings have 
become more focused.   
- Mr DIR3 also stated that board processes are universal.  Certain board processes 
must be present in order for a board to function.  These include discussions and 
debates, coming out with a decision and engaging the skills of various directors.  At 
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times, having a “no” decision at the end of a board meeting is more acceptable than 
not discussing the business issue at all. 
- The presence of certain board norms is useful.  They enable directors to perform 
their given roles better.  Traditionally in his board, the agenda and reports are given 
on the day of the meeting itself.  As such, non-executive directors are not able to 
contribute much. Worse still, they may even look “stupid” at times.  Now, as 
information is given ahead of all meetings, directors are in a better position to 
question the managers of certain decisions. Very often, the non-executive directors 
who sit on other boards bring in fresh perspectives about business issues.  Hence, 
while the traditional role of the board is to ensure proper “checks and balances”, it is 
now more advisory than controlling.  
- Conflicts should be seen in a positive manner.  One is free to agree or disagree for 
board decisions.  This is because conflicts allow various viewpoints and 
perspectives, and are especially important for decisions whereby there is a great 
degree of uncertainty.  A good example is overseas expansion whereby returns are 
never guaranteed and there are often disagreements. 
- It is important to find the right directors with the right skills for the job in a board.  
For example, for a tobacco company, a non-smoker may be a wrong choice.  
Similarly, asking someone with an engineering background for a marketing plan is 




3.2.3 Interview with DIR5 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- Mr DIR5 states that board structure does not matter much.  While non-executive 
directors may check on management, they do not have intimate knowledge of the 
business.  Thus, they can be a hindrance to company vision at times.  Moreover, 
unlike in U.S., professional independent directors are generally few in number 
locally. 
- The concept of independence is also suspicious.  It is difficult for a director to be 
independent especially so when they have the intention of seeking re-appointment.  
Non-executive directors are therefore needed more for legal purposes, for example, 
as members of the audit committee. 
- The CEO can be different from Chairman.  This was no problem as long as the 
company has a “driver”, who is the CEO in Mr DIR5’s case.  A CEO must be able 
to balance the divergence of views between management and shareholders.  For the 
former, it is the perpetuity of their existence in companies.  For the latter, it is 
maximization of their wealth, whether in terms of capital gains and/or dividend 
income.  A good “driver” needs both business acumen (for company performance) 
and moral obligation to staff and shareholders. 
 
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- Board processes is important.  While board meetings are generally cordial, largely 
due to the fact that company is majority-owned by CEO and family, duties of board 
have been quite high in recent years.  This is especially so in view of U.S. corporate 
failures, for example, the Enron case. 
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- Mr DIR5 noted that the days of “rubber-stamping” management decisions are 
definitely over.  Preparation for meetings, agendas and reports are given ahead of 
times and the use of knowledge/skills is constantly happening in boards.  Conflicts, 
especially personal, are minimal, due to the fact that the company is controlled by 
the CEO and the CEO’s family.  Moreover, the company has been performing well 
over the years.  As Mr DIR5 puts it, his company has “no lack of cash”. 
- Good effort norms have developed over the years, leading to the prevalence of 
service in the company. This is particularly so in the areas of law and finance, and 
evaluation of new projects.  Mr DIR5 noted that with non-executive directors going 
through the information, participating actively in meetings and being responsible for 
their work, the CEO and managers obtain valuable advice and feedback. 
- However, the ability of board to perform the roles of monitoring, strategy and 
resource dependence is limited.  As the managerial style is quite steady (cordial), 
strategic direction remains in the hands of the CEO. Access to financial resources 
like loans is not a problem in the company. 
 
3.2.4 Interview with DIR6 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- Board structure, based on theory, is expected to have impact on board processes.  
But in practice and from his experience in Singapore, Mr DIR6 states that it does not 
matter whether there is separation of CEO/chairman duties or a majority of 
independent directors.  In Singapore, most board decisions are under the care of the 
Executive Committee.  In his company, this committee comprises of six board 
members and management staff.  They meet monthly with each meeting averaging 
three hours.   
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- The presence of non-executive directors has put management on their toes.  With 
their industry knowledge, non-executive directors could assess whether strategic 
plans of the company are viable. 
- To be a truly independent, the directors must be appointed by an independent body, 
which currently does not exist in Singapore.  Furthermore, as directors in Singapore 
are closely watched, they will be more cautious.  Mr. DIR6 noted that the days of 
rubber-stamping are over. 
 
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- In most companies, the characteristic of the board chairman will determine the level 
of board processes.  A company whereby the chairman owns the majority of shares 
will likely witness a very low level of board processes.  A company whereby the 
board members are professionals will see a high level of board processes.  Board 
processes take a long time to develop.  The chairman has to set a good example.  He 
has to prepare for the board meeting, engage the directors in meaningful discussion 
and ensure that the board has proper skills and knowledge. 
- Proper documentation of information is stressed in boards.  With the correct 
information at hand, the company can be continuously monitored.  In addition, this 
practice is advantageous to the service role of advising management and strategic 
role in terms of strategy evaluation.  
 
3.2.5 Interview with DIR7 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- Board structure is not an important factor in board performance. 
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- Regarding the issue of non-executive directors, the company has three (a lawyer, an 
accountant and a business associate).  They provide valuable inputs in corporate 
governance but much less in business decisions.   The reasons are that they do not 
want to interfere in company affairs as they are not in the business and it is very 
difficult to comment on business issues.  In addition, operations in the company 
have been smooth running. 
- Mr DIR7 pointed out that it would be wrong to say that independent directors are not 
active members.  While the two independent directors (lawyer and accountant) are 
generally not active in company affairs, especially the day-to-day management, they 
are actually active in corporate governance areas such as auditing, remuneration and 
monitoring the general performance of managers and the company.  The 
independent directors are members of the board’s audit and remuneration 
committees. 
- Board meetings in Singapore are generally cordial in nature, because the company is 
majority-owned by a corporation and well-managed by managers. 
- Most managers were in the company since ten years ago and more often than not, 
possess common understanding of business decisions.  Management meetings 
whereby executive directors are also present occur very frequently, about once every 
two weeks.  In fact, business issues were ironed out before board meetings.  
Carefully thought-out decisions are thus made. 
 
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- As the independent directors are members of the audit and remuneration 
committees, they monitor the performance of the managers and the company.  With 
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their relevant skills in law and finance, the lawyer and accountant could advise the 
CEO and other board members (all with engineering degrees) on such matters.   
- The other non-executive director, the business associate, was brought into the board 
this year as he has good experience in doing business in China.  The business 
associate now handles the company’s expansion plans in Asia. 
- Furthermore, as all three non-executive directors are experts in their respective 
fields, they often provide alternative views for company operations. 
- All directors have to make use of their skills to help the company. 
- In all, Mr DIR7 concluded that board processes have ensured the continual smooth 
performance of company. 
 
3.2.6 Interview with DIR8 
(a)  Relationship between Board Structure and Board Process/Performance 
- To conclude that board structure is unimportant or irrelevant is fundamentally 
incorrect.  Mr DIR8 posed some interesting questions: How to have processes 
without a structure?  How to have quality debate if there are no or few non-executive 
directors?  How to have skills like law and accounting if there are no outside 
professional directors? 
- With the current strong emphasis and relevance of good corporate governance, a 
board size of 10-15 members appears to be appropriate.  Reasons being that there are 
various board committees, such as executive, audit, remuneration, nominating and 
risk management.  For proper checks/balances, it is not logical to have a small board 
or else one will tire out easily. 
- Mr DIR8 sees independent directors as of utmost importance in financial sectors in 
view of the great linkage between financial and other sectors of the economy.  
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However, these directors must be truly independent minded.  The willingness and 
ability to question not only management but also other board members (including 
the Chairman) must be present. 
- In a professionally run board, separation of Chairman/CEO and large number of 
non-executive directors will improve board processes.  From Mr DIR8’s experience 
in various boards, such a board structure has led to quality debate and decisions, and 
better usage of various skills. 
- It may not be advisable for a board to comprise entirely of non-executive directors.  
Having executives to be on board serves three purposes: (1) Listen to collective 
wisdom of board; (2) Provide a channel for management to argue and (3) Allow 
executives to interact actively with non-executive board members. 
- Also it is wrong to assume that family-owned companies and/or smaller-sized 
companies in Singapore have no board process.  Traditionally, in family-owned 
listed companies for example, the non-executive directors are friends of the 
Chairman/CEO.  Board process then was a one-man show.  But then, the structure is 
and will be changing in view of various initiatives by SGX and MAS.  In fact, 
“because they are controlled by family or a major shareholder, they need to be more 
transparent.  Aren’t companies like Osim and Qian Hu family-owned and yet have 
been winning awards for corporate governance?” 
 
(b)  Relationship between Board Process and Board Performance 
- Having good processes will naturally lead to effective board performance. 
- A good board is one whereby members make useful contributions.  Management is 
involved in execution of board decisions.  Board is instrumental in strategic 
directions, policy and decision-making. 
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- In a well-managed company, there are differing views.  This is expected with 




APPENDIX E: RESEARCH MEASUREMENTS IN STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 
1.  General Effort Norms (GEN) – 5 items 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 





1. Board members go through information carefully before meetings. 
GEN1 Wageman, 1995, ASQ 
2. Board members participate actively in meetings. GEN2 Wageman, 1995, ASQ 
3. Board members enjoy their work. GEN3 Shanley & Langfred, 1998, 
PAQ 
4. Board members feel responsible for their work that need to be 
done. GEN4 
Shanley & Langfred, 1998, 
PAQ 
5. Board members are satisfied when work is accomplished well. 
GEN5 
Shanley & Langfred, 1998, 
PAQ 
 
2.  Conflict (Cognitive (CC)  - 5 items; Affective (AC) - 5 items and Process (PC) - 4 items) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 




          Sources: 
1. This board considers viewpoints of different members before 
making final decision. CC1 
Charan, 1998, Boards at 
Work 
2. There are personality clashes among directors in decision-making. 
AC1 Smith, et al., 1994, ASQ 
3. Board members tend to debate on the way things are done. PC1 Jehn,, Northcraft & Neale, 
1999, ASQ 
4. Decisions are always settled amicably. CC2 Jehn, 1995, ASQ 
5. Board members get along together very well. AC2R Smith, et al., 1994, ASQ 
6. Procedures on how work to be done are often disputed during 
board meetings. PC2 Jehn et al., 1999, ASQ 
7. The discussions are open and candid. CC3 Charan, 1998, Boards at 
Work 
8. Board members often feel that work allocated is unfair. PC3 Jehn & Mannix, 2001, ASQ 
9. The board members are always ready to co-operate and help each 
other. AC3R Smith, et al., 1994, ASQ 
10. When final decisions are reached, it is common for at least one 
director to be unhappy with the decision. AC4 Smith, et al., 1994, ASQ 
11. The atmosphere in this board encourages critical thinking. CC4 Charan, 1998, Boards at 
Work 
12. Board meetings often do not result in a clear decision. CC5R Jehn, 1995, ASQ 
13. Relationships among directors are best described as “win-lose”, 
that is, if he/she wins, I lose. AC5 Smith, et al., 1994, ASQ 




 3. Presence (SP) & Use (SU) of Skills - 5 items each 
1 2 3 4 5 





1. Strategic thinking SP1, SU1 Dulewicz et al., 1995, JGM 
2. Analytical thinking SP2, SU2 Dulewicz et al., 1995, JGM 
3. Communications skills SP3, SU3 Dulewicz et al., 1995, JGM 
4. Interaction skills SP4, SU4 Dulewicz et al., 1995, JGM 
5. Management skills SP5, SU5 Dulewicz et al., 1995, JGM 
6. Result-oriented perspective SP6, SU6 Dulewicz et al., 1995, JGM 
 
4.  Board Functions (Monitoring (M)- 10 items, Service (SV) – 5 items, Strategy (ST) - 6 items 
and Resource Dependence (RD) – 5 items) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 




          Sources: 
1. This board monitors top management decision-making. M1 Westphal, 1999, AMJ 
2. Directors provide advice and counsel to top managers in 
discussions outside of board/committee meetings. SV1 Westphal, 1999, AMJ 
3. Board members are aware of environmental trends. ST1 Zahra, 1990, LRP 
4. This board formally evaluates the performance of top company 
executives. M2 Westphal, 1999, AMJ 
5. This board possesses an internal mechanism to evaluate its 
performance yearly. M3 Westphal, 1999, AMJ 
6. This board has outsider directors who possess expertise on skills 
relevant for the company’s operations. RD1 Hillman, et al., 2000, JMS 
7. Each board member is formally assessed by the other directors in 
this board. M4 Westphal, 1999, AMJ 
8. Top managers do not solicit board assistance in the formulation of 
corporate strategy. SV2R Westphal, 1999, AMJ 
9. This board analyses budget allocation against performance. M5 Blake, 1999, Dynamic 
Directors 
10. This board ensures the communications with stakeholders and the 





1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Disagree 





11. This board requires information showing progress (or otherwise) 
against corporate objectives. M6 
Blake, 1999, Dynamic 
Directors 
12. This board benchmarks the strategic plan with industry 
comparative data. ST2 
Blake, 1999, Dynamic 
Directors 
13. This board reviews company performance against strategic plan. 
M7 
Blake, 1999, Dynamic 
Directors 
14. This board takes into account the legitimate interests of 
organizations, groups and individuals (stakeholders) who have a 
direct interest in the achievement of company objectives. SV4 
Dulewicz et al, 1995, JGM 
15. This board receives plans for the implementation of strategy from 
the CEO. ST3 
Blake, 1999, Dynamic 
Directors 
16. This board promotes the goodwill and support of relevant 
stakeholders. SV5 Dulewicz et al, 1995, JGM 
17. Outsider directors provide alternative viewpoints for company 
operations. RD2 Hillman, et al., 2000, JMS 
18. This board is involved in the articulation of the company mission. 
ST4 Zahra, 1990, LRP 
19. This board reviews financial information for important issues and 
trends. M8 
Blake, 1999, Dynamic 
Directors 
20. This board debates on the strategic plan for the company yearly. 
ST5 
Blake, 1999, Dynamic 
Directors 
21. Board members are chosen for their influence in the community. 
RD3 Pfeffer, 1983, ROB 
22. This board identifies the strategic direction for the company 
yearly. ST6 Zahra, 1990, LRP 
23. Outside board members provide channels of communication 
between firms. RD4 Hillman, et al., 2000, JMS 
24. This board is actively engaged in succession planning for the CEO 
of this company. M9 
Shultz, 2001.  The Board 
Book 
25. Outside board members serve as a link to government agencies. 
RD5 Hillman, et al., 2000, JMS 
26. This board is actively engaged in succession planning for the 
other executive officers (besides the CEO) of this company. M10 
Shultz, 2001.  The Board 
Book 
 
 
 
 
 
